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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 What justifies regulatory policy? What are the moral criteria by 
reference to which regulatory choices and institutions are properly 
assessed? These questions have yet to be convincingly answered, or 
so I will argue in this Article. My focus will be legal scholarship, 
since it is legal scholars who, in recent years, have paid the most sus-
tained attention to the problem of justifying regulation—the problem 
of generating a moral theory of regulation in light of which general 
regulatory approaches, specific regulatory decisions, the design of 
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Rob 
Atkinson, Brian Bix, Howard Chang, Eric Posner, and Dan Rodriguez, to participants in 
the Florida State University Law School Symposium on Regulatory Theory and the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School faculty retreat, and to students in Penn’s Topics in Le-
gal Theory course, for their extremely helpful comments. Many thanks, too, to Mark Sei-
denfeld and Heidi Hurd for giving me an opportunity to present drafts of this Article at 
Florida State and Penn. 
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regulatory agencies, and all other aspects of regulation can be evalu-
ated as good or bad, right or wrong. 
 I will say nothing here about positive regulatory theories—
theories that attempt to predict what regulatory outcomes will be, 
given (more or less) simple assumptions about human motivation, 
human beliefs, and so on—except to make the obvious point that no 
positive theory can tell us whether the outcomes it predicts are to be 
embraced or avoided. For example, a positive theory may reliably 
predict that a regulatory agency with jurisdiction over a concentrated 
industry will choose outcomes which inefficiently benefit the indus-
try, at the expense of diffuse and unorganized groups such as con-
sumers or taxpayers. But this prediction is not yet grounds for dis-
mantling or constraining the agency. It is not yet grounds for doing 
anything. 
 Imagine that someone in a position of power over the agency (a 
legislator, an administrator, or the President, for example) has the 
capability to perform an action such that, if the person performs that 
action, the agency will produce an efficient but otherwise morally 
neutral outcome, relative to the outcome that the agency will produce 
if the powerful actor stays her hand. Thus our positive theory pre-
dicts. Then the actor ought to take the action if, and only if, efficiency 
itself has moral import. If it does not—if the efficient cast of an out-
come is not (wholly or partly) constitutive of its goodness or badness, 
rightness or wrongness—then the action will be a matter of indiffer-
ence. For if efficiency is not (wholly or partly) constitutive of goodness 
or badness, rightness or wrongness, then an actor has no more rea-
son to choose one of two outcomes that differ only with respect to effi-
ciency than she has to choose one of two outcomes that differ only 
with respect to other morally trivial properties. The fact that one 
outcome (O1) is more efficient than another (O2) would no more jus-
tify the powerful actor in producing O1 than the fact that in O1 a par-
ticular blade of grass is located at a particular spatio-temporal loca-
tion, and that in O2 it is located somewhere else. But whether effi-
ciency is (wholly or partly) constitutive of goodness or badness, 
rightness or wrongness, is a question of moral theory, not positive 
theory. 
 Does efficiency indeed possess bedrock moral significance? The 
reader may be alarmed at my use of the adjective “bedrock.” If so, she 
should reconsider her alarm. “Bedrock” adds nothing, besides em-
phasis, to “moral significance.” A moral theory purports to identify 
the features of actions or outcomes that possess moral significance 
or, equivalently, bedrock moral significance. Where an actor can 
choose one action (A1) leading to O1 or another action (A2) leading to 
O2, a moral theory purports to isolate the features of A1 and A2, O1 
and O2, such that whether the actor is, all things considered, justified 
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in choosing A1 rather than A2 is a collective function of those fea-
tures. If the features are thus isolated by the theory, then they have 
bedrock significance (within that theory); if not, then they do not. 
 In this Article I will criticize the two types of moral theories of 
regulation that have been most influential within American legal 
scholarship. One type, which I will call “neoclassical,” attributes bed-
rock significance to efficiency. The second type, which I will call “pro-
ceduralist,” does not do so, but instead attributes bedrock signifi-
cance to the procedures by which regulatory agencies reach their de-
cisions. The neoclassical type of theory is epitomized by Stephen 
Breyer’s well-known book, Regulation and Its Reform,1 and is re-
flected in the leading casebooks on regulation.2 The proceduralist 
type of theory includes the “interest representation” theory deline-
ated (if not defended) by Richard Stewart in his seminal article The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law;3 the “civic republican” 
theories defended by Mark Seidenfeld,4 Cass Sunstein,5 and others; 6 
and, most recently, the theory of collaborative governance advanced 
by Jody Freeman.7  
 Neoclassical and proceduralist theories are both flawed; but, as I 
will suggest, it is proceduralist theories, articulated largely in re-
sponse to neoclassicism, that are the most deeply flawed. Efficiency 
does not possess moral significance, but overall well-being does, and 
the two criteria are significantly coextensive. By contrast, govern-
mental procedures, particularly the procedures of regulatory agen-
cies, have no normative significance. Two governmental decisions 
which differ only in the procedures by which they were reached are 
                                                                                                                  
 1. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM  (1982). 
 2. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. HARRISON ET AL., REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (1997); RICHARD J. PIERCE,  JR. ,  ECONOMIC REGULATION:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1994); LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION (6th ed. 1985); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. 
TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1998). 
 3. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law , 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
 4. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 5. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE  (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 
1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival ]; Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-
Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271 (1986); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
 6. See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 801 (1993) (citing sources); see also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorpo-
rating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 76-86 (1998) (same); Note, Civic 
Republican Administrative Theory: Bureaucrats as Deliberative Democrats, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1401 (1994) (same). 
 7. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997). 
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morally identical. Proceduralism, because it says otherwise, is fun-
damentally misdirected. 
 Part II criticizes neoclassical theories. Part III criticizes proce-
duralist theories. Part IV outlines and defends an alternative type of 
theory—a welfarist theory of regulation. A welfarist theory gives 
moral significance (if not conclusive significance) to the criterion of 
overall well-being. Welfarism and neoclassicism may not differ too 
much in their practical implications, but neither are they practically 
indistinguishable. In Part IV I describe some of the noteworthy ways 
in which the recommendations of welfarism and neoclassicism differ. 
 Welfarism is, in effect, refurbished neoclassicism. Efficiency is an 
untenable moral foundation for the practice of regulation, but that 
foundation can be replaced without too much shifting of the structure 
above. Proceduralists and others who properly criticize neoclassicism 
go astray in thinking that regulatory agencies should make a large-
scale, rather than an incremental, shift away from the pursuit of 
economic efficiency. 
II.   NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES OF REGULATION 
A.   Characterizing Neoclassicism 
 By a “neoclassical” theory of regulation, I mean roughly a theory 
grounded in the normative premises of modern welfare economics. 
More precisely, it is a theory with the following two elements: (1) the 
adoption of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as one, if not the only, moral cri-
terion by which to evaluate regulatory choices, policies, and institu-
tions; 8 and (2) the adoption of the preference-based account of well-
being, which holds that whether a particular person is made better 
or worse off by a choice, policy, or institution wholly depends upon 
the extent to which that person’s preferences are satisfied.9 Neoclas-
sical theories are espoused by such classics as Breyer’s Regulation 
and Its Reform10 and Alfred Kahn’s The Economics of Regulation;11 by 
most of the leading legal casebooks on regulation;12 by much law-and-
                                                                                                                  
 8. See, e.g., J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 
(1939); Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of 
Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Proposi-
tions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
 9. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 71-83 (1996) (describing and criticizing the preference-based view 
of well-being held by welfare economics); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE , HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 
113-22 (1996) (same). 
 10. BREYER, supra note 1. 
 11. 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1988).  
 12. See sources cited supra note 2. A similar approach is adopted by one of the leading 
contemporary textbooks on policy analysis. See EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 9-29 (2d ed. 1990). 
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economics scholarship on regulation;13 and by Anthony Ogus’s book 
on regulation,14 which is the most recent attempt by a legal scholar to 
provide something approaching a comprehensive, normative theory 
of regulation. Note that the term “neoclassical,” as I have defined it, 
denotes a class of normative theories, rather than a unique theory. 
Two neoclassicists who agree as to the moral significance of effi-
ciency, and as to the equivalence of welfare and preference satisfac-
tion, may disagree about whether some further moral criterion (be-
sides efficiency) is also relevant in evaluating regulatory choices, op-
tions, and institutions. 15 One neoclassicist may think that the envi-
ronment has intrinsic value, apart from human welfare; another may 
deny that. Or, one neoclassicist may think that the fair distribution 
of welfare, as well as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is an important thing; 
another neoclassicist may be solely concerned with efficiency.16 It is 
certainly not the case that Breyer, Kahn, Ogus, and all the scholars I 
have just styled as neoclassicists adopt the same, unique theory of 
regulation; but it is true, I suggest, that the otherwise divergent 
theories they propose share a common commitment to efficiency and 
to preferences. 
 This is not immediately obvious. It is a matter of interpretation, 
or at least sometimes it is—since the neoclassicist’s commitment to 
efficiency and to preferences is sometimes implicit or even obscured 
rather than laid plain to view.17 Nonetheless, this commitment is 
plausibly inferred from other claims that Breyer, Ogus, and the other 
neoclassicists do make quite explicitly and centrally. Consider the 
“market failure” framework that these scholars adopt, within which 
monopolization and spillovers (externalities) are seen to be two para-
                                                                                                                  
 13. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10 
(2d ed. 1989) (stating that law and economics focuses on the “efficiency” of legal rules, with 
efficiency defined in the Kaldor-Hicks sense as “the relationship between the aggregate 
benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situation”); Chris William Sanchirico, 
The New Efficiency Rationale: An Internal Critique (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author) (“For as long as Law and Economics has played a formative force in legal 
scholarship, its principal mode of analysis has been to evaluate legal rules according to the 
sole criterion of ‘efficiency’: that is, to judge rules by the simple sum of the costs and bene-
fits that they impose on the population without regard to how those costs and benefits are 
distributed among different individuals.”), available at http://www.cstone.net/~csanchir/ 
Taxes2.pdf (visited Oct. 3, 2000). 
 14. ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1994). 
 15. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 32-33 (citing various possible noneconomic rationales 
for regulation); HARRISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 30 (same); KAHN, supra note 11, at 189-
93 (same); OGUS, supra note 14, at 46-54 (same); PIERCE, supra note 2, at 11-50 (same); 
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 79 (same); SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 313-55, 
557-657 (same). 
 16. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the arguable moral relevance of criteria other than 
overall well-being, including perfectionist and distributive criteria). 
 17. But not always. Some neoclassicists explicitly adopt efficiency, in the Kaldor-
Hicks sense, as a criterion for assessing regulatory policy. See, e.g., HARRISON ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 20-25; OGUS, supra note 14, at 29. 
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digmatic failures that justify some kind of regulatory response.18 
Anyone who thinks that the state is prima facie justified in moving a 
market from the price-output point reached under monopoly (Pm), to 
the price-output point reached under competitive conditions (Pc), is 
plausibly interpreted as adopting a commitment to Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency. Why? Because the move from Pm to Pc is necessarily Kaldor-
Hicks efficient, 19 but there is no other plausible moral criterion that 
necessarily counts the move from Pm to Pc as a good thing.20 That 
move is not Pareto-efficient, 21 since the monopolist is made worse off 
by the move. It does not necessarily increase overall well-being, since 
money has (or can have) differential welfare productivity across per-
sons. Although the monopolist’s foregone profits at Pc are less, in dol-
lar terms, than the consumers’ gained surplus, the consumers may 
be wealthier than the monopolist, or otherwise less “productive” at 
converting dollars into welfare, so that Pm is actually welfare maxi-
mizing relative to Pc. Even more obviously, the move from Pm to Pc is 
not necessarily better in light of distributive criteria (egalitarian cri-
teria, for example) since the monopolist may again be poorer in over-
all wealth or welfare than the consumers, or otherwise more deserv-
ing in light of plausible standards for fair distribution. Nor, clearly, 
is it necessarily better in light of deontological criteria, since some 
anti-monopoly policies could move society from Pm to Pc but also vio-
late the monopolist’s deontological rights, or in light of perfectionist 
criteria, since they have no connection at all to human well-being. 
The consumers at Pc have enjoyed a welfare gain that is large 
enough, in dollar terms, to compensate for the monopolist’s welfare 
loss. In short, it is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and that alone explains 
why the state might be prima facie justified in choosing Pc. 
                                                                                                                  
 18. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 15-16, 23; HARRISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 124-65, 
191-94; OGUS, supra note 14, at 30-33, 35-38; PIERCE, supra note 2, at 12-21, 24-32; 
SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 32-34; cf. KAHN, supra note 11 (focusing on monopoly); 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 63-65 (same). 
 19. More precisely, the move is necessarily Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the welfare-
relevant preferences are taken to be those of consumers and producers, see infra Section 
IV.D.2, and if special cases such as “natural monopoly” are placed to one side.  
 20. To quote Richard Posner: 
[W]hen economists say that monopoly is inefficient, they mean inefficient in the 
Kaldor-Hicks or wealth-maximization, not the Pareto, sense. . . . The loss [in 
monopoly] is clear from a wealth-maximization standpoint: the sum of con-
sumer and producer surplus is less under monopoly than under competition. . . 
. Thus a move from monopoly to competition would satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks or 
wealth-maximization criterion for a gain in efficiency. But it would not satisfy 
the criterion of Pareto superiority, because the monopolist would be worse off. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 91-92 (1981). 
 21. One outcome is “Pareto-efficient” or “Pareto-superior,” relative to a second, if at 
least one person is better off with the first outcome and no one is worse off. In that case, 
the second outcome is “Pareto -inefficient” or “Pareto -inferior” relative to the first. If one 
outcome is neither Pareto -inferior nor Pareto-superior to another, the two are “Pareto-
noncomparable.” 
2000]  WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION 247 
 
 A similar point can be made about the identification of external-
ities (spillovers) as a key scenario warranting regulatory interven-
tion. Neoclassicists see externalities as troubling because external-
ities can be Pareto-inferior. If the external costs of an activity are 
large enough, the state of affairs in which the actor performs the ac-
tivity will be Pareto-inferior to some other state in which the actor 
refrains from the activity. Indeed, the link between externalities and 
Pareto-inferiority is inherent in the description of externalities as a 
“market failure”; for what is special about an ideally functioning 
market just is the fact that its outcomes are Pareto-optimal. 22 By con-
trast, it is clear that an ideally functioning market—one in which 
(among other things) actors are perfectly informed, conditions are 
competitive, and all goods are private—may still fail to maximize 
well-being, achieve distributive justice, comply with deontological re-
quirements, or advance perfectionist goals. 
 But neoclassicists do not suggest that an activity which is Pareto-
inferior by virtue of its external costs should be regulated only if the 
regulator arranges or anticipates a side-payment from the cost-
bearers to the actor. Rather, they think (or seem to think) that a Pa-
reto-inferior activity is justifiably regulated without more—without 
the actual payment of compensation to the actor. And this view im-
plies a commitment to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, just like the view that 
a monopolized market is justifiably moved from Pm to Pc even if the 
monopolist is not actually compensated for the move. 
 What about the second component of neoclassicism, the adoption 
of a preference-based account of well-being? The preference-based 
view of well-being is even more deeply entrenched in welfare econom-
ics than the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,23 and often neoclas-
sicists espouse that view quite plainly.24 Where they do not, the view 
can plausibly be inferred from other claims. 
 First, it can be inferred from their adoption of “imperfect informa-
tion” rather than, say, “objective badness” or “failure of pleasure,” as 
a prime scenario where regulation may be justified.25 Consider the 
case where a purchaser (P) is about to buy a good or service (G). If 
the preference-based view of well-being obtains, then regulators jus-
tifiably intervene here, in light of P’s well-being, only if (1) P is im-
perfectly informed about the consequences of buying G, or (2) P is ir-
                                                                                                                  
 22. An outcome is Pareto-optimal if there are no other outcomes relative to which it is 
Pareto-inefficient. 
 23. See sources cited infra note 29 (citing theoretical and applied welfare economists 
who reject Kaldor-Hicks criterion, but who do not generally reject the preference-based ac-
count of well-being). 
 24. See, e.g., OGUS , supra note 14, at 38. 
 25. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 26-28; HARRISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 210-19; 
OGUS, supra note 14, at 38-41; PIERCE, supra note 2, at 32-33; SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra 
note 2, at 34-35. 
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rational. By contrast, the regulatory theorist’s focus on “imperfect in-
formation” would be quite puzzling if the theorist held an objective-
list view of well-being (such that P’s well-being consists in his 
achievement of one or more objective goods, quite apart from his pre-
ferring or not preferring that achievement) or a hedonic view of well-
being (such that P’s well-being consists in his experiencing one or 
more types of pleasurable mental states, quite apart from his prefer-
ring or not preferring that experience). Perfectly informed and per-
fectly rational persons can still fail to realize objective goods or ex-
perience an optimal mix of pleasures, insofar as they just do not care 
about the goods or the pleasures.26 
 Second, the neoclassicist’s commitment to a preference-based view 
of well-being is plausibly inferred from his distaste for paternalism. 
Some kind of antipaternalism, ranging from mild skepticism to fierce 
hostility, is characteristic of virtually all of the scholarship under 
consideration here.27 Note that antipaternalism is one immediate im-
plication of a preference-based view of well-being. On that view, if P 
prefers the state of affairs which results from his buying G to the 
state which results from his not buying G, then government’s pater-
nalistic intervention to prevent P from buying G cannot make him 
better off. By contrast, on an objective-list or a hedonic view of wel-
fare, governmental intervention in the teeth of P’s preferences can 
still be welfare improving for P. A certain kind of antipaternalism 
may follow from objectivism—if the objectivist counts autonomy as 
one of the goods constitutive of welfare–but the link to anti-
paternalism is less fundamental here than within a preference-based 
view. 
B.   Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency: Does It Have Moral Significance?  
 So much for my interpretive claim that Breyer, Ogus, and the 
other neoclassicists are committed to (1) Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a 
moral criterion (if not the only criterion) by which to evaluate regula-
tory choices, policies, and institutions and (2) a preference-based ac-
count of well-being. What is wrong with these commitments? Let me 
                                                                                                                  
 26. It might be objected that objective goods are those goods that all persons, under 
conditions of perfect information and rationality, would prefer—and thus that perfectly in-
formed and rational persons would realize objective goods. See infra text accompanying 
note 151. I would respond by noting, first, that objective goods are those things that pe r-
fectly informed and rational persons would restrictedly prefer, i.e., prefer for themselves; a 
perfectly informed and rational person could act contrary to her own welfare and deny her-
self objective goods. Second, even in the case where preferences are “restricted”—where ac-
tion is self-interested—a perfectly informed and rational person will have a prima facie 
preference to realize objective goods, but may prefer, all things considered, to realize her 
own, idiosyncratic conception of welfare. See infra Section II.C. 
 27. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1, at 33-34; OGUS , supra note 14, at 51-53. But see 
SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 35. 
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start with efficiency, since I think the commitment to efficiency is 
more deeply mistaken than the commitment to preferentialism. 
There is (as we shall see) a large grain of truth in preferentialism, 
but the thought that Kaldor-Hicks has normative import is plain 
wrong.28 These days, theoretical welfare economists generally reject 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a standard for ranking social states.29 And 
the considerations against efficiency as a moral criterion were fully 
articulated in the legal literature almost twenty years ago, in contri-
butions by Ronald Dworkin,30 Jules Coleman,31 Mark Kelman,32 and 
others. 33 Nonetheless, the efficiency criterion lingers on in the works 
of neoclassical regulatory theorists, and more generally in much of 
law and economics. It thus bears repeating just why Kaldor-Hicks ef-
ficiency should be removed from our normative vocabulary. It lacks 
the basic status of Pareto-efficiency, overall well-being, distributive 
considerations, deontological requirements, and (perhaps) perfection-
ist value. 
1.   Putative Defenses of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
 Consider the following putative defenses of Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency, which at one time or another have been presented by econo-
mists or legal scholars. First, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is sometimes 
linked to overall well-being.34 But it is clear that the two can di-
                                                                                                                  
 28. For a more compact argument defending the related point that cost-benefit analy-
sis lacks normative import, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 187-94 (1999). 
 29. See, e.g., ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS  96-101 (1984); 
Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, A Review Article: The Case Against the Use of the 
Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 CANADIAN J. ECON. 471 
(1990); Stephen Coate, Welfare Economics and the Theory of Project Evaluation (April 
1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). For a frank rejection of the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion by a leading textbook in applied welfare economics, see COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 6 (Richard Layard & Stephen Glaister eds., 2d ed. 1994), which states, “[T]here 
is no ethical justification for the Hicks-Kaldor criterion; where compensation will not be 
paid there seems no alternative to interpersonal comparisons of the value of each person’s 
gains and losses.”  
 30. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980). 
 31. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 509 (1980). 
 32. See MARK KELMAN, A G UIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-50 (1987). 
 33. See generally Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
(1980); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 34. This seems to be the suggestion in J.R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income, 
7 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 105, 111 (1940), which states, “This [the Hicks criterion] would seem to 
be quite acceptable as a definition of increase in real social income.” Anandarup Ray has 
also suggested a link to welfare:  
Even though compensation tests are often claimed to be the foundation of tradi-
tional cost-benefit analysis, it is perhaps more sensible to interpret the tradi-
tional approach in a different way. If the gains and losses accruing to individu-
als are regarded as equal from the social point of view, then the [sum of com-
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verge,35 as I suggested above in my discussion of the regulation of 
monopoly. A simple illustration of the divergence between Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency and overall well-being is the following. One so-called 
exchange economy (S1) consists of a fixed stock of private goods (G1, 
G2 . . . Gn) plus an allocation of those goods to various persons. The 
total amounts of the goods are G1*, G2* . . . Gn*. A second exchange 
economy (S2) consists of the same goods (G1, G2 . . . Gn); however, the 
total amounts in this economy are G1+, G2* . . . Gn*, and G1+ is bigger 
than G1*. In other words, the two economies have identical stocks of 
goods except that S2 has more of G1. 
 Then S2 is necessarily Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to S1 be-
cause, whatever the actual allocation in S1 and S2, the goods in S2 
could always be reallocated (if reallocation were costless) to match 
the allocation in S1, leaving a surplus equaling the difference be-
tween G1+ and G1*. Surely, however, the move from S1 to S2 does not 
necessarily increase overall well-being. For example, assume that in 
both economies all of the goods G2 . . . Gn are allocated to a single in-
dividual Rich; in S1 the stock of G1 is divided equally among persons; 
but in S2 all of good G1 is allocated to Rich. Then a shift from S1 to S2 
will decrease overall well-being, despite the acquired surplus, if it is 
the case that G1 (like many goods) has declining marginal utility and 
the surplus (the difference between G1* and G1+) is not large enough 
to offset the declining marginal utility of G1. More generally, unless 
all of the goods have a constant (rather than declining or increasing) 
marginal utility that is the same amount for all persons, the shift 
from S1 to S2 will not be necessarily welfare improving, even though 
it is necessarily Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 36  
                                                                                                                  
pensating variations] measure would represent actual, rather than potential, 
changes in welfare. 
ANANDARUP RAY,  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGIES 26 (1984); see 
also ROBERT SUGDEN & ALAN WILLIAMS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 93-95 (1978) (suggesting that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and distributional jus-
tice are different dimensions of “social welfare”); cf. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, 
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (rejecting utilitarian defense of 
wealth maximization). 
 35. See David Copp, The Justice and Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 THEORY & 
DECISION 65, 74-77 (1987) (arguing that a project with net monetary benefits can decrease 
overall well-being); Peter Railton, Benefit-Cost Analysis as a Source of Information About 
Welfare, in VALUING HEALTH RISKS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION 
MAKING 55, 67-69 (P. Brett Hammond & Rob Coppock eds., 1990) (same). 
 36. The disjunction between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and overall well-being is now 
widely recognized in the literature on welfare economics. For example, that disjunction is 
typically part of the case for the use of “distributive weights” in cost-benefit analysis, i.e., 
weighting factors that adjust an individual’s monetary valuation of a governmental or 
regulatory project so as to reflect his marginal utility of money, or to reflect distributive 
considerations. See BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 29, at 271-91 (advocating distributive 
weighting); AJIT K. DASGUPTA & D.W. PEARCE,  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:  THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 57-69 (1972) (same); D.W. PEARCE & C.A. NASH, THE SOCIAL APPRAISAL OF 
PROJECTS: A TEXT IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 27-38 (1981) (same); RICHARD O. ZERBE JR. 
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 Second, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is sometimes linked to Pareto-
efficiency, via the claim that the surplus created by a particular Kal-
dor-Hicks efficient move can or will be redistributed through the tax 
system, making the move universally beneficial. 37 This claim is con-
fused. Imagine that S1 is a world where the regulator fails to initiate 
a particular regulatory policy, that S2 is a world with the policy, and 
that S2 is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to S1. S2 has two variants, 
S2* and S2+. In S2*, the taxing authorities engage in Paretian redis-
tribution38 of the surplus created by the move from S1 to S2; in S2+ 
they do not.39 Why, now, is S2 morally better than S1 ? If the variant 
of S2 that obtains is S2*, then we have a clear answer: S2* is Pareto-
efficient relative to S1. But if the variant of S2 that obtains is instead 
S2+, then the question remains unanswered. The fact that S2* is 
morally better than S1 by virtue of being Pareto-efficient hardly ex-
plains why S2+, which is a different world than S2*, and which is not 
Pareto-efficient relative to S1, is also morally better than S1. 
 To put the point another way, the fact that a policy is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient relative to the status quo merely entails that the pol-
icy could be transformed into a Pareto-efficient move via an ideal-
                                                                                                                  
& DWIGHT D. DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 236-53 (1994) 
(same); see also COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 29, at 6 (“[Unless one dollar is equally 
valuable to all parties concerned], there are only two alternatives: to use some system of 
distributional weights or simply to show the net benefits to each party and let the policy 
maker apply his own evaluation.”). 
 37. This seems to be the suggestion in Kaldor, supra note 8. See also E.J. MISHAN, 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 170-71 (4th ed. 1988) (“[T]here exist within Western societies 
economic institutions—such as progressive tax systems and welfare payments systems—
which act over time to translate a potential into an actual Pareto improvement.”); PEARCE 
& NASH, supra note 36, at 28 (“While ensuring [through application of the Kaldor-Hicks 
test] that we reach some position on the welfare frontier, we may use taxation and income 
supplementation as policy instruments to move along the frontier to our chosen distribu-
tion of income (citation omitted).”); SUGDEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 92 (“A project 
that satisfies the potential Pareto improvement criterion is one that the government can 
use, in conjunction with tax changes, to make everyone better off.”). Louis Kaplow and Ste-
ven Shavell have also relied on the “surplus” rationale: 
[M]oving to the efficient legal rule with an appropriate change in the income 
tax leaves all individuals equally well off but leaves the government with a 
surplus. With this additional revenue, the government can make each individ-
ual better off—for example, by lowering taxes by a fixed amount for each indi-
vidual or by spending the funds on a public good that benefits everyone. 
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, THE EFFICIENCY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM VERSUS THE 
INCOME TAX IN REDISTRIBUTING INCOME 5 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working 
Paper No. 4457, 1993). 
 38. By “Paretian” redistribution, I mean a redistribution from those who are better off 
in S2, as compared to S1, to those who would otherwise be worse off, such that the resulting 
outcome is in fact Pareto-superior to S1, i.e., everyone is better off. 
 39. There are a host of reasons, including corruption, administrative expense, democ-
ratic constraints, the absence of statutory authorization, and many others, that might pre-
vent Paretian redistribution by the taxing authorities. The sheer fact that S2 is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient relative to S1 does not guarantee that a Paretian redistribution will take 
place, since Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is defined in terms of hypothetical, not actual, redistri-
bution from winners to losers. 
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ized, cost-free, lump-sum tax system. If a particular Kaldor-Hicks ef-
ficient policy will in fact be transformed into a Pareto-efficient move 
through the tax system (that is, we will move from S1 to S2*), then 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is superfluous in explaining the moral at-
tractiveness of the policy; that is more straightforwardly explained 
by the unimpeachable criterion of Pareto-efficiency. Conversely, if a 
particular Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy will not be transformed into a 
Pareto-efficient move (that is, we will move from S1 to S2+), then 
something besides the Pareto criterion is needed to explain why the 
policy is a good thing.40 
 Third, Kaldor-Hicks is sometimes defended through the notion of 
a long-run Pareto improvement.41 The idea, here, is not that the sur-
plus from a particular Kaldor-Hicks move will be redistributed 
through the tax system, but that any particular Kaldor-Hicks move 
is part of a package of Kaldor-Hicks improvements such that this 
package is, collectively, better for everyone. To put the idea most 
crisply and plausibly: a general governmental (regulatory) practice of 
Kaldor-Hicks evaluation is Pareto-efficient relative to other prac-
tices. 
 There are a number of difficulties here. To begin with, the long-
run or practice-level justification of Kaldor-Hicks does not constitute 
a full defense of Kaldor-Hicks as a moral criterion, since it fails to 
explain why one-off Kaldor-Hicks changes—changes that are effi-
cient but occur in a world where no practice of Kaldor-Hicks evalua-
tion exists, or where the existing practice does not reach such 
changes—are a good thing. More seriously, the claim that the prac-
tice of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation is necessarily or actually Pareto-
efficient relative to other practices is simply untrue. One reason is 
                                                                                                                  
 40. As Amartya Sen has explained: 
There is a real motivational tension in the use of the logic of compensation for 
reading social welfare. If compensations are actually paid, then of course we do 
not need the compensation criterion, since the actual outcome already includes 
the paid compensations and can be judged without reference to compensation 
tests . . . . On the other hand, if compensations are not paid, it is not at all clear 
in what sense it can be said that this is a social improvement . . . . The compen-
sation tests are either redundant or unconvincing. 
Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 947 (2000); 
see also RAY, supra note 34, at 25 (“Unless decisionmakers can ensure that all project bene-
fits are redistributed at no cost (in which case the Kaldor criterion is redundant), the link 
between potential welfare [in the sense of the Kaldor test] and actual welfare is not 
straightforward.”). 
 41. This idea is formalized in A. Mitchell Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Crite-
ria, 86 Q.J. ECON. 407 (1972). E.J. Mishan also makes the “long-run” argument: 
[E]ven though it may be the case that for each change sanctioned by the [poten-
tial] Pareto criterion a number of people will be made worse off, a succession of 
such changes is not likely to inflict losses on the same group. Over time, there-
fore, there can be a presumption that everyone or nearly everyone will be made 
better off by consistent application of the Pareto criterion. 
MISHAN, supra note 37, at 171. 
2000]  WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION 253 
 
that particular persons may suffer large losses in particular rounds 
of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation, such that the gains they reap in other 
rounds are not substantial enough to make them net winners from 
the overall practice. Consider, for example, the hardly unrealistic 
case where a Kaldor-Hicks efficient decision (perhaps the decision of 
an environmental, health, or safety agency) causes grave physical 
harm or death to a few persons. Those persons could well be better 
off in a world where agencies follow a practice of Pareto-evaluation 
rather than Kaldor-Hicks evaluation and generally decline to issue a 
regulatory directive unless the outcome produced by that directive is 
truly Pareto-efficient relative to the status quo.42 
 The attribution of Pareto-efficiency to the practice of Kaldor-Hicks 
evaluation is also false for a more subtle reason. There is a whole 
range of evaluative practices that governmental and regulatory 
agencies could follow other than Kaldor-Hicks evaluation and its sa-
lient alternatives (like Pareto-evaluation). Agencies could follow 
stranger alternatives such as approving projects only if they generate 
a certain kind of welfare benefit, or only if they benefit persons in a 
particular part of the country, and so on. But of course a practice of 
Kaldor-Hicks evaluation will not be Pareto-efficient relative to all al-
ternatives. For example, if Joe Smith is a person, then the regulatory 
practice of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation will not be Pareto-efficient rela-
tive to the regulatory practice of making those and only those deci-
sions that benefit Joe Smith, since Joe will be better off under this 
latter practice than under Kaldor-Hicks evaluation! 
 In short, there is a “Pareto-frontier” of regulatory practices along 
which practices are Pareto-noncomparable with each other, as well 
as an “interior” area of regulatory practices where each practice is 
Pareto-inferior to some practice on the frontier. Even if the practice 
of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation lies on the frontier, the criterion of 
Pareto-efficiency can at most explain why that practice should be 
chosen over certain “interior” practices, but not why it should be cho-
sen over noncomparable practices (like the Joe Smith practice) that 
also lie on the frontier or that lie in the interior but are noncompa-
rable with the Kaldor-Hicks practice. The long-run argument is not a 
defense of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency simpliciter? a defense against all 
alternative regulatory practices? but is at best a defense of that 
practice against a particular set of alternatives: namely, those prac-
                                                                                                                  
 42. This practice would not be well-defined unless the “status quo” outcome were de-
fined, but presumably that could be done with reference to the action/inaction distinction 
(the status quo is the outcome in which the agency fails to act), or with reference to some 
common law baseline (the status quo is the outcome in which the set of legal rights, duties, 
and so on, is closer to the set defined by traditional property, contract, tort, and criminal 
law). 
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tices compared to which the Kaldor-Hicks practice is truly Pareto-
superior. 
 Fourth, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is sometimes linked to Pareto-
efficiency by introducing risk or uncertainty.43 The general idea 
seems to be that a Kaldor-Hicks change can prove (ex ante) Pareto-
optimal once individuals or the government have probabilistic rather 
than perfect information. But a simple example will suggest that 
probabilistic considerations do not reliably support the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion. Imagine a project that will affect ten people, five men and 
five women, producing some welfare benefit worth $200 for each of 
the ten persons and some welfare setback worth $300 for five of the 
ten persons. The defender of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency might argue 
that each of the ten persons calculates the expected net monetary 
impact of the project upon himself or herself as $50, so that the pro-
ject is, ex ante, a welfare improvement from the point of view of each 
person and therefore, ex ante, Pareto-efficient.44 
 But this argument is spurious. First, although the project is nec-
essarily Kaldor-Hicks efficient (since $2000 is greater than $1500), 
each person will not necessarily calculate his or her expected net 
gain from the project as $50. P1 might have good grounds for the as-
sessment that his risk of falling in the losing group is 90%. Similarly, 
if one person is a woman and it can be accurately predicted that four 
of the five women will be losers, then (knowing nothing more) the ex-
pected impact of the project upon her is -$40 ((80% ?  -100) + (20% ? 
200)). The point here is that it takes much more than Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency plus risk or uncertainty to ensure that the project is, ex 
ante, a welfare improvement from the point of view of each person; it 
takes a particular pattern of probability assessments as well. Absent 
that particular pattern, we are still left without any defense, ex ante 
or ex post, of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. 
                                                                                                                  
 43. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 41. 
 44. The argument would be that each person, not knowing who will suffer the set-
back, would estimate the impact of the project on her welfare thus: 
 
Probability Possible Outcome 
of Project 
Weighted Value of 
Outcome 
50% -$100 -$50 
50% +$200 +$100 
Total Expected Value of Project: +$50 
 
In other words, she will consider she has a 50% chance of coming out $200 ahead and a 
50% chance of coming out $100 behind. Thus the expected value of the project is $50. If 
each person is risk -neutral, each should count this project as an ex ante welfare improve-
ment. 
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 Second, even if we put this point aside, the putative risk-based or 
uncertainty-based linkage from Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to Pareto-
efficiency remains hazardous. Assume that each person in the exam-
ple just described adopts the same estimate of his or her chances of 
benefit and setback from the project: 100% chance of a $200 gross 
gain, 50% chance of a $300 gross setback, and thus an expected net 
gain of $50. So the project is, ex ante, welfare improving from the 
point of view of each person (at least on the simplifying assumption 
that each person is risk-neutral). This hardly implies that govern-
ment should expect the project to be universally beneficial and, on 
those Paretian grounds, choose the project. After all, government 
knows for sure that there will be persons who are made worse off by 
the project—namely, the five unidentified persons who will in fact 
lose $100 net. So the project is not, ex ante, an unequivocally good 
thing, from the point of view of government or of any other “observer” 
who takes into account the well-being of all ten persons. In short, the 
project is not, ex ante, Pareto-efficient; it would only be, ex ante, Pa-
reto-efficient if government (incorrectly) expected that everyone 
would end up with a net gain from the project. Nor of course is it, ex 
post, Pareto-efficient, since in fact five persons end up losing. Thus 
the Pareto criterion provides no reason to choose the project. 45 
 To generalize: Even if the right pattern of probability assessments 
transforms a Kaldor-Hicks project into a project that is welfare-
improving from the point of view of each affected person, such a pro-
ject can still fail to be either ex ante or ex post Pareto-efficient. It can 
be clear ex ante, to a regulatory agency or some other government in-
stitution, that at least one person (not fully identified) will be 
harmed on balance by a government policy—that the policy will not 
be universally beneficial. This is true even if each person rationally 
expects to be a gainer and even if government has no further infor-
mation ex ante than that available to each and all of the affected per-
sons. For this important reason, among others, the putative link from 
Kaldor-Hicks to Pareto-efficiency, via risk or uncertainty, is a spuri-
ous one.46 
 In the example just considered, the Kaldor-Hicks move at stake 
was a small-scale regulatory choice of one option over another, rather 
than a large-scale social choice of one regulatory practice over an-
other, such as the practice of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation over the prac-
tice of Pareto or “Joe Smith” evaluation. However, my analysis ap-
                                                                                                                  
 45. This line of argument is advanced by John Broome, who claims that ex ante 
valuations of the risk of death are an inappropriate basis for cost-benefit analyses of gov-
ernmental projects that cause death. See John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. 
ECON. 91 (1978). 
 46. The defender of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency might use risk or uncertainty to draw a 
link from that criterion to the concept of consent, rather than to Pareto -superiority. This 
strategy is discussed and criticized below. 
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plies equally to the case of choosing practices. If one practice (P1) is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to a second practice (P2), and if infor-
mation is probabilistic rather than perfect, it is still only contingently 
true that P1 is, ex ante, welfare improving from the point of view of 
each person affected by the practices. And even if this is true, it may 
still be the case that P1 is neither ex post nor ex ante a Pareto im-
provement. If at least one person loses from the practice, and if gov-
ernment has sufficient information to expect that, then P1 is not uni-
versally beneficial either ex ante or ex post. 
 Fifth, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is sometimes defended by refer-
ence to considerations of “consent.”47 The least plausible version of 
this defense runs as follows: since (1) the winners’ gains from a Kal-
dor-Hicks move could be redistributed to the losers, producing a uni-
versal benefit, and since (2) everyone would consent to the Kaldor-
Hicks move together with the Paretian redistribution, we can con-
clude that (3) everyone would consent to the Kaldor-Hicks move. Just 
because everyone would consent to the Kaldor-Hicks move plus Pare-
tian redistribution (S'), and S' is related to the Kaldor-Hicks move 
alone (S) via a certain transformation (the redistribution), it hardly 
follows that everyone would or should or does consent to S. 
 A much better version of the consent-based defense of Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency builds upon the idea, discussed above, that the in-
troduction of risk or uncertainty can transform an individual’s 
evaluation of a Kaldor-Hicks move. Consider the following argument 
for the Kaldor-Hicks criterion: (1) A Kaldor-Hicks move48 is, ex ante, 
welfare-improving from the point of view of each affected person; (2) 
every person would consent to a move that is, ex ante, welfare-
improving for her; and, therefore, (3) every person would consent to a 
Kaldor-Hicks move. One problem with this syllogism, already men-
tioned, is that a Kaldor-Hicks move may not be, ex ante, welfare-
improving from the point of view of each affected person; that de-
pends upon the pattern of probability assessments, and any a priori 
or conceptual link between Kaldor-Hicks and a particular pattern is 
spurious. But let us put that issue aside. Assume that, as it happens, 
all of the following are true of a particular Kaldor-Hicks move: (a) the 
move is not ex post a Pareto improvement, since at least one person 
will end up losing from it; (b) government does not believe ex ante 
that the move is a Pareto improvement, since (given its probability 
assessment) government believes that at least one person will lose 
                                                                                                                  
 47. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 20, at 88-115; Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in 
VALUES AT RISK 31, 34-36 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical 
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 487, 491-95 (1980). 
 48. “Move” here could be a small-scale decision or a large-scale move from one regula-
tory practice to another. 
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from the project; and (c) each person, given her information, counts 
the move as an ex ante welfare improvement for her, and govern-
ment knows that. The interesting question here is whether govern-
ment has moral grounds to approve the move—grounds consisting in 
the fact that each person would consent to the move—even though it 
is neither ex ante nor ex post a Pareto improvement. 
 I think not, although the question is clearly not an easy one. If 
everyone affected actually consents to the move—if an actual con-
tract is signed by all, or if the move is universally approved in a ref-
erendum—then there are moral grounds in favor of the project. Ac-
tual consent has moral force. But it is not clear that hypothetical con-
sent does. 49 To begin with, it is clear that hypothetical consent does 
not have the same moral force as actual consent. For example, if I 
would or should contract with you to the effect that I do A if you do 
B, and you do B, then the grounds for forcing me to do A or pay dam-
ages are surely weaker than if I actually had contracted to do A upon 
your doing B. 
 Further, in the case of the hypothetical consent to a Kaldor-Hicks 
move that flows from probabilistic information, it is not clear why 
hypothetical consent should have any moral force. Suppose a person 
(P) is, ex post, a loser from the Kaldor-Hicks move, but as a result of 
risk or uncertainty, P’s ex ante assessment (if P were to make such 
an assessment) would be that the move would produce an expected 
gain for him. P does not actually consent to the move, but he would 
do so if the question were raised in a scenario of social contracting. 
Why should this sway government in favor of the move? Note that P’s 
hypothetical consent to the move is partly uninformed; he would ap-
prove it only because he is ignorant of the fact that it will end up 
harming him. In short, the best version of the consent-based argu-
ment for Kaldor-Hicks appeals not to actual consent, nor to fully in-
formed hypothetical consent, but to partly uninformed hypothetical 
consent, and thus is hardly compelling, even in the empirically con-
tingent case where the partial information available to each actor 
makes the project seem an expected gain for her. 
 Sixth, the Kaldor-Hicks standard is sometimes defended as a 
workable decision procedure. The idea is that Kaldor-Hicks offers a 
clearer and easier way for agencies, courts, applied economists, 
and/or legal scholars to evaluate governmental choices (as compared 
to direct evaluation of governmental choices in light of a full social 
welfare function) and that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency tracks the true so-
cial welfare function sufficiently well to be a viable proxy.50 This is 
                                                                                                                  
 49. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
2203, 2305 (1992) (contrasting moral force of actual and hypothetical consent). 
 50. See Arnold C. Harberger, Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: 
An Interpretive Essay , 9 J. ECON. LIT. 785, 796 (1971) (presenting three “basic postulates” 
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quite plausible.51 But it fails to answer the question under considera-
tion now: is Kaldor-Hicks a normative (specifically, a moral) crite-
rion?52 
 A theory of regulation starts from a normative framework with 
reference to which regulatory policies, choices, institutions, and deci-
sion procedures can be assessed. In order to know whether Kaldor-
Hicks is a “good” or “viable” or “appropriate” decision procedure—
that is, in order to assess the claim that it generally produces “good” 
or “good enough” outcomes, that its decisional “costs” are “low,” that 
it is unlikely to be “misused” by practitioners, and so on—we need 
criteria for appraising the goodness and badness of outcomes, the 
existence and level of costs, and the fact and extent of misuse. And 
even if this is denied—even if we somehow can intuitively “know” 
that Kaldor-Hicks is a normatively appropriate decision procedure 
without knowing what the criteria for normative appropriateness 
are—the point remains that justified decision procedures and 
normative criteria are distinct. A given standard can constitute a 
justified decision procedure without constituting a normative 
criterion, and vice versa. Neoclassicism is the view that posits 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as one (if not the only) basic normative 
criterion. The question at hand is whether Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
indeed has this status; and to characterize it as a viable decision 
procedure is simply to switch debates. 
 Seventh and finally, the defense of the Kaldor-Hicks standard is 
sometimes married to a certain moral skepticism, in particular a 
skepticism about the possibility of interpersonal welfare compari-
sons.53 This was certainly true of the original defense of the standard, 
set forth by the economists Kaldor, Hicks, and Scitovsky.54 They pro-
posed the hypothetical-compensation standard in a milieu where 
overall well-being was thought to be indeterminate or unknowable,55 
and as a way to rank Pareto-noncomparable states without making 
interpersonal welfare comparisons. But as I shall argue at greater 
                                                                                                                  
as the answer to a need for a set of standards, and arguing they provide a basis for “a 
professional consensus on procedures”). 
 51. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 194-243 (defending cost-benefit analy-
sis as a justified decision procedure in light of the moral criterion of overall well-being). 
 52. On the difference between decision procedures and moral criteria, see DAVID O. 
BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS  216-17 (1989). 
 53. It is unclear to me whether Richard Posner is still committed to the Kaldor-Hicks 
standard, but if so, that commitment is now wedded to a kind of moral skepticism. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY passim (1999) (at-
tack on moral theorizing); id. at 235 (equating “normative economics” and “cost benefit 
analysis”). 
 54. See Hicks, supra note 8; Kaldor, supra note 8; Tibor de Scitovsky, A Note on Wel-
fare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941).  
 55. See Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J. 
635 (1938) (articulating a skeptical view about interpersonal welfare comparisons). 
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length below, the criterion of overall well-being is neither indetermi-
nate nor unknowable. Modern theoretical welfare economists, unlike 
Kaldor and Hicks and their contemporaries, are generally not skep-
tics about the possibility of interpersonal comparisons. 56 
 In any event, even if such skepticism were warranted, the leap to 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion would be unjustified. We would still need 
an affirmative argument why, given two Pareto-noncomparable 
states, the one that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient is better. I have tried to 
show that no such argument is forthcoming; thus skepticism about 
interpersonal comparisons, if warranted, would simply warrant us in 
a general skepticism about the normative comparability of Pareto-
noncomparable states via judgments of “overall well-being” or “Kal-
dor-Hicks efficiency”—or anything else. 
 My argument against the moral significance of Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency concludes here. That Kaldor-Hicks lacks moral importance is, 
as I have said, hardly a novel point. It is a point ably articulated in 
the legal literature.57 But scholarly appeals to the Kaldor-Hicks 
standard—explicit appeals or, as in the case of some neoclassicists, 
implicit appeals—have not ceased, and so the point bears the empha-
sis and elaboration that I have given it. Further, it should be under-
lined that someone who rejects the moral importance of Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency (as I do) need not reject it for all the various reasons pre-
sented by its past critics. The argument against Kaldor-Hicks pre-
sented here is, in significant ways, different from and more modest 
than the arguments previously advanced by scholars who oppose that 
standard or, more generally, law and economics. 
2.   Some Spurious Criticisms of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
 Note what I have not said in criticism of Kaldor-Hicks. To begin 
with, I have not criticized Kaldor-Hicks for sometimes leading to an 
indeterminate ranking of social states. This is the so-called Scitovsky 
paradox: it is possible for one social state (S1) to be Kaldor-Hicks effi-
cient relative to another (S2), while at the same time S2 is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient relative to S1.58 The Scitovsky paradox is closely re-
                                                                                                                  
 56. See, e.g., BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 29, at 137-69. The so -called Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare function is routinely employed by modern welfare economists as 
a criterion for evaluating social states; it assumes interpersonally comparable utilities. See 
id. But see Robert A. Pollak, Welfare Comparisons and Situation Comparisons, 50 J. 
ECONOMETRICS  31, 31 (1991) (claiming that “most economists think interpersonal compari-
sons are nonsense”). 
 57. See sources cited supra notes 30-33. 
 58. See Scitovsky, supra note 54. For textbook discussions, see, for example, BOADWAY 
& BRUCE, supra note 29, at 96-101; YEW-KWANG NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS: INTRODUCTION 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC CONCEPTS 59-66 (1980). A more precise formulation of the 
Scitovsky paradox is as follows. Given two states, Si and Sj, where Si is the status quo and 
Sj is an alternative, let us say that the Winners in Si are those persons who are better off 
in Si than Sj; that the Losers in Si are those persons who are worse off in Si than Sj; that 
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lated to another phenomenon, often discussed in the legal litera-
ture—the fact that P’s “willingness to pay” to gain a good does not 
necessarily equal what he would be “willing to accept” in compensa-
tion for its loss.59 That is, a person’s preferences as between various 
goods can change as her total wealth changes. And sometimes the 
critics of Kaldor-Hicks have argued that, because of the Scitovsky 
paradox, Kaldor-Hicks cannot be a true moral criterion.60 But this 
criticism is unpersuasive. 
 The Scitovsky paradox means that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does 
not enable a “complete” ranking of social outcomes such that each 
outcome is better, worse, or precisely equal to every other. But so 
what? Genuine moral criteria do not necessarily enable complete 
rankings of social outcomes. For example, the criterion of overall 
well-being does not: if one social state (S1) is a little more pleasurable 
for one person (P1) than a second state (S2), but S2 allows a second 
person (P2) to accomplish his professional goals a little better than 
S1, then S1 may be neither better, nor worse, nor precisely equal to 
S2 in light of overall well-being. It may instead be welfare-
incomparable. Similarly, if S1 decreases the cumulative deviation 
from average welfare relative to S2, but S2 decreases the cumulative 
deviation from the welfare of the richest person relative to S1, then 
S1 and S2 may be neither better, nor worse, nor precisely the same 
with respect to the criterion of equality.61 Indeed, the point that true 
normative criteria need not enable complete rankings of states 
should have been obvious from an examination of the Pareto crite-
                                                                                                                  
the Winners in Sj are those persons who are better off in Sj than Si; and that the Losers in 
Sj are those persons who are worse off in Sj than Si. Note that the Winners in Si are just 
the same persons who are the Losers in Sj, and that the Losers in Si are just the same pe r-
sons who are the Winners in Sj. So there are really only two relevant categories of persons, 
who can be referred to as the Winners, those who benefit from a change in the status quo 
(the Winners in Sj/Losers in Si) and the Losers, those who lose from a change in the status 
quo (Losers in Sj/Winners in Si). 
 What Scitovsky pointed out was this: It is possible for states S1 and S2 to exist, with S1 
the status quo and S2 the alternative, such that (1) there is a reallocation of goods in S2 
from the Winners to the Losers that makes at least one person better off in S2 and no one 
worse off, as compared to S1; and yet (2) there is a reallocation of goods in S1 from the Los-
ers to the Winners that makes at least one person better off in S1 and no one worse off, as 
compared to S2. See id. 
 59. See generally Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. 
Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993). 
 60. For an example of this criticism within the legal literature, see Coleman, supra 
note 31, at 518-20; within the theoretical literature on welfare economics, see BOADWAY & 
BRUCE, supra note 29, at 96-101; within the literature on applied welfare economics and 
cost-benefit analysis, see PEARCE & NASH, supra note 36, at 28-31; and within the philoso-
phical literature, see HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 9, at 96. 
 61. See infra text accompanying notes 158-61 (arguing that outcomes can be incompa-
rable with respect to welfare and other moral criteria, and citing sources); see also LARRY 
S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 19-52 (1993) (suggesting that cumulative deviation from average 
welfare and cumulative deviation from the welfare of the richest person are, inter alia, 
possible conceptions of equality). 
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rion; where P1 is better off in S1, and P2 is better off in S2, neither 
state is better than, worse than, or precisely equal to the other with 
respect to Pareto-efficiency, since some S3 can be Pareto-efficient 
relative to S1 but not S2. 
 Nor have I tasked Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for running afoul of the 
“incommensurability” of diverse goods. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and 
its cousin, cost-benefit analysis, have been roundly criticized for re-
ducing all the various impacts that governmental choices can have to 
dollar- or resource-equivalents. These criteria involve the “pricing” of 
physical safety, friendship, environmental preservation, sexual ful-
fillment, and other such “priceless” goods, or so the criticism goes. 62 
For reasons I have articulated at length elsewhere,63 I think the “in-
commensurability” criticism of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or of cost-
benefit analysis fails. If Kaldor-Hicks efficiency did track something 
of basic importance about outcomes—long-run Paretianism, expected 
Paretianism, consent, or whatever—neither incommensurability nor 
the Scitovsky paradox would preclude counting Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency as a normative criterion and operationalizing it through the 
cost-benefit procedure. 
 Finally, I have not faulted Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for running 
afoul of “rights” (deontological criteria), equality, perfectionist values, 
overall well-being, or any other normative criteria distinct from Kal-
dor-Hicks that the critic might posit. To be sure, one state (S1) can be 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to another (S2) even though S2 is bet-
ter in light of rights, equality, perfectionist values, and so on. Then 
again, S3 can be better than S4 in light of rights, even though S4 is 
better in light of equality. And S5 can be better than S6 in light of 
equality, even though S6 is better in light of overall well-being. Dis-
tinct moral criteria can conflict; that is exactly what makes them dis-
tinct. Unless our moral framework is assumed to be a monistic one—
and why should we assume that?64—the fact that a proposed moral 
                                                                                                                  
 62. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS  190-216 (1993); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Plato on Commensurability and Desire, in LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: 
ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 106 (1990); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES 115-22 (1996); Lester B. Lave, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed 
the Costs?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED:  GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM 
REGULATION 104, 113 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, In-
commensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 782-85 (1994). 
 63. See Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1371, 1401-17 (1998). 
 64. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1990) (arguing 
against monism). 
 65. “Outcomes” here are total world-histories. If outcomes are taken instead to mean 
discrete states of affairs, then the preference-based view claims that P is intrinsically bene-
fited by an outcome (thus defined) if, and only if, he prefers it. On this ambiguity in the no-
tion of an outcome or state, see Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 202 n.97. 
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criterion can conflict with another, accepted criterion, is no grounds 
for rejecting the proposal. 
 The fact that I do not fault Kaldor-Hicks efficiency on the grounds 
of incompleteness (Scitovsky reversals), incommensurability, or po-
tential conflict with other criteria will become significant when I pre-
sent my own theory of regulation, the welfarist theory. Such criti-
cisms could be leveled against welfarism, just as they have been lev-
eled against Kaldor-Hicks; but they are effective against neither. 
C.   The Preference-based View of Well-being 
 So much for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the first component of neo-
classicism. What about the second component, the preference-based 
view of well-being? There are strong grounds for rejecting a straight 
preference-based view. It is less clear whether the best alternative is 
(1) a modified preference-based view, or (2) an objective-list view 
with some minimal role for preferences. I tend to think that the most 
persuasive theory of well-being is the first, a modified preference-
based view. This is less of a departure from neoclassicism than the 
second alternative, objectivism, but the difference will be sufficiently 
significant for regulatory purposes that it merits delineation. 
1.   Problems with the Preference-based View 
 What’s wrong with the straight preference-based view of well-
being? The view is that a person (P) is benefited by one outcome (S1) 
as compared to another (S2), just in case P prefers S1 to S2.65 One 
large problem is that preferences can be motivated by a range of con-
siderations, including but not limited to P’s welfare.66 A preference is 
simply a ranking of world-states or, perhaps, a ranking that is con-
ceptually connected to the actions of the person who holds the prefer-
ence.67 In either case, P’s grounds for the ranking can be anything 
that motivates him to count one outcome as better than the other. 
                                                                                                                  
 66. This difficulty with the straight preference-based view of well-being is widely rec-
ognized within the philosophical literature on well-being. See SUMNER, supra note 9, at 
134-35; John Broome, Choice and Value in Economics, 30 OXFORD ECON.  PAPERS 313 
(1978); Allan Gibbard, Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good, and the Intrinsic Re-
ward of a Life, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 165, 173-75 (Jon Elster & 
Aanund Hylland eds., 1986); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest and the Concept of Self-
Sacrifice, 10 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 105 (1980); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of 
the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977); David 
Sobel, On the Subjectivity of Welfare, 107 ETHICS 501 (1997). 
 67. On the nature of a “preference” and the possible conceptual connection between 
preference and choice, see, for example, S.L. HURLEY,  NATURAL REASONS : PERSONALITY 
AND POLITY 55-83 (1989); PREFERENCES (Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels eds., 1998); 
Richard Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Wel-
fare, 19 PHIL. & PUB.  AFF. 158, 161-64 (1990); Arthur Ripstein, Preference, in VALUE, 
WELFARE, AND MORALITY 93-111 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1993). 
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 For example, P might rank S1 over S2 on moral grounds. Thus he 
may prefer S1 because he believes that equality is of prime moral 
significance and S1 advances the value of equality better than S2, or 
because he believes that the environment is intrinsically valuable 
and S1 is better than S2 in that regard, or because S2 involves some 
action of his that he takes deontological constraints to prohibit. Al-
ternatively, P might rank S1 over S2 by virtue of some relationship he 
has. Thus, he may believe that S1 is better for the welfare of some 
friend or relation of his and, although P is personally indifferent be-
tween the two outcomes, choose S1 out of loyalty. Or, the ranking 
might be grounded in a role of P’s: perhaps P is an American, or a 
Jew, or a teacher, and it is constitutive of that role to prefer S1 to S2. 
Finally, P might rank S1 over S2 for reasons of nonmoral goodness: it 
does not matter to his life whether S1 or S2 occurs, but S1 is better, 
say, in light of aesthetic values.68 
 There are surely some kinds of motivating reasons such that, if P 
is motivated to rank S1 over S2 by virtue of these kinds of reasons, he 
is indeed typically made better off by S1. Call such reasons welfare-
productive. We might agree that self-interested reasons are welfare-
productive: if P prefers S1 to S2 on the grounds of his own welfare, 
then he is typically better off if S1 occurs. We might also think that 
reasons concerning certain objective welfarist goods are welfare-
productive: if P prefers S1 to S2 on the grounds that S1 involves more 
fun for him, or a more genuine accomplishment, or a deeper involve-
ment with important others, then P is typically better off if S1 occurs. 
 However one delineates the category of welfare-productive rea-
sons, it is implausible that all reasons motivating preferences are 
welfare-productive. The straight preference-based view insists that 
moral reasons, relationship-based reasons, role-relative reasons, rea-
sons of nonmoral goodness, and all other considerations that might 
motivate P to prefer or rank S1 over S2 are welfare-productive. But 
why think that? To begin with, it is counterintuitive. More seriously, 
it is ungrounded; there is nothing in the possible connection between 
preference and choice, or in the general desiderata of a theory of 
well-being, to move us even prima facie towards thinking that all 
preference-motivating reasons are welfare-productive. As for the 
connection between preference and choice, people can certainly 
choose options that have no personal benefit or are personally detri-
mental. As for the general desiderata of a theory of well-being, it is 
certainly plausible that preferences are a necessary condition for a 
welfare improvement (P cannot be made better off by S1 over S2  
unless, inter alia, he prefers S1 to S2), but it is a logical mistake to 
                                                                                                                  
 68. The possible disjunction between welfare and preference satisfaction in the kind 
of cases just described is discussed at length in David Sobel, Well-Being as the Object of 
Moral Consideration, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 249 (1998). 
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leap from this plausible point to the conclusion that preferences are 
both necessary and sufficient for a welfare improvement (P is made 
better off by S1 over S2 just in case he prefers S1 to S2), which is what 
the straight preference-based view of welfare says.69 
 A second problem with the straight preference-based view of well-
being is that preferences can be uninformed, unreflective, nonauto-
nomous, or otherwise nonideal.70 A person may, for example, prefer 
smoking to abstinence; were she fully informed about the damage 
that smoking does to her internal organs, she would prefer absti-
nence. Another person may prefer building a house on the mountain-
side lot that she owns to leaving it bare. She knows that the moun-
tainside is part of a rare, old-growth forest, but not having fully de-
liberated on that point, she still prefers to build. Only if the 
information about the forest were integrated with her other, back-
ground information and with her background commitments, values, 
and goals, would she come to prefer an undeveloped lot. 
 One standard view in the philosophy of well-being is that “ideal” 
conditions for preference formation are simply the conditions of full 
information and deliberation,71 but it is not clear whether this is 
right.72 For example, suppose a person (P), who was horribly abused 
as a child, prefers to torture cats. He retains this preference notwith-
standing full information about the pain that his actions cause the 
suffering animal, and notwithstanding all the deliberation of which 
he is capable. Yet it seems counterintuitive that the world is made 
better, even pro tanto, when P tortures a cat. To resist this conclu-
sion, one might characterize P’s preferences (albeit fully informed 
and deliberate) as nonautonomous, in the sense that he lacks the ca-
pacity to revise his preferences, or in the sense that the set of prefer-
ences which are possible for him is not sufficiently large, or in the 
sense that his preferences are rooted in a particular sort of upbring-
ing, or in some such related sense. 
2.   Alternative Theories of Well-Being 
 I see two theories (more precisely, families of theories) of welfare 
that are responsive to the problems with the straight preference-
based view just described and yet retain enough of that view to re-
                                                                                                                  
 69. See Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 197-204 (distinguishing between the claim 
that preference satisfaction is necessary for welfare and the claim that preference satisfac-
tion is both necessary and sufficient for welfare, and defending the former). 
 70. See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 9, at 156-71. 
 71. See David Sobel, Full Information Accounts of Well-Being, 104 ETHICS 784, 792 
n.15 (1994) (noting the prevalence of full-information accounts of well-being within phi-
losophical scholarship and citing sources). 
 72. See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS  45-46 (1987); SUMNER, supra note 
9, at 162-71. 
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main plausible accounts of what makes a life go well. 73 The hedonic 
view of welfare—equating welfare with pleasurable sensations and 
the absence of painful sensations—“solves” these problems at the 
significant cost of excluding preferences from the picture entirely. 
Even if hedonism were amended to make joint reference to pleas-
ure/pain and preference satisfaction, the problem would remain that 
we can prefer for ourselves, and benefit from, much more than the 
presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. Objectivism that counts 
hedonic sensations as one entry on a larger list of objective goods74 is 
surely an improvement over straight hedonism, but it falls to the 
criticism that no amount of objective goodness in one state (S1) over 
another (S2) can make S1 better for a person (P) unless P prefers (or 
at least comes to prefer) S1. 
 This leaves the following candidates. 
Sophisticated Preferentialism: P is better off with S1, as compared 
to S2, just in case (1) P prefers S1 over S2; and (2) P would prefer S1 
over S2 under ideal conditions; and (3) P’s preference and ideal 
preference are suitably restricted. 
Sophisticated Objectivism: P is better off with S1, as compared to 
S2, just in case (1) P does better in S1, in light of the totality of ob-
jective welfare goods (friendship, accomplishment, community in-
volvement, fun, pleasure, and so on); and (2) P prefers S1 over S2. 
How exactly the notion of “ideal conditions” should be specified is a 
matter for further debate among sophisticated preferentialists. A 
parallel point can be made about the goods identified as “objective 
welfare goods” by sophisticated objectivists, and about the grounds 
for thus identifying them. This is the sense in which these are fami-
lies of welfare theories rather than specific theories. Note that both 
kinds of theories are sensitive to the criticism I leveled above against 
simple objectivism—namely, P cannot be made better off in the teeth 
of his actual preferences. This is the key insight behind the straight 
preference-based view. It is incorporated into sophisticated preferen-
tialism and sophisticated objectivism by making P’s actual preference 
for an outcome a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for that out-
come to improve his well-being. 
 What about the choice between sophisticated preferentialism and 
sophisticated objectivism? Both are plausible, but which is the 
uniquely right theory or kind of theory? This is a difficult question. 
Sophisticated preferentialism, as here articulated, contains a large 
                                                                                                                  
 73. See generally JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 7-72 (1986) (discussing different theo-
ries of well-being, specifically hedonic, preference-based, and objectivist views); DEREK 
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493-502 (1984) (same); SUMNER, supra note 9 (same). 
 74. For plausible examples of such lists, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90 (1980); GRIFFIN, supra note 73, at 67-68; and GEORGE SHER, 
BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 199-201 (1997). 
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and embarrassing lacuna: the failure to state just how preferences 
should be “restricted” such that thus-restricted preferences, and only 
those, are welfare productive. Filling the gap by requiring that pref-
erences be “self-interested” or that they “concern P’s life” would be 
circular; these formulations, in effect, define the class of “restricted” 
preferences by reference to their effect on welfare, yet it was the very 
concept of welfare that sophisticated preferentialism was trying to 
explain through the notion of restricted preferences. 
 Mark Overvold has developed a noncircular account of restricted 
preferences.75 Roughly, P’s preference for an outcome is welfare-
productive for P if the outcome entails P’s existence. But this runs 
afoul of the objection that various morally required outcomes can en-
tail P’s existence, and be preferred by him on moral grounds, without 
benefiting him.76 (Imagine the case where P, who has committed 
wrong, prefers that he suffer because he believes retributivism about 
punishment to be true.) Other philosophers have, in less detail, pro-
posed accounts of preference restriction different from Overvold’s, 
but these accounts, too, have troubling and maybe fatal flaws.77 
 On the other hand, sophisticated objectivism may not be able to 
avoid the problem of restricting preferences. That problem is superfi-
cially avoided through the incorporation of objective goods, where 
each good constitutes a criterion for ranking outcomes and, for each 
pair of outcomes, specifying those persons who have fared better or 
worse as between the two. (So, for example, the value of “fun” would 
tell us whether a given outcome is more fun for anyone and, if so, for 
whom.) But the avoidance may be superficial. If the objectivist sim-
ply gives us a list of objective goods, we can protest that a mere list is 
ad hoc. What are the grounds for placing various goods on the list?78 
And if the objectivist tries to ground his list in collective or normal 
preferences of some sort (as many working in value-theory now try to 
do), we are back to the problem of restriction. 
 Quite apart from all this, sophisticated objectivism is vulnerable 
to the criticism that it is conformist. If “objective values” for a given P 
                                                                                                                  
 75. See Mark Carl Overvold, Morality, Self-Interest, and Reasons for Being Moral, 44 
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 493, 499-501 (1984); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest 
and Getting What You Want, in THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 186 (Harlan Miller & Wil-
liam H. Williams eds., 1982); Overvold, supra note 66, at 117-18 n.10.  
 76. See Sobel, supra note 66, at 505-06 (criticizing Overvold’s theory on this and other 
grounds). 
 77. See id. (generally discussing and criticizing attempts to “restrict” preference, i.e., 
to identify some subset of welfare-productive preferences). 
 78. L.W. Sumner has made this objection:  
The particular items on Finnis’s list [of objective goods] do not matter for our 
present purposes; what does matter is that he has no account to offer of what 
makes something (anything) a source of our welfare—what gains it a place on 
the list—if this does not depend on our attitudes or concerns. 
SUMNER, supra note 9, at 46. 
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are specified as the things that P would prefer under ideal condi-
tions, then sophisticated objectivism is not an alternative to prefer-
entialism. But if “objective values” are specified more narrowly, then 
(seemingly) it becomes impossible for P to benefit by an idiosyncratic 
or contrarian way of life, since such a life is one that is good for P 
only in being endorsed by him and in no other way. 
 I tend to think that sophisticated preferentialism is on balance a 
better welfare view than sophisticated objectivism, and that the 
problem of preference restriction—which clearly bedevils the first 
view, if not the second—will eventually be solved. Further, preferen-
tialist views are much more widely adopted by modern philosophers 
and other contemporary scholars doing rigorous work on the nature 
of well-being.79 Finally, sophisticated preferentialism is closer to neo-
classicism than sophisticated objectivism, and it thus represents a 
less dramatic change in prevailing theories of regulation. For all 
these reasons, the remainder of this Article is written on the premise 
that sophisticated preferentialism (not sophisticated objectivism) is 
the correct account of well-being. That premise will be of some sig-
nificance in Part III, where I criticize so-called proceduralist theories 
of regulation; and it will be of particular importance in Part IV, 
where I turn from my criticism of neoclassicism and proceduralism to 
defend my own, novel theory of regulation, which I call “welfarism.”  
III.   PROCEDURALIST THEORIES OF REGULATION 
A.   Characterizing Proceduralism 
 I use the term “proceduralist” to mean a moral theory of regula-
tion which accords intrinsic significance, not merely instrumental 
significance, to the fact that a regulatory agency followed or failed to 
follow some specified type of procedure. In other words, a procedural-
ist theory stipulates that the moral status of a regulatory choice is a 
function of criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn, where at least one Xi is a procedural 
criterion in that it refers not to the legal content of the directives is-
sued by regulators, nor to the broader social context in which those 
directives are issued, but specifically to the decisionmaking processes 
that the regulators traversed (or failed to traverse) in issuing the di-
rectives. The most significant body of theoretical work on regulation, 
other than neoclassicism, consists of theories that are (or at least are 
plausibly understood as) proceduralist. Under this rubric I include 
traditional and modern variants of pluralism, civic republican theo-
                                                                                                                  
 79. See Sobel, supra note 71, at 792 n.15 (“[A] truly impressive and diverse list of con-
temporary ethicists have found [some kind of desire-based or preference-based] account of 
well-being congenial.”). 
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ries, and negotiated rulemaking or collaborative governance theo-
ries. 80 
 The pluralists, the civic republicans, and the collaborative-
governance theorists clearly direct their attention to the procedures 
by which regulatory policies are enacted and advocate certain proce-
dural alternatives while criticizing others. This common feature of 
these theories does not yet demonstrate them to be proceduralist—as 
I have defined that term—because it is possible that their concern for 
procedural forms is instrumental, not intrinsic. The pluralist might 
simply think that a process of self-interested bargaining among 
groups is the best way to effect the substantive moral criteria that 
govern regulatory choices: criteria such as welfare maximization, the 
equalization of welfare or the opportunity for welfare, and the promo-
tion of the environment or other perfectionist values. Similarly, the 
civic republican’s commitment to public-spirited deliberation about 
the common good might be grounded in the contingent and empirical 
claim that deliberation produces “good” or “right” laws and other 
regulatory directives, with “good” or “right” specifiable solely in 
terms of the legal content of the directives plus general social con-
text, and not in terms of the decisionmaking processes that were 
used to formulate the directives. 81 And the collaborative-governance 
theorist might advocate regulatory procedures characterized by “[a] 
problem-solving orientation,” “[p]articipation by interested and af-
fected parties in all stages of the decision making process,” 
“[p]rovisional solutions,” “[a]ccountability that transcends traditional 
public and private roles in governance,” and “[a] flexible, engaged 
agency”82—to use Jody Freeman’s list of procedural desiderata—on 
purely instrumental grounds. 
 But there is significant textual evidence that at least some plural-
ists, civic republicans, and collaborative-governance theorists do 
have a noncontingent and nonempirical attachment to regulatory 
procedures—in short, that they are proceduralist, as I have defined 
that term. 83 Note further that proceduralism constitutes a distinctive 
                                                                                                                  
 80. See sources cited supra notes 3-7. 
 81. One author has noted: 
[It is open to] question whether civic republicanism defines the public good pro-
cedurally or substantively. If defined substantively, the common good is akin to 
a right answer, and it implies a politics that emphasizes deliberation in order 
to ensure higher-quality decisionmaking. If defined procedurally, the public 
good . . . implies a politics that emphasizes participation so that each citizen 
has the opportunity to experience self-government. 
Note, supra note 6, at 1404. 
 82. Freeman, supra note 7, at 22-23. 
 83. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 7, at 27 (“[P]articipation in regulatory problem solv-
ing by interested and affected parties has an independent, democratic value.”); Gey, supra 
note 6, at 810 (claiming that civic republicans define virtuous outcomes as those that result 
from selfless, collective deliberation); Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 1514 (“[Under civic re-
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type of moral theory of regulation, while instrumentalism does not. 
Instrumentalism about a given procedure (to be plausible) presup-
poses some prior and independent theory of the criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn 
applicable to regulatory choices; for it would only be plausible to say 
that a given procedure has the empirical tendency to produce out-
comes that are better with respect to a given set of criteria. It would 
not be plausible to suggest that a given procedure has the tendency 
to produce outcomes that are better with respect to the correct set of 
criteria whatever that set happens to be. 
 For these reasons, I will generally focus in this section upon the 
proceduralist construal of pluralism, civic republicanism, and col-
laborative-governance theory. Bargaining, deliberation, or collabora-
tion can be defended instrumentally, but that possibility will be kept 
in abeyance until it becomes clear why proceduralism fails. Further, 
I will launch a global attack on proceduralism, an attack which is 
meant to target all its variants, including the pluralist variant that 
takes bargaining to be of intrinsic importance, the civic-republican 
variant that takes deliberation to be of intrinsic importance, and the 
collaborative-governance variant that takes a certain kind of collabo-
rative engagement by the regulatory agency and interested parties to 
be of intrinsic importance. Readers of the legal scholarship on regula-
tion are well accustomed to civic-republican arguments against plu-
ralism, 84 to collaborative-governance arguments against civic-
republicanism, 85 and to other scholarship that criticizes one or more 
procedural forms only to conclude by favoring another. My approach 
will be less discriminating and, therefore, less familiar. Procedural-
ists of all stripes have made a common mistake, and their theories 
are equally flawed, since the moral criteria governing regulatory 
choice do not include procedural criteria—or so I will now try to 
show. 
B.   The Defense Based on Moral Skepticism 
 What’s wrong with proceduralism? Let me flip the question 
around: How might proceduralism, of any kind, be defended? First, 
the proceduralist might be a moral skeptic. She might think that 
                                                                                                                  
publicanism] government’s primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate 
about altering preferences and to reach consensus on the common good.”); id. at 1535 
(“Some commentators have even suggested that participation in determining the identity 
of the political community is itself a good, thereby rendering civic republicanism inherently 
as well as instrumentally valuable.”) (citing sources); SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 35 (“A dif-
ferent conception of autonomy places an emphasis on the freedom of collectivities or com-
munities—a freedom embodied in decisions, reached by the citizenry as a whole, about 
what courses to pursue. . . . An important form of freedom may consist in precisely these 
processes of collective self-determination.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 1533-34. 
 85. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 7, at 19-21. 
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regulatory choices cannot be evaluated as morally better or worse, 
right or wrong—that where the regulator has the option of choosing 
one of two outcomes (O1 or O2), any statement to the effect that the 
regulator is truly morally obliged to choose O1 (because O1 maximizes 
welfare, or equalizes welfare, for example) is nonsense. There is cer-
tainly a flavor of skepticism in some versions of pluralism, 86 which 
originated at a time when logical positivism87 and legal realism 88 
were ascendant, and when many philosophers and other intellectuals 
indeed denied the existence of moral truth. The argument from skep-
ticism to pluralism that pluralists (at least traditional ones) some-
times seem to advance goes roughly like this:  
(1) there is no objective moral standard by which to assess gov-
ernmental choices; 
(2) rather, statements purportedly describing choices as better or 
worse, right or wrong, simply express the subjective preferences of 
the speaker; 
(3) more generally, human actions can be fully explained by refer-
ence to the preferences and beliefs of actors, with no need to invoke 
moral criteria or anything else beyond preferences as the driving 
force behind actions; and therefore 
(4) all that is true, and all that needs to be true, of governmental 
choices is that they result from a process of bargaining between 
self-interested actors, each seeking to maximize her preferences 
given her beliefs.89 
 This argument is both unsound and invalid. It is unsound because 
the first two premises are untrue. There are objective moral stan-
dards applicable to governmental choices and other human actions; 
statements attributing moral obligations, permissions, and so forth, 
to governmental actors are meaningful, sometimes true, and need not 
merely express the preferences of the speaker. A persuasive case 
against moral skepticism, and in favor of moral cognitivism, has been 
                                                                                                                  
 86. As Richard Stewart observes: 
Implicit in [the interest-group model of administrative law] is the assumption 
that there is no ascertainable, transcendent ‘public interest,’ but only the dis-
tinct interests of various individuals and groups in society. Under this assump-
tion, legislation represents no more than compromises struck between compe t-
ing interest groups. . . . In the extreme form of this view, there is no objective, 
independent yardstick by which one can measure the content of compromise; 
compromises are legitimated by the process of their negotiation. . . . Pluralist 
political theory may be regarded as a translation into collective terms of the 
principle of subje ctivity of individual values. 
Stewart, supra note 3, at 1712 & n.206 (citing ARTHUR FISHER BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF 
GOVERNMENT (1908), and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951)). 
 87. See, e.g., ALFRED J. AYER, LANGUAGE , TRUTH AND LOGIC (1936). 
 88. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE , 1927-1960 (1986). 
 89. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1671-76; see also ARTHUR FISHER BENTLEY, THE 
PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). 
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presented by a number of contemporary philosophers working in 
metaethics, including Michael Moore,90 David Brink,91 Michael 
Smith,92 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,93 John McDowell,94 and others. 
Cognitivism is probably now the dominant (if not exclusive) position 
in philosophy;95 the skeptical consensus characteristic of the era of 
logical positivism is surely long past. But even if the demise of moral 
skepticism were unwarranted, and the initial premises of the argu-
ment just sketched were true, the problem would remain that the in-
ference from those two premises plus the third to the pluralist-
proceduralist conclusion is be mistaken. The three premises merely 
imply the following: (4)* all that is true of governmental choices is 
that they result from a process of bargaining by self-interested ac-
tors. The premises do not additionally imply that governmental 
choices need to, ought to, or should result from a bargaining process. 
In fact, the premises imply the opposite: if in general objective moral 
criteria do not exist, then in particular the objective moral criteria 
that might require a bargaining process do not exist, and the pur-
portedly objective statement that governmental choices need to, 
ought to, or should result from such a process is nonsense. The only 
kind of statement, objectively, that the moral skeptic-cum-pluralist is 
permitted by her own skepticism to utter is a positive statement 
about the kinds of governmental processes that do or will occur, 
namely (4)*.96 Normative pluralism grounded upon skepticism is self-
defeating. 
 More generally, any kind of proceduralism founded upon skepti-
cism is self-defeating. Skepticism denies that moral truths exist, and 
it construes moral claims as playing the “expressive” role of articulat-
ing the speaker’s preferences, or some other such non-truth-stating 
role.97 But then the claim that governmental actors are morally 
                                                                                                                  
 90. See, e.g., Michael Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation , 58 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 277 (1985). 
 91. See BRINK, supra note 52. 
 92. See MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM (1994). 
 93. See Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence, in ESSAYS 
ON MORAL REALISM 256 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988). 
 94. See John McDowell, Values and Secondary Qualities, in MORALITY AND 
OBJECTIVITY 110 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985). 
 95. See generally Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends, in 
MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 3 (Steven Darwall et 
al. eds., 1997) (providing overview of contemporary metaethics, in particular the debate be-
tween cognitivists and noncogntivists). See also BRINK, supra note 52 (same); DAVID 
MCNAUGHTON, MORAL VISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1988) (same); Smith, supra 
note 92 (same). 
 96. Or objective conditionals. That is, if you want government to do X, then you want 
it to follow a particular procedure, since that procedure leads to  X. 
 97. See, e.g., Darwall, et al., supra note 95, at 17 (“Most noncognitivists are expressiv-
ists: they explain moral language as expressing moral judgments, and explain moral judg-
ments as something other than beliefs.”); SMITH, supra note 92, at 16 (“Expressivists deny 
that moral judgments represent the world as being one way rather than another. . . . 
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obliged to follow a particular procedure—whether it is a preference-
driven (bargaining) procedure or something else—cannot be true ei-
ther. 
 So much for the first, skeptical defense of proceduralism. The sev-
eral other defenses that I will consider all incorporate a cognitivist 
rather than skeptical view about the nature of morality. All assume 
that moral statements can be true or false, and that they are some-
times true; in particular, the remaining defenses assume that moral 
criteria applicable to regulatory choices truly exist and, most specifi-
cally, that moral criteria obliging regulators to follow certain proce-
dures exist. There is nothing self-defeating in this combination of 
claims (in contrast to the combination involved in skeptical proce-
duralism). The question, rather, is whether the cognitivist-
proceduralist’s final claim—the one that makes her theory proce-
duralist—is a claim we have sufficient reason to accept. 
C.   The Foundationalist Defense 
 Foundationalism is one possible way to defend proceduralism 
within a cognitivist moral framework. The idea here is to invoke mo-
rality’s foundations—to argue that moral truths, at bottom, are 
truths that issue from certain sorts of procedures—and then to move 
from this premise to the conclusion that the moral criteria applicable 
to regulators include procedural criteria. Certainly there are respect-
able foundationalist views that see moral truths as issuing from cer-
tain sorts of collective procedures. By “foundationalism,” I mean a 
general view about the truth-conditions of moral statements—a gen-
eral view about why an utterance asserting the existence of, for ex-
ample, a moral obligation, permission, or criterion is correct. 98 John 
Rawls is a famous example of a contemporary philosopher whose 
foundationalist view involves a collective procedure. Rawls’ A Theory 
of Justice99 argues that the requirements of justice are those provi-
sions that self-interested parties, bargaining about a social contract, 
but operating under a “veil of ignorance,” would agree to.100 More re-
cently, Tim Scanlon has built a moral theory upon a substructure 
that is more consensualist than the foundational bargain described 
by A Theory of Justice.101 Scanlon suggests that the hypothetical par-
ties whose deliberations result in moral principles should be seen as 
adopting an impartial, not a self-interested, point of view, and that 
                                                                                                                  
[They] rather serve to express the judger’s attitudes of approval or disapproval, or perhaps 
their more complicated dispositions to have such attitudes.” (citations omitted)).  
 98. See generally SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 189-303 (1998) (describing and 
assessing a variety of plausible foundationalist views). 
 99. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE  (1971). 
 100. Id. at 118-92. 
 101. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). 
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moral principles should (in effect) be defined as principles to which 
such parties would universally consent. 102 
 Does Rawlsian foundationalism, Scanlonian foundationalism, 
Habermasian foundationalism, 103 or some other foundationalist view 
that (like these) envisions a collective procedure as the constitutive 
grounds for moral truths104 lead to proceduralism about regulation 
and governance? Certainly some proceduralists seem to have thought 
so. For example, there is a foundationalist flavor in much of the lit-
erature on civic republicanism. The idea seems to be that impartial-
ity (civic virtue) and unanimity (consensus) are concepts that anyone 
thinking normatively about governmental choice would need to in-
voke—that, foundationally, the “public good” is just what public-
spirited citizens deliberating to consensus under ideal conditions 
would agree to—and thus that impartiality, consensus, and explicit 
consideration of the public good are procedural desiderata for actual 
governmental choice.105 One could construct parallel foundationalist 
stories in defense of pluralism, collaborative-governance theory, or 
other proceduralist views. As I just suggested, the moral foundations 
described by Rawls in A Theory of Justice106 would seem more ame-
nable to pluralism than civic republicanism; the Rawlsian social con-
tractors are bargaining, not deliberating (as the very term “social 
contract” suggests). The pluralist might try to reason from these 
Rawlsian beginnings to the conclusion that regulatory or governmen-
tal outcomes should result from a process of bargaining and compro-
mise among selfish, not public-spirited, actors. So foundationalism is, 
in principle, a generic strategy for defending proceduralism. But is it 
a successful strategy? 
 The answer is no, and the reason for that answer will become 
clearer if we distinguish between two versions of foundationalism: 
hypothetical-choice and actual-choice foundationalism. Hypothetical-
choice foundationalism says that moral criteria are those criteria 
that would issue from a certain, hypothetical procedure. The proce-
                                                                                                                  
 102. See id. at 189-247. 
 103. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER:  STUDIES IN POLITICAL 
THEORY 49-101 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998). 
 104. See KAGAN, supra note 98, at 240-56 (discussing “contractarian” foundationalist 
views, including Rawls’ and Scanlon’s). 
 105. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 1528-33. Professor Seidenfeld states: 
Civic republicanism . . . posits that no individual acting in her political capacity 
should be subservient to other political actors. Hence, the theory does not 
equate the public good . . . with majority rule. Social consensus about what is 
best for the community as a community, not as the aggregation of individuals’ 
private interests, is the defining feature of the common good. Government’s po-
litical decisions—that is, the law—must embody this consensus of the common 
good. 
Id. at 1528-29 (citing Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 5, at 1550, 1548). 
 106. RAWLS, supra note 99. 
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dure can be specified as you like: it can be a procedure of impartial 
deliberation, a procedure of self-interested bargaining, or some other 
procedure. Actual-choice foundationalism says that moral criteria are 
those criteria that have actually issued from a procedure of a speci-
fied kind that has actually occurred (again, specified as an actual de-
liberative procedure, an actual bargaining procedure, or some other 
actual procedure).  
 Hypothetical-choice foundationalism is a plausible view about mo-
rality’s foundations; but it does not lead to proceduralism. Rawls and 
Scanlon are both hypothetical-choice foundationalists. Rawls identi-
fies moral principles as those principles that would be chosen by self-
interested parties behind a veil of ignorance;107 Scanlon identifies 
moral principles as those principles that would be chosen by impar-
tial parties deliberating to consensus. 108 For both Rawls and Scanlon, 
the proposition that one regulatory choice (O1) is better than another 
regulatory choice (O2) flows from the proposition: 
(1) O1 would be chosen over O2 in a certain, hypothetical, collective 
procedure. 
And this proposition is in turn consistent with the following proposi-
tions: 
(2) The actual procedure by which O1 was chosen over O2 does not 
conform to the requirements of the hypothetical foundational pro-
cedure; indeed 
(3) No procedure that has ever occurred conforms to the hypotheti-
cal, foundational procedure. 
Consider Rawlsian morality, which consists of the following two 
principles: 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all. . . . Social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) at-
tached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity. . . . [These] principles of justice are to be 
ranked in lexical order . . . [and the] second principle of justice is 
lexically prior to the principle of efficiency . . . [and] fair opportu-
nity is prior to the difference principle.109 
Then O1 is better than O2, within a Rawlsian view, if O1 is better in 
light of the two Rawlsian principles. Equivalently, O1 would be cho-
sen over O2 by self-interested parties bargaining behind a veil of ig-
                                                                                                                  
 107. See RAWLS, supra note 99, at 46-53. 
 108. See SCANLON, supra note 101, at 189-247. 
 109. RAWLS, supra note 99, at 302-03. 
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norance. But this imposes no constraint upon the actual procedure 
that leads to O1 over O2. A regulatory choice is fully compliant with 
Rawlsian justice as long as it complies with the two Rawlsian princi-
ples, whatever the actual procedure that led to the choice. And the 
point can be readily generalized to all kinds of hypothetical-choice 
foundationalism: If the hypothetical-choice procedure constitutive of 
morality leads to a particular set of criteria (X1, X2 . . . Xn), and regu-
latory choice O1 is better than O2 in light of the totality of X1, X2 . . . 
Xn, then O1 is morally better than O2, whatever the actual procedure 
by which O1 was chosen. 
 The objection might be raised that the principles X1, X2 . . . Xn re-
sulting from a hypothetical-choice foundation will themselves include 
certain procedural requirements. But it is not clear why this should 
be the case. The hypothetical parties, formulating the principles of 
morality, are obviously not constrained to produce the requirement 
that actual persons actually carry out the foundational procedure—
for example, the two Rawlsian principles do not include such a re-
quirement—nor is it clear why they would end up producing proce-
dural requirements other than a requirement that the foundational 
procedure be implemented. (Note that Rawls’ two principles have 
hardly any procedural content at all; he is centrally and perhaps ex-
clusively concerned with the effect of governmental choice on the al-
location of primary goods and the range of individual liberty.110) 
 Indeed, it might be argued that hypothetical-choice foundational-
ism would be less likely to produce a proceduralist morality—a set of 
moral criteria including procedural requirements—than other foun-
dationalist views, since the moral work of procedure would already 
have been done in the hypothetical situation. The parties in that 
situation would see no further need for it. In any event, the point to 
be emphasized here is that hypothetical-choice foundationalism will 
produce a set of moral criteria (X1, X2 . . . Xn) that may or may not in-
clude procedural requirements (depending on the course that the hy-
pothetical process takes), just as nonprocedural foundationalism will 
produce a set of moral principles (X1*, X2* . . . Xn*) that may or may 
not include procedural requirements. It is X1, X2 . . . Xn or X1*, 
X2* . . . Xn* that regulatory institutions must comply with, not the 
hypothetical procedure itself. 
 Another objection that might be raised is epistemic. It is difficult 
to know what X1, X2 . . . Xn are. Thus, if a decisionmaker (D) is de-
signing some governmental procedure, specifically, if D is a legislator 
or President setting up a regulatory-agency procedure, then the best 
course for D is to require that the agency follow a procedure ap-
                                                                                                                  
 110. This aspect of Rawls’ theory is discussed in Paul J. Weithman, Contractualist Lib-
eralism and Deliberative Democracy, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 314 (1995). 
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proximating the hypothetical-choice situation. For example, if D be-
lieves the hypothetical-choice situation to be a Scanlonian scenario of 
impartial deliberation and consensus among all involved parties, 
then the best course for D is to set up a legal regime that requires 
agency deliberation and encourages public-spirited involvement by 
the citizenry.111 The strategy here is to combine hypothetical-choice 
foundationalism with moral uncertainty on the part of the agency-
builder, D, to argue for proceduralism. 
 This strategy is tempting but, I think, unsuccessful. For any plau-
sible specification of the hypothetical-choice scenario constitutive of 
moral principles, actual governmental procedures will approximate 
that scenario only very imperfectly. Actual agency rulemaking, how-
ever public-spirited and consensual, is generally far removed from 
the idealized scenario of full reasonableness and universal agreement 
posited by Scanlon; and, of course, interest groups that engage in po-
litical bargaining are not operating under a Rawlsian veil. So the 
epistemic claim becomes the following: Even though the feasible 
agency procedure that most closely approximates the hypothetical-
choice scenario is a crude approximation, the reasonable course for 
the agency-builder D (given his uncertainty about what morality re-
quires) is to instruct agencies to employ this crudely approximate 
procedure. 
 Maybe this claim is true, but I doubt it. Wouldn’t D have some 
evidence as to what morality requires—as to what the correct moral 
criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn really are?112 And wouldn’t he then design 
agency procedures in light of (his best understanding of) X1, X2 . . . 
Xn, rather than simply instructing agencies to do their best to im-
plement the foundational, moral procedure? For example, D might 
come to believe that overall well-being is one of the moral criteria X1, 
X2 . . . Xn and that cost-benefit analysis is the agency decision-
procedure best justified in light of overall well-being; and it would 
then be reasonable for D to instruct agencies to engage in cost-benefit 
                                                                                                                  
 111. See id. (presenting epistemic case for proceduralism). 
 112. The substantive moral theory advanced by A Theory of Justice, together with the 
voluminous scholarly responses to that book, is at least some evidence of what self-
interested contractors bargaining behind a veil of ignorance would choose. Similarly, the 
emerging corpus of scholarly work on Scanlon’s theory (presented first in a 1982 article, 
T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103 
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982), and in fuller form in his book What We Owe 
to Each Other, supra note 101) is at least some evidence of the principles that impartial 
and deliberative contractors would agree to. 
 More generally, whatever methodology D has used to determine the nature of the foun-
dational moral procedure will also, presumably, provide him some evidence of what the X1, 
X2 . . . Xn are. For example, if he has determined the nature of that procedure through a 
combination of internal deliberation and consultation with scholarly and other experts, 
then internal deliberation plus consultation with scholarly and other experts should give D 
some evidence about the content of the X1, X2 . . . Xn. 
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analysis (as one component of their procedures), even though cost-
benefit analysis is surely not a component of the foundational, moral 
procedure.113 
 Note that the epistemic argument has a self-defeating aspect. D 
knows that moral principles are those that would be chosen by a cer-
tain, hypothetical procedure; but he does not know enough about the 
content of those principles to do anything but set up a governmental 
procedure approximating the hypothetical one. Why does D have 
good evidence (independent of governmental choice) about the foun-
dations of morality, but no good evidence (independent of govern-
mental choice) about the content of morality? Note further that the 
epistemic argument is really an instrumental, not an intrinsic one, 
and thus is not an argument for proceduralism as I have defined it. 
The claim is not that morality includes a procedural criterion Xp, 
along with substantive criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn. The claim, rather, is as 
follows:  
(1) the hypothetical-choice procedure that is the foundation of mo-
rality gives rise to some substantive criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn; but 
(2) because those who design regulatory agency procedures are ig-
norant as to the precise content of the X1, X2 . . . Xn, the best course 
for them, in light of X1, X2 . . . Xn, is to instruct agencies to imple-
ment some approximation of the foundational procedure. 
In any event, this particular (instrumental) claim about regulatory 
agency procedures is unpersuasive. 
 So much for hypothetical-choice foundationalism. Hypothetical-
choice foundationalism is, again, a very plausible view about the na-
ture of moral truth; but it does not lead to proceduralism. Actual-
choice foundationalism does lead to proceduralism, but it involves a 
highly implausible view about the nature of moral truth. The actual-
choice foundationalist says that one outcome (O1) is morally better 
than another (O2) if and only if O1 actually results from the specified 
sort of procedure (or, a bit more weakly, if and only if O1 has an ap-
propriate nexus to an actual procedure that meets the foundational 
specification, for example, where O1 is better than O2 in light of 
standards enacted by a body that meets the foundational specifica-
tion). 
 Actual-choice foundationalism is a purely expository device on my 
part. It is designed to illustrate what would need to be true about a 
foundational view for there to be a direct link between such a view 
and proceduralism. Actual-choice foundationalism is not a founda-
tional view that moral philosophers have, in fact, defended, and it is 
                                                                                                                  
 113. On the status of cost-benefit analysis as a welfare-justified decision procedure, see 
Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 28, and infra Part IV.E. 
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easy to see why they have not done so. Imagine that no procedure 
meeting the foundational specifications has actually occurred, or at 
least no such procedure with a nexus to O1 and O2. Then the upshot 
is that the O1-O2 choice must be morally neutral: O1 and O2 are 
equally good, or incomparably good, or something like that, such that 
O1 is not definitely better than O2 nor is O2 definitely better than O1. 
But O1 could be substantively horrendous, relative to O2. It could be 
a policy that causes massive welfare losses, large-scale inequalities, 
and serious damage to environmental values.114 To insist that O1 in 
such a case remains no worse than O2—because no procedure of the 
specified type has actually selected O2 over O1—is deeply counterin-
tuitive. Overall well-being, equality of welfare, environmental pres-
ervation, deontological constraints, and other moral criteria may all 
derive their force from the fact that they would be chosen in a cer-
tain, hypothetical situation; but it is not the case that their moral 
force is suspended until some actual body confirms them. 
D.   The Conventionalist Defense 
 A third strategy for defending proceduralism, distinct from moral 
skepticism and moral foundationalism, is the conventionalist strat-
egy. Conventionalism (as I use the term here) is the view that moral-
ity, or some part thereof, is a function of social norms. 115 Convention-
alism could be a general view about morality (in which case it be-
comes a kind of foundationalism); or, less ambitiously, it could be the 
view that certain moral criteria (for example, criteria of objective 
welfare-value, which set forth better or worse “ways of life”) are re-
ducible to social norms.116 
 Social norms have been conceptualized in various ways but, 
roughly, norms are constituted by common beliefs and behaviors. 117 
Crucially, social norms are distinct from legal norms and proce-
dures.118 This distinction is a central point in the burgeoning litera-
                                                                                                                  
 114. There is obviously nothing in the values of overall well-being, equality of welfare, 
and environmental preservation that entails that an outcome which is seriously worse 
than another with respect to one of the values, or all taken together, will actually have 
been rejected by a governmental body or by some other such mechanism for collective 
choice. 
 115. See BRINK, supra note 52, at 14-36 (defining conventionalism and distinguishing 
conventionalism from noncognitivism). 
 116. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 3-5 (1994) (explaining that 
valuable activities depend on social practices for their availability and, to a degree, even 
for their existence). 
 117. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1467-72 (2000) (describing various conceptualizations of “social 
norms”). 
 118. See id. 
2000]  WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION 279 
 
ture on social norms; 119 and it amounts to the fatal flaw in the con-
ventionalist defense of proceduralism. However social norms are de-
fined, it is not the case that the (assumed) truth of conventionalism 
will make certain regulatory procedures intrinsically important. 
 Consider a simple version of conventionalism that defines social 
norms, and some or all moral criteria, by reference to the evaluative 
judgments shared by a large majority of the relevant society.120 One 
outcome is better than another, in light of social norms, only if a 
large majority of the society would judge the first to be better. Imag-
ine further that the only evaluative judgments shared by a large ma-
jority of the relevant society with respect to regulatory agencies are 
substantive judgments. There is not, let us assume, general agree-
ment that regulatory agencies should follow or refrain from following 
particular procedures. Then in this society regulators have no intrin-
sic, conventional obligation to follow or refrain from following certain 
procedures. The regulator’s sheer decision to follow a particular pro-
cedure will not (without more) be conventionally good or bad. For ex-
ample, it might be widely agreed in the society that certain wilder-
ness areas are precious. Then if one outcome (O1) damages the areas 
relative to a second (O2), O1 will be conventionally worse than O2 re-
gardless of the procedure by which O1 was adopted. Conversely, if the 
two outcomes are neutral with respect to their impact on the wilder-
ness areas, the regulator’s choice of one or the other will be conven-
                                                                                                                  
 119. The legal scholarship includes ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Ex-
tralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); 
Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997); Steven 
A. Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999); 
William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545; Jody S. Kraus, Le-
gal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997); Law-
rence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. 
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race 
Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995) [hereinafter McAdams, Cooperation and 
Conflict]; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) [hereinafter McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation 
of Norms]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM . L. REV. 903 
(1996); Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); and Sym-
posium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 537 (1998). Yet further entries in the legal literature are cited by Hetcher, supra, at 
2-3 nn.2-4. 
 120. Cf. Cooter, supra note 119 (arguing that the existence of a norm involves the pun-
ishment of nonconformers by “norm enforcers” who have “internalized” the norm); 
McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, supra note 119 (arguing 
that norms involve a preexisting moral consensus among some portion of the population, 
which becomes widely known and is then informally enforced by the withdrawal of esteem 
from norm-violators). 
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tionally neutral regardless of the procedure by which the choice was 
resolved.121 
 It might be objected that this example does not vitiate the link be-
tween proceduralism and conventionalism. Rather, what the example 
shows is that (on the simple version of conventionalism under con-
sideration here) regulators in the United States have intrinsic proce-
dural obligations if, and only if, a large majority of Americans believe 
that certain regulatory procedures are bad or good. Thus it is only in 
the special case where there is no procedure whose goodness or bad-
ness is supported by an evaluative consensus that proceduralism 
fails. True enough. If the goodness or badness of a particular proce-
dure (P*) is supported by an evaluative consensus, then (on this ver-
sion of conventionalism) regulators have moral reason to follow or re-
frain from P*, independent of its outcomes. But, relatedly: 
(1) for any particular procedure P' (for example, a procedure of 
pluralist bargaining, or of civic republican deliberation, or of col-
laborative governance), regulators will have moral reason to follow 
or refrain from P', independent of outcomes, only  insofar as an 
evaluative consensus supporting the goodness or badness of P' ex-
ists; and thus 
(2) no conventional argument for P' that transcends the popula-
tion’s contingent beliefs about procedures is possible. 
 In short, the proceduralist who presents a conventionalist argu-
ment for pluralism, civic republicanism, collaborative governance, or 
some other P' is properly engaged in descriptive sociology; all she can 
claim is that citizens happen to share a common set of beliefs about 
P', and that P' will remain of intrinsic importance as long as they do. 
Note, too, that a firm conventionalist argument for P' (civic republi-
canism, say) as against P'' (pluralism, say) is not really possible, be-
cause consensus beliefs may shift from P' to P''. The proceduralist 
who wants an argument for her favored procedure, P', that outlasts 
the lucky sociological fact that P' also falls under the description, “be-
lieved to be good by most Americans,” had better look beyond conven-
tionalism. 122 
                                                                                                                  
 121. I am assuming here that O1 is not conventionally better than O2, or vice versa, in 
light of some feature other than its impact on the wilderness areas. Otherwise, O1 might be 
conventionally better than O2, all things considered, even though O1 damages the areas. 
 122. Again, my discussion here has focused on a particular, simple version of conven-
tionalism; but what I say can, I think, be  generalized. 
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E.   The Expressivist Defense 
 A fourth possible strategy for defending proceduralism might be 
called expressivism.123 Law is sometimes described as expressive inso-
far as it has a value-creating function.124 The idea is that legal out-
comes can, themselves, be (partly) constitutive of our evaluative and, 
specifically, moral framework. How might this idea underwrite pro-
ceduralism? Consider the following: 
An Expressive Case for Proceduralism 
If regulators follow procedure P*, and they end up choosing O1 over 
O2, then O1 is morally better than O2, either conclusively (strong-
form expressivism) or prima facie (weak-form expressivism). 
Expressivism circumvents some of the above-noted difficulties in the 
skeptical, foundationalist, and conventionalist arguments for proce-
duralism. Expressivism (as here presented) is cognitivist, not skepti-
cal. Unlike actual-choice foundationalism, it does not adduce P* as a 
procedure constitutive of all moral criteria, but rather as a procedure 
that supplements other grounds for moral distinctions. O3 can be 
morally better than O4, even if the O3-over-O4 choice is not the out-
come of P*—the expressivist allows as much; but where O1 is chosen 
over O2 by means of P*, then O1 is (conclusively or at least prima fa-
cie) better. In effect, actual-choice foundationalism makes the im-
plementation of the favored procedure a necessary condition for 
moral distinctions, while expressivism (more plausibly) makes its 
implementation a merely sufficient condition. Finally, by contrast 
with conventionalism, expressivism eschews any link to social norms 
and practices. P* is claimed to be morally constitutive, quite apart 
from whether P* is generally believed to be morally constitutive (or 
otherwise favored by existing social norms), and quite apart from 
whether the O1 that results from P* is generally believed to be better 
than the alternative O2 (or is otherwise favored over O2 in light of so-
cial norms). 
                                                                                                                  
 123. “Expressivism,” as I use the term here, is one kind of cognitivist moral view and 
thus is quite different from the noncognitivist metaethical view often referred to by moral 
philosophers as “expressivism.” See sources cited supra note 97. 
 124. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 70 (“[The] expressive or symbolic 
dimensions of policy are central [because] [p]art of what policy-making does is to define, in-
terpret, and create collective understandings and values.”). Professor Sunstein has also ar-
ticulated this view of the law as value-generating, thus: 
The effects of any legal rule can be described in an infinite number of ways. 
Any particular characterization or accounting of consequences will rest not on 
some depiction of the brute facts; instead it will be mediated by a set of (often 
tacit) norms determining how to describe or conceive of consequences. It is pos-
sible to see a large part of the expressive function of law in the identification of 
what consequences count. 
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law , 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2048 
(1996). 
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 Still, expressivism is a problematic strategy for defending proce-
duralism. One problem is in specifying a procedure (P*) that is not 
too idealized to be infeasible, but that is still sufficiently idealized to 
be constitutive of the moral standing of the outcomes it produces. 
Consider a civic-republican specification of P*: P* is the procedure 
where regulators sincerely attempt to be impartial, where they delib-
erate pretty well, where they are not too uninformed, and where 
some kind of consensus is reached among a large fraction of those in-
terest-group representatives or other members of the public who par-
ticipate in the regulatory process. Why should P* constitute O1 as 
morally better than O2, even prima facie? Let’s assume that hypo-
thetical-choice foundationalism is true and also that the foundation 
of morality is some idealized, civic-republican style procedure, 
roughly along the lines that Scanlon suggests. Call it P+. P* is not the 
same procedure as P+; if it were, P* would be infeasible. So O1 could 
be chosen by O2 through P* even though O2 would be chosen over O1 
through P+. To be more concrete, O1 could be an outcome that causes 
large welfare losses and widespread environmental degradation, or 
in which an innocent victim is sacrificed for the greater good, in vio-
lation of her deontological rights. But why should the fact that O1 
was chosen over O2 in a not-too-bad procedure, by civic-republican 
lights, confer any moral authority on O1, when O2 would be chosen 
over O1 in a perfect civic-republican procedure? Conversely, in the 
case where both P* and P+ point in favor of O1, we do not need to in-
voke P* to explain the betterness of O1; that is fully explained by P+, 
our civic-republican foundation. 
 The proceduralist could respond to this objection by denying hypo-
thetical-choice foundationalism. To make the response sharpest, as-
sume she posits a foundation for morality that has nothing whatso-
ever to do with collective choice or approval. Perhaps she posits a 
traditionalist view of morality. She might claim, “In general, one out-
come is better than another if the first is traditionally believed to be 
better, in the relevant society. But in the special case where O1 is 
chosen over O2 through P*, O1 is at least prima facie better on those 
very grounds.” Yet if morality is generally a matter of traditional be-
liefs, not hypothetical procedures, then why does P* have a morally 
constitutive role? In short, the expressivist faces a dilemma: either 
she adopts a hypothetical-choice foundationalism that makes some 
idealized version of P* the general grounds of morality (in which case 
we can ask why feasible and nonideal P* is also morally constitutive), 
or she does not (in which case we can accuse her of inconsistency in 
ascribing moral power to P* while asserting that the general grounds 
of morality are quite different). 
 This line of attack on expressivism might be overcome. Perhaps 
there is some feasible governmental procedure P* such that its out-
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comes are guaranteed to be morally good or right, at least prima fa-
cie. I have not shown definitively that P* cannot or does not exist. 
But even if P* does exist, the kind of proceduralism that follows from 
its existence is really quite thin. Regulators are not obliged to follow 
P*, even prima facie. If they follow a different (and nonconstitutive) 
procedure which is instrumentally appropriate in that it produces 
morally better O3 as against morally worse O4, then the regulators 
have not done anything wrong, even prime facie. (Contrast this with 
the standard view, to be considered in a moment, that certain, par-
ticipatory procedures are intrinsically important because they en-
hance the welfare of participants. If this view is right, then regula-
tors are obliged, at least prima facie, to follow the participatory pro-
cedures.) Further, it may be the case that regulators are all-things-
considered obliged not to follow P*. This possibility is avoided only if 
P* has a conclusive rather than merely prima facie role in fixing the 
moral standing of its outcomes; but that strong-expressivist claim 
raises the plausible objection that no nonideal governmental proce-
dure could guarantee moral betterness. 
F.   The Interest-Based Defense 
 So much for expressivism. The fifth and final strategy for defend-
ing proceduralism to be considered here is widespread in the legal 
literature.125 This is the view that certain governmental procedures 
are intrinsically beneficial for certain persons (paradigmatically, 
those persons who participate in the procedures). Call this the inter-
est-based defense of proceduralism. Expressivism, conventionalism, 
and foundationalism all, in different ways, attempt to give the fa-
vored procedure a constitutive moral role, or to draw a special link 
between the procedure and something else that has a constitutive 
moral role (for example, conventional beliefs or a hypothetical proce-
                                                                                                                  
 125. The view that certain governmental procedures are intrinsically beneficial for cer-
tain persons has been particularly important in the legal literature on procedural due pro-
cess. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary 
Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981) (“The unifying thread in this literature [on proce-
dural due process] is the perception that the effects of process on participants, not just the 
rationality of substantive results, must be considered in judging the legitimacy of public 
decisionmaking.”); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due 
Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126, 127 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman 
eds., 1977) (“[Participatory] procedures seem responsive to demands for revelation and par-
ticipation. They attach value to the individual’s being told why the agent is treating him 
unfavorably and to his having a part in the decision.”). As Professor Summers e xplains: 
My principal thesis in this Essay is that a legal process can be good, as a proc-
ess, in two possible ways, not just one: It can be good not only as a means to 
good results, but also as a means of implementing or serving process values 
such as participatory governance, procedural rationality, and humaneness. 
Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Val-
ues” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1974). 
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dure). The interest-based defense is quite different. It prescinds from 
issues of moral truth and constitution. Instead, it says, much more 
straightforwardly, that a particular item of moral significance, 
namely human welfare, can be directly affected by the procedures 
that regulators employ, quite apart from the welfare effect of out-
comes. 
 The interest-based defense of proceduralism certainly possesses 
intuitive resonance. Imagine a regulatory agency that furnishes no 
opportunity whatsoever for participation by the public.126 No notice of 
proposed directives is published; no public commentary on these pro-
posals is even received, let alone solicited; and no public statement 
justifying enacted directives is ever issued. This is true not only 
when the directives are general rules, but even when they are indi-
vidualized orders that fix the rights, duties, and other legal positions 
of named parties. Even in the case of adjudication, the persons who 
are affected (however directly) by agency decisions are not afforded a 
hearing, or any component of a normal hearing, except (let us as-
sume) publication of the directive that the agency finally enacts. 
Surely this participation-free procedure amounts to an intrinsic wel-
fare setback for members of the public, or at least for those who want 
to participate in the decisions of the insulated agency! 
 I deny that it does.127 Specifically, I deny that it does insofar as 
participation diminishes the accuracy of the agency’s decisionmaking 
process; and conversely if participation enhances accuracy, the par-
ticipatory procedure is already justified on instrumental grounds and 
so the interest-based argument for participation is superfluous. To 
see this, imagine that the participation-free procedure leads to out-
come O rather than O*, that a participatory procedure would lead to 
outcome O* rather than O, and that O is substantively better than 
O* (that is, it is better apart from the procedure by which the O-O* 
choice is resolved). Then participation is a bad thing (from the point 
of view of the rest of our moral framework), and the welfare-claims of 
those who insist upon participation should be discounted. The wel-
fare-claims of the would-be participants are arguably no different, in 
this sort of case, from the welfare-claims of those who purport to reap 
an intrinsic benefit from discrimination or governmental action that 
                                                                                                                  
 126. In short, imagine that the agency provides none of the elements of procedural due 
process identified by Judge Friendly in his classic article, Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of 
Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
 127. I do not deny that the participation-free procedure just described would be uncon-
stitutional under existing doctrines interpreting the Due Process Clause; but one can give 
content to that clause and defend a judicial role in enforcing it without believing that par-
ticipation or other procedural elements have intrinsic value for welfare. See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (setting forth a three-factor framework for determin-
ing what process is “due,” which arguably envisions procedure as instrumentally, rather 
than intrinsically, valuable). 
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violates moral rights simply because they “like” or “want” these in-
justices. 128 On the other hand, if the participatory procedure leads to 
O* rather than O, and it is O* that is the substantively better out-
come, then the welfare-claims of the would-be participants need not 
be discounted. However, the claims need not be discounted only be-
cause the regulators already have instrumental grounds here for 
choosing the participatory procedure, as the one that leads to the 
substantively best outcome O*.129 
 The point can clearly be generalized beyond participation. Take a 
given agency choice situation. Imagine that one procedure (Paccurate) is 
the instrumentally justified procedure—the procedure that the legis-
lator, President or administrator (D) who designs the agency’s proce-
dures is justified in requiring the agency to follow in light of substan-
tive moral criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn—and that a second procedure (Pinter-
est) is the procedure that supposedly intrinsically benefits the welfare 
of the citizenry or some subset thereof. One possibility is that, in this 
situation, Paccurate is Pinterest. If so, regulators can have intrinsic 
grounds for following Pinterest, but this procedure turns out to be the 
very one that regulators would have been obliged to follow (Paccurate) if 
governmental procedures had no intrinsic welfare value. Alterna-
tively, in the given choice situation, Pinterest might be different from 
Paccurate.130 If so, we are left to wonder how it can be a good thing for 
human welfare to skew government towards outcomes that are oth-
erwise morally unfavorable. So either interest-based proceduralism 
makes no difference to what is morally required of regulators; or, if it 
                                                                                                                  
 128. See, e.g., GEOFFREY SCARRE,  UTILITARIANISM 155-62 (1996) (suggesting that sa-
distic preferences should not be incorporated in the calculation of social welfare); John C. 
Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 
39 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (same). See generally RAWLS, supra note 
99, at 395-587 (arguing that a person’s welfare goals, i.e., his conception of his self -interest, 
can and should be revised to reflect moral requirements). 
 129. Larry Alexander has made a similar point: 
I do not deny that two procedures that are otherwise equal in factfinding accu-
racy and that do not violate moral side-constraints may differ in their achieve-
ment of other values. And if the procedures are otherwise not only equally ac-
curate, but also equally intrusive on privacy, equally costly in resources, and so 
forth, we should surely choose the procedure that has more positive or fewer 
negative byproducts. The more important question, however, is whether either 
accuracy or social resources should be sacrificed to achieve such values as par-
ticipation. 
Larry Alexander, Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?, 17 LAW & PHIL. 
19, 36 (1998). 
 130. I have not considered the case of equality or incomparability. It might be that, in a 
given choice situation, there are a number of procedures that are equally well or incompa-
rably well justified, instrumentally speaking, and that only one is Pinterest. In that special 
case I would concede that intrinsicalist considerations could justify choosing Pinterest . See 
Alexander, supra note 129, at 36. 
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does, there is a powerful argument that the putative intrinsic inter-
ests in regulatory procedure are spurious. 131 
 The key to my case against interest-based proceduralism is, obvi-
ously, my discounting of certain welfare claims: where the procedure 
of purported intrinsic benefit (Pinterest) differs from the instrumentally 
justified procedure (Paccurate), the intrinsic welfare value of Pinterest is 
deflated. Is this discounting fair? As I have suggested, there are cer-
tainly other cases where we discount someone’s claim to be intrinsi-
cally benefited by an outcome, institution, or procedure that is (oth-
erwise) morally wrong (for example, a discriminatory or rights-
violating outcome). The proceduralist might object that there are 
other cases where we do not discount someone’s claim to be intrinsi-
cally benefited by an outcome that is (otherwise) morally wrong. For 
example, if I like fishing and everyone else likes jet-skiing, and a 
lake can only be used for one or the other, then the outcome in which 
the lake is used for fishing is morally wrong apart from its effect on 
my welfare. But that does not mean that my interest in fishing 
should be discounted; rather, the interest in fishing retains full force 
and should be thrown into the balance along with the interests of the 
jet-skiers. 132 This is a fair objection. I think that procedural interests 
are more like discountable interests in discrimination or rights viola-
tion than they are like nondiscountable interests in fishing; but the 
point is surely debatable. 
 My claim that procedural interests are discountable is, in part, an 
appeal to the reader’s intuitions. Where procedure Pinterest leads to 
morally worse results than Paccurate, it seems intuitively problematic 
to think that some person P’s welfare is genuinely improved by the 
                                                                                                                  
 131. Might the proceduralist exploit the disjunction between what is ex ante justified 
in light of X1, X2 . . . Xn, and what is ex post justified? Paccurate, as I have characterized it, is 
the procedure that the designer D is ex ante justified in requiring the agency to follow—in 
other words, the procedure that D is justified in requiring, given less than perfect informa-
tion on D’s part. (For more discussion of moral choice under uncertainty, see infra Part 
IV.E. If D had perfect information, he would know already what X1, X2 . . . Xn required in 
every choice situation and presumably could just instruct agencies to do that.) But Paccurate 
might not be ex post justified in a given agency choice situation; it might not end up pro-
ducing the outcome that is best in light of X1, X2 . . . Xn. 
 So it is possible that in a given agency choice situation (1) Paccurate deviates from Pinterest, 
but (2) Pinterest leads to the outcome that is ex post justified. In such a scenario, should the 
welfare-value of Pinterest be discounted? Perhaps not. Even so, this (partial) response to my 
discounting argument does not change how the designer D should act. He is still ex ante 
justified in requiring agencies to follow Paccurate, rather than requiring them to deviate in 
some cases from Paccurate and follow Pinterest instead. D, after all, does not know which are the 
cases in which Paccurate produces results that are ex post unjustified; if he did know that, he 
would revise Paccurate so as to eliminate the disjunction, and the cases in which procedural 
interests are nondiscountable because Paccurate and ex post-justifiability deviate would dis-
appear. 
 132. Note the paradox otherwise: if the fishing interest is discounted then, symmetri-
cally, the jet-skiing interest should also be discounted, and we end up with no interests at 
all. 
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performance of Pinterest. We do have strong intuitions about the sorts 
of procedures that government ought to follow (for example, about 
the need for participation by the person who will be directly affected 
by an adjudicative hearing), but these intuitions (I think) are gener-
ally connected to the belief that the procedure at stake enhances, 
rather than diminishes, accuracy. Relatedly, our intuition that par-
ticipation and other procedural features have welfare-value is not (I 
think) severable from the belief that the features are accuracy-
enhancing. 
 Further, I would suggest, the discountability of procedural inter-
ests is consistent with the account of well-being I have defended in 
this Article, namely sophisticated preferentialism. Consider a given 
person (P) who claims to have an intrinsic welfare interest in a par-
ticular procedure, Pinterest, as compared to another procedure, Paccurate, 
even in the case where Pinterest leads to morally worse results. Given 
sophisticated preferentialism, P truly benefits from Pinterest only if: 
(1) P prefers Pinterest to Paccurate, and 
(2) P would prefer Pinterest to Paccurate under suitably ideal conditions. 
The first prong of this schema is unproblematic: people can have all 
sorts of odd preferences. But why think that P’s preference for Pinterest 
would survive idealization? Perhaps P thinks that Pinterest serves his 
own welfare: he prefers Pinterest to Paccurate even where the first leads to 
O*, the second leads to O, and O* is morally worse, because O* is 
better for P  than O. Yet in such a case P does not really have an ide-
alized preference for a particular procedure (Pinterest); rather, he has 
an idealized preference for outcomes (O* over O) and, derivatively, 
for whatever procedure leads to them. 
 What we need to show is that P can have a preference and an ide-
alized preference for Pinterest which is 
(a) not merely an instrumental preference, derivative of the out-
comes that Pinterest produces (for example, a preference for morally 
better outcomes, or for outcomes that are beneficial to P himself); 
and 
(b) which retains force even where Pinterest produces O* rather than 
O and O* is morally worse than O. 
I am skeptical that such idealized preferences actually obtain; and if 
they do obtain I would guess that they occur so infrequently and (re-
latedly) are sufficiently idiosyncratic, that they would make little dif-
ference to the moral calculus of regulators. Given a case where Paccu-
rate leads to O and Pinterest leads to O*, there would need to be suffi-
cient persons who prefer and ideally prefer Pinterest (notwithstanding 
its moral costs), such that regulators are all things considered 
obliged to use Pinterest—that is, such that the welfare benefit of Pinterest 
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compared to Paccurate outweighs the welfare and other moral costs of 
O* compared to O. My conjecture (debatable, to be sure) is that the 
frequency of such cases is trivial. 
IV.   A WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION 
 This Part defends a welfarist theory of regulation and describes 
the implications of that kind of theory. What is a welfarist theory? By 
that I mean a normative theory of regulation which asserts the fol-
lowing propositions: 
??Overall well-being is morally relevant to regulatory choice, if not 
morally conclusive of regulatory choice. It is one criterion (per-
haps supplemented by others) that bears upon the moral status 
of regulation. 
??The right theory of well-being is sophisticated preferentialism. 
??Other moral criteria possibly bearing upon regulatory choice in-
clude distributive criteria, deontological criteria, and perfection-
ist criteria, but not the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, nor 
procedural criteria.  
 Welfarism, thus described, is really a family of moral theories 
rather than a unique one. For example, the version of utilitarianism 
that incorporates a sophisticated preferentialist view of well-being is 
a welfarist theory; so is a consequentialist theory that takes both 
overall well-being (again understood in sophisticated preferentialist 
terms) and the equal distribution of well-being as criteria for ranking 
consequences; and so is a mixed theory that combines the consequen-
tialist theory just mentioned with deontological constraints such as 
the constraint against intentional harming. It would be nice to be in 
a position to argue for a unique normative theory of regulation. That 
would be a more impressive and practically significant accomplish-
ment than defending a family of views, such as welfarism. But I am 
in no such position now, nor am I likely ever to be. On the other 
hand, welfarism excludes the theories that have been most important 
within American legal scholarship, namely neoclassicism and proce-
duralism—no theory can be both a welfarist theory and a neoclassi-
cal theory, or both a welfarist theory and a proceduralist theory—and 
thus a defense of welfarism should, by itself, have real payoffs. 
 In the initial parts of this Article, I argued for certain components 
of welfarism. Specifically, I tried to show that sophisticated preferen-
tialism is indeed the correct account of well-being; that Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency is not a moral criterion; and that no procedural standard 
(for example, a standard requiring regulators to allow citizen partici-
pation or to engage in deliberation prior to choosing outcomes) is a 
moral criterion either. But the central component of welfarism—the 
moral relevance of overall well-being—remains to be shown. Is over-
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all well-being a determinate concept? Given two regulatory choices, 
such that some persons gain by the first choice and others gain by 
the second, is it meaningful to say that one choice or the other is bet-
ter in light of overall well-being? Does not such a statement implau-
sibly presuppose that interpersonal comparisons are possible? And 
even if such comparisons are possible, why does overall well-being 
have moral force? Why should an increment to P2’s well-being be 
grounds for P1 to accept a decrement to her own, just because P2’s in-
crement is (in some sense) greater than P1’s decrement? 
 Section A argues that overall well-being is a determinate concept. 
Section B argues that the concept is not only determinate, but pos-
sesses moral force.133 Section C discusses the possible role of distribu-
tive, deontological, or perfectionist criteria within a welfarist theory. 
Sections D and E describe the implications of welfarism for regula-
tory choices and institutions. Section D compares welfarism to neo-
classicism. Although welfarism is, in effect, refurbished neoclassi-
cism, there remain substantial differences between the two theories, 
and I elaborate these. Section E compares welfarism to procedural-
ism. Here, the implications of the new theory are even larger, since 
for the welfarist the only moral significance of regulatory procedures 
is in producing welfare-maximizing choices and, perhaps, choices 
that also fairly distribute welfare, maximize perfections, and comply 
with whatever deontological norms limit government regulators.  
A.   Interpersonal Comparisons and the Determinacy of 
Overall Well-Being 
 Sophisticated preferentialism makes welfare a combination of (re-
stricted) actual preference and (restricted) ideal preference. It says: P 
would be better off with S1, as compared to S2, just in case: 
(1) P prefers S1 over S2; and 
(2) P would prefer S1 over S2 under ideal conditions; and 
(3) P’s actual preference and ideal preference are both suitably re-
stricted. 
The difference between sophisticated preferentialism and the simple 
preference-based view of welfare, which is the view that is conven-
tional within welfare economics and which neoclassicism incorpo-
rates, lies in conditions (2) and (3). The function of condition (2) is to 
add ideal preference; the function of condition (3) is to restrict both 
actual and ideal preference. But it does not seem that either of these 
conditions will help sophisticated preferentialism solve the problem 
                                                                                                                  
 133. Sections A and B are a more elaborate and, in some respects, materially different 
version of the argument presented in Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 197-209. 
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of interpersonal comparisons—a problem that, famously, bedevils the 
simple view.134 
 Why are interpersonal comparisons a serious problem for the sim-
ple preference-based view of welfare? That view, again, says that P 
would be better off with S1, as compared to S2, just in case P prefers 
S1 to S2. The problem arises once we move from Pareto-superiority to 
Pareto-noncomparability, that is, once we add a second person (Q) to 
the picture, such that P is benefited by S1 over S2 but Q is benefited 
by S2 over S1. How should we decide whether S1 or S2 is better for 
overall well-being—that is, better in light of the aggregate welfare of 
P and Q? 
 One approach would be to rely upon P’s and Q’s ordinal ranking of 
the outcomes, but this approach seems morally arbitrary and no one 
(as far as I am aware) has seriously advocated it. Imagine that there 
are N possible outcomes. P and Q assign numbers of 1 to N to each 
outcome, depending on their preferences, with N given to the very 
best outcome and 1 given to the very worst. 135 In particular, P gives a 
ranking of P1 to S1, and P2 to S2 (where P1 > P2); while Q gives a 
ranking of Q1 to S1 and Q2 to S2 (where Q1 < Q2). Then the ordinal-
ist would say that S1 is better for the overall welfare of P and Q if 
and only if P1-P2 > Q2-Q1. 
 The ordinalist approach to interpersonal comparisons is quite 
problematic, for several reasons. First, it assumes that the N out-
comes are equally “spaced” in light of overall well-being—that the ef-
fect on overall well-being of moving P from her lowest-ranked out-
come (the outcome assigned number 1) to her next-lowest-ranked 
outcome (the outcome assigned number 2) is the same as the effect 
on overall well-being of moving her from her next-lowest-ranked out-
come to the outcome assigned number 3. More generally, it assumes 
that the effect on overall well-being of moving P from an outcome as-
signed number i to an outcome assigned number i+k is the same re-
gardless of where i and i+k are in P’s rankings. 
 Second, it assumes that different persons are equally productive 
of well-being. Any policy that moves P up r units in his ranking, 
while moving Q down q units will necessarily increase overall well-
being, so long as q is smaller than r, regardless of what the set of N 
                                                                                                                  
 134. See generally KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: PLAYING 
FAIR 282-96 (1994) (presenting problem of interpersonal welfare comparisons and various 
possible solutions); Peter J. Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and 
How They Are and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 200 
(Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991) (same); Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of 
Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104 MIND 473 (1995) (same). 
 135. This assumes that neither person is indifferent between any two outcomes; oth-
erwise, the ordinalist method here described would need to be modified. 
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possible outcomes is. For example, suppose we are in a universe with 
only three outcomes: S1 (complete bliss for P, torturous pain for Q), 
S2 (complete bliss for P, dampened only by a headache and a hang-
nail; mild pleasure for Q), and S3 (complete bliss for P, dampened 
only by a headache; complete bliss for Q). P will rank S1, S2, and S3 3, 
1, and 2, respectively, while Q will rank them 1, 2, and 3. Thus, the 
ordinalist approach ranks S1 better than S2 in light of overall well-
being, even though ever-blissful P’s relief from headache and a hang-
nail is purchased at the cost of moving Q from mild pleasure to tor-
turous pain. 
 A somewhat more attractive approach, advocated by J.R. Isbell136 
and others, is to determine overall well-being based upon P’s and Q’s 
cardinal rankings of the outcomes. 137 These cardinal numbers will be 
derived from each person’s ordinal rankings of the various outcomes, 
plus her rankings for the various outcomes as compared to risky lot-
teries of the outcomes. Roughly, P will be told to assign the number 1 
to his very best outcome, 0 to his very worst outcome, and a number r 
to every intermediate outcome such that he would be indifferent be-
tween that intermediate outcome and a lottery with a probability of r 
for the very best outcome and 1-r for the very worst. Q will be told 
the same. Overall well-being is then determined, quite simply, by 
adding P’s numerical increment or decrement (in terms of her cardi-
nal numbers) to Q’s increment or decrement (in terms of her cardinal 
numbers). If, for example, P assigns P1 to S1 and P2 to S2 (where P1 
> P2), and Q assigns Q1 to S1 and Q2 to S2 (where Q1 < Q2), then S1 
is better overall as compared to S2 if and only if P1-P2 > Q2–Q1. This 
approach is more attractive than the ordinalist approach because it 
does not assume equal “spacing.” The numerical difference between 
the number assigned by P to his worst outcome (0) and his next-to-
worst outcome need not be the same as the difference between the 
number assigned to his next-to-worst outcome and his third-worst 
outcome. 
 However, there turn out to be various technical objections to the 
cardinalist approach.138 Quite apart from these objections, the ap-
proach is suspect because—like the ordinalist approach—it assumes 
that different persons are equally productive of well-being. Moving P 
                                                                                                                  
 136. See Hammond, supra note 134, at 215-16 (discussing Isbell’s construct); Haus-
man, supra note 134, at 479-82 (same); Ruth Weintraub, Do Utility Comparisons Pose a 
Problem?, 92 PHIL. STUD. 307, 317-18 (1998) (same). 
 137. Isbell’s technique has, in effect, been adopted by the so -called QUALY approach to 
evaluating governmental projects that affect longevity or health. See Robert Fabian, The 
Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 118, 119, 124 
(George Tolley et al., eds., 1994) (stating that “QUALYs [i.e., quality-adjusted life years] 
returning to different individuals should be weighted equally” and that “a full healthy life 
for each individual carries the same weight” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 138. See Hausman, supra note 134, at 479-82. 
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from his very worst outcome to his very best outcome is assumed to 
have the same effect on overall well-being as moving Q from her very 
worst outcome to her very best outcome; more generally, moving P a 
fraction (r) of the way from his very worst outcome to his very best 
outcome is assumed to have the same effect on overall well-being as 
moving Q the very same fraction (r) of the way from her very worst 
outcome to her very best outcome. This effect is reflected in the car-
dinalist’s assignment of the same numbers, 0 and 1, to each person’s 
worst and best outcomes, and in the fact that the numerical incre-
ments or decrements summed across persons to determine the effect 
of a given move (S2 to S1) on overall well-being are unweighted. It is 
one thing to say that persons have an equal claim to well-being, that 
is, that equality of well-being or other such distributive criteria are 
relevant to regulatory choice. It is quite another to say that overall 
well-being is itself inherently distributive, in that whatever the set of 
possible outcomes, overall well-being is a function of P’s and Q’s car-
dinal rankings normalized on a zero-one scale. Imagine that P is an 
ascetic, while Q’s welfare is exquisitely sensitive to small changes in 
the world that would barely make a difference to P. Then, for a given 
cardinal increment, that increment, experienced by P, should have 
less significance for aggregate well-being than if experienced by Q. 
(This is just what it means, after all, to say that P is an ascetic, while 
Q is not.) But the cardinal approach makes this impossible; it ignores 
affective differences and other such differences that bear upon the 
capacity of persons to contribute to aggregate welfare.139 
 A third approach to interpersonal comparisons of welfare, on a 
simple preference-based view of welfare, is the well-known sugges-
tion of Harsanyi140 and others141 that we look to the extended prefer-
ences of an impartial observer. P prefers S1 to S2, while Q prefers S2 
to S1. Observer I is asked to 
(i) imagine herself in P’s shoes, with all of P’s characteristics in-
cluding P’s preferences, moving from S2 to S1; 
(ii) imagine herself in Q’s shoes, with all of Q’s characteristics 
including Q’s preferences, moving from S1 to S2; and 
                                                                                                                  
 139. See AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 98 (1970) (criti-
cizing the Isbell approach because it fails to allow “interpersonal variability of capacity for 
satisfaction”); RAWLS, supra note 99, at 323 (making a similar criticism); GRIFFIN, supra 
note 73, at 120 (making a similar criticism and noting “It is not the case that we all reach 
the same peaks and valleys.”). 
 140. See Harsanyi, supra note 128; see also John A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the 
Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, 
supra note 134, at 255, 289-97 (presenting Harsanyi’s model). 
 141. See, e.g., James Griffin, Against the Taste Model, in INTERPERSONAL 
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 134, at 45, 52 n.15 (citing other scholars who 
develop variants of Harsanyi’s model, including Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, R.M. Hare, 
and Donald Davidson). 
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(iii) decide whether she would prefer the first move or the second. 
The extended-preference approach is inviting first because it is sensi-
tive to the possibility of affective differences and the like that make 
persons differentially welfare-productive, and second because it is 
open to the possibility that outcomes might be differentially “spaced” 
in terms of persons’ welfare. All this would bear upon I’s ranking of 
the S2-S1 move for P, as compared to the S1-S2 move for Q. The prob-
lem with the extended-preference approach lies elsewhere. It is that 
different impartial observers might have different rankings of the 
relevant items. For example, observer I might prefer being P and 
moving from S2 to S1, over being Q and moving from S1 to S2; while 
another observer (I*) might have just the opposite preference.142 
 What is Harsanyi to say to this objection? He might say that, if I 
and I* were sufficiently idealized, that is, if their preferences were 
sufficiently informed, sufficiently deliberate, and so on, then both 
would prefer either the first move to the second or the second move to 
the first. But is this true? One person could have an idealized prefer-
ence for vanilla ice cream, while another could have an idealized 
preference for chocolate ice cream, just by virtue of differences in 
their physical makeups and backgrounds. If this is true, then it is not 
clear why idealized I and idealized I* could not have different prefer-
ences over the moves for P and Q. Observers I and I* may just have 
different “tastes” with respect to the prospect of becoming one person 
or, instead, a different person (P or Q) in a world that undergoes a 
particular change (the move between S1 and S2). 
 A final approach to determining overall well-being, consistent 
with the simple preference-based view, is to translate each person’s 
preferences over outcomes into cardinal units of one or another basic 
resource for well-being, where an objective, public, and cardinal scale 
for measuring such units exists. For example, an objective, public, 
and cardinal scale of dollars exists; it is an objective fact that P has, 
say, $100, while Q has $80, and that moving P to a level of $90 would 
decrease her stock of dollars more than moving Q to a level of $85 
would increase Q’s. So where the outcomes to be compared are S1 and 
S2, we can give P a dollar equivalent Dp for the S2-to-S1 move, and Q 
a dollar equivalent Dq for that move. We can then subtract the Los-
ers’ equivalents from the Winners’ equivalents to determine the ef-
fect of the move on overall well-being. In short, cost-benefit analysis 
in terms of dollars, or liberty, or any other objectively-scaled resource 
could be understood as a methodology for interpersonal comparison—
                                                                                                                  
 142. See GRIFFIN, supra note 73, at 53-54 (articulating this kind of criticism of Har-
sanyi); Hausman, supra note 134, at 477-78 (same); see also BINMORE , supra note 134; 
HURLEY, supra note 67, at 103-11; Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal 
Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 134, at 17, 22-
38. 
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where the existence of an objective scale is meant to get around the 
unwelcome effect of subjectivity (the divergence between the ex-
tended preferences of I and I*) that afflicted Harsanyi’s approach, 
while the reliance on a welfare resource is meant to make plausible 
the claim that cost-benefit analysis and overall well-being are just 
equivalent. But are they? Can they be, even where cost-benefit 
analysis is performed in terms of a basic resource—a “primary 
good,”143 to quote Rawls, such as dollars?  
 It seems not. The central claim of cost-benefit analysis, again, is 
that the move from S2 to S1 is better in light of the overall well-being 
of P and Q just in case the winner P’s resource equivalent Rp (for ex-
ample, a dollar equivalent) is larger than the loser Q’s resource 
equivalent Rq. This claim is problematic, regardless of how Rp and Rq 
are defined.144 If Rp and Rq are defined as the amounts that P and Q 
would be willing to pay or accept for the S2-to-S1 move, given their 
actual holdings of the basic resource, then the claimed identity be-
tween cost-benefit analysis and overall well-being bumps up against 
the objection that these numbers can be distorted by the differential 
size of P’s and Q’s holdings. Imagine that S1 is an outcome in which a 
particulate fouls the sky, thereby improving the beauty of the sun-
sets that P views, but causing respiratory distress to Q. Because P 
owns tremendous amounts of the resource, he is willing to spend a 
very large amount (Rp) to purchase the sunset; that large expendi-
ture will still leave P free to purchase everything else he needs. Be-
cause Q is relatively poor in her resource holdings, she is willing to 
spend less (Rq) to purchase relief from respiratory distress; 145 addi-
tional amounts beyond Rq are needed by Q for goods even more im-
portant than relief from respiratory distress, for example, food or 
shelter. So Rp is greater than Rq but the S2-to-S1 move still seems to 
decrease, not increase, overall well-being; respiratory distress is 
more important for welfare than a pretty sunset. To put the point 
more generally and abstractly, the proposal to define Rp and Rq in 
terms of P’s and Q’s actual holdings of the resource ignores the possi-
bility that the resource may have diminishing marginal utility; and 
                                                                                                                  
 143. RAWLS, supra note 99. 
 144. See Adler, supra note 63, at 1373-74; Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 191-95. 
 145. If Rp is the amount that P is willing to spend in S1 to purchase the sunset then, 
technically, Rq is the amount that Q would be willing to accept in S1 in compensation for 
the respiratory distress—not the amount that Q would be willing to pay (in S2) to purchase 
relief from distress. However, it is particularly easy to see that the amount P is willing to 
spend to purchase the sunset could be greater than the amount Q is willing to spend to 
purchase relief, by virtue of differences in their holdings of the basic resource. Further, ab-
sent special circumstances (such as would arise if the respiratory distress and sunset made 
a large difference to Q’s and P’s overall well-being), the amount that Q is willing to accept 
in compensation for the respiratory distress should be equal to the amount that she is will-
ing to spend to purchase relief from it. 
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yet it is widely recognized that the marginal utility of all goods, in-
cluding basic resources (like dollars), can and usually does diminish. 
 One way around the diminishing-marginal-utility objection to 
cost-benefit analysis, perhaps, is to define Rp and Rq in terms of P’s 
and Q’s normalized resource-holdings rather than their actual hold-
ings. If P and Q had equal amounts of the resource, how much would 
P pay for the S2-to-S1 move, as compared to the amount that Q would 
require for the S2-to-S1 move? The difficulty here is the same as with 
Isbell’s cardinal-utility approach to interpersonal comparisons, and 
with the ordinalist approach: Persons can be differentially productive 
of well-being. Although P and Q may have an equal distributive 
claim to the resource, that does not entail, and it does not seem plau-
sible to say, that P’s (diminishing) function relating basic resources 
and well-being is necessarily the same as Q’s (diminishing) function. 
If P is ascetic while Q is super-sensitive, P’s Rp (defined in the “nor-
malized” way described above) can be bigger than Q’s Rq even though 
the S2-to-S1 move, like all other changes in the world, makes barely a 
difference to P’s welfare.146 
 To sum up, interpersonal comparisons of well-being are seriously 
problematic for the simple view that equates well-being with prefer-
ence satisfaction. All of the preference-based approaches to interper-
sonal comparison—the ordinal approach, Isbell’s cardinal approach, 
Harsanyi’s extended-preference approach, and the cost-benefit ap-
proach—encounter cogent objections. And these problems with inter-
personal comparisons would seemingly carry over from the simple 
preference-based view to the view espoused by welfarism, namely so-
phisticated preferentialism. 
 The sophisticated preferentialist could follow an ordinal, cardinal, 
extended-preference, or cost-benefit approach, defined in terms of ac-
tual preference. That is, the sophisticated preferentialist could say: 
??P is better with S1 as opposed to S2 because P’s actual restricted 
preference favors S1 and his ideal restricted preference favors S1 
??Q is better with S2 as opposed to S1 because Q’s actual restricted 
preference favors S2 and his ideal restricted preference favors S2 
??Whether S1 or S2 is better for the overall welfare of P and Q de-
pends on P’s and Q’s actual restricted preference; in particular 
the [ordinal approach/cardinal approach/extended-preference 
approach/cost-benefit approach] is the right way to integrate ac-
                                                                                                                  
 146. The point that money can have differential welfare productivity as between 
equally wealthy persons, e.g., because of their physical differences, has been recognized in 
the literature on pain-and-suffering damages. See W. KIP VISCUSI,  FATAL TRADEOFFS: 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 70-73 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Proposals 
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis 97 YALE L.J. 353, 364 (1988). See 
generally Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-
and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995). 
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tual preferences so as to arrive at a judgment of overall well-
being. 
But then the above-described objections to the ordinal, cardinal, ex-
tended-preference, and cost-benefit approaches apply directly to the 
sophisticated preferentialist’s proposal. 
 Alternatively, the sophisticated preferentialist could use P’s and 
Q’s ideal preferences to determine overall well-being by plugging 
ideal preferences into the ordinal, cardinal, extended-preference, or 
cost-benefit approaches; but it is not clear why the difficulties with 
such approaches are avoided by the shift to ideal preference. Take 
Isbell’s cardinal approach, in which the idea would be to assign 1 to 
the outcome ranked very best by P’s ideal preference, 0 to the out-
come ranked very worst, and a number r to each intermediate out-
come such that P, choosing on the basis of his ideal preferences, 
would be indifferent between that outcome and an (r, 1-r) lottery of 
the very best and worst outcomes. This approach still assumes, im-
plausibly, that moving P from his very worst to his very best outcome 
must have exactly the same effect on overall well-being as moving Q 
from her very worst to her very best outcome. 
 What to do? One option is to abandon the project of interpersonal 
comparisons. The sophisticated preferentialist could say that, where 
two outcomes are Pareto-noncomparable, overall well-being is simply 
indeterminate. But this option is deeply unattractive. As the philoso-
pher Daniel Hausman has rightly commented: “[I]f a conception of 
well-being does not permit one to make interpersonal comparisons in 
an acceptable way, then that conception of well-being is itself unac-
ceptable.”147 It may be true that some, even most Pareto-
noncomparable outcomes are welfare-noncomparable; but the view 
that all such outcomes are welfare-noncomparable is highly counter-
intuitive. 
 Imagine that S1 involves a painful death for thousands (who pre-
fer not to die); in S2, the thousands do not die, but P suffers a mild 
headache (which he prefers not to have). S1 and S2 are Pareto-
noncomparable, but surely we would want to, and can, say that S2 is 
better for overall well-being than S1. If sophisticated preferentialism 
fails to warrant such an obviously true statement, then that should 
be taken as a strong and maybe decisive objection against this wel-
fare view. 
 Note further that if sophisticated preferentialism disables judg-
ments of overall well-being, then it also disables the comparisons of 
welfare levels necessary for distributive criteria (for example, the cri-
                                                                                                                  
 147. Hausman, supra note 134, at 474. Hausman continues: “[I]nterpersonal compari-
sons are an ineliminable part of human life.” Id. at 489. For similar statements, see Har-
sanyi, supra note 128, at 49; Weintraub, supra note 136, at 307. 
2000]  WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION 297 
 
terion that seeks to equalize well-being, or to maximize the welfare 
position of the least well-off).148 To put the point epistemologically, in 
choosing between sophisticated preferentialism and other welfare 
views (for example, hedonism, simple objectivism, or sophisticated 
objectivism), we ought to strive for a “reflective equilibrium”149 where 
the chosen view is the one best supported by intuitive judgments as 
well as systematic considerations. Sophisticated preferentialism, if it 
entailed the welfare-noncomparability of Pareto-noncomparable 
states and the impossibility of welfare-level comparisons, would be so 
counterintuitive and so systematically problematic that it could not 
be the equilibrium welfare view. 
 A more palatable option for the sophisticated preferentialist is to 
use objective values as a basis for interpersonal comparisons. James 
Griffin (one of the leading philosophers of well-being, and an advo-
cate of something like the sophisticated preferentialist view) has ar-
gued that judgments of overall well-being as between Pareto-
noncomparable states reduce to judgments of overall objective value. 
 We have a picture of normal human desires: virtually all per-
sons, when informed, want to live autonomously, to have deep per-
sonal relations, to accomplish something with their lives, to enjoy 
themselves. With experience, we build up such a profile of the 
components of a valuable life, including their relative impor-
tance—a chart to the various peaks that human life can reach. 
These values, if our profile is complete, cover the whole domain of 
prudential [i.e, welfare-related] value. They are valuable in any 
life; individual differences matter not to what appears in this pro-
file of general prudential values, but to how, or how much, a par-
ticular person can realize one or other particular value. 
  . . . [Consider] Mill’s interpersonal comparison of Socrates and 
the Fool. . . . What [the person making the comparison] needs to 
make is a judgment of a very different sort from what we ordinar-
ily understand by a personal preference. He needs to know how 
much persons generally, when informed, would want each life, how 
desirable they are. This judgment can be expressed as a personal 
preference, but the nature of the judgment is very special: it is a 
judgment about prudential values that is independent of what any 
particular individual’s desires or preferences happen to be.150 
 The objectivist approach to interpersonal comparisons is some-
times framed (as Griffin seems to frame it) in terms of a list of objec-
                                                                                                                  
 148. See BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 29, at 137-70 (discussing extent to which dif-
ferent “social welfare” criteria, such as the utilitarian criterion or distributive criteria, de-
mand interpersonal comparability of utility levels or differences). 
 149. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1996) (presenting and extending Rawlsian idea of “reflective equi-
librium”). 
 150. GRIFFIN, supra note 73, at 114-17. 
298  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:241 
 
tive values V1, V2 . . . Vn, such that the comparative effect of S1 and 
S2 on overall well-being is a function of how they compare with re-
spect to each Vi, plus tradeoff rates between different values. 151 (So if 
V1 is the value of physical pleasure, and V2 is the value of artistic ac-
complishment, then we might determine that: (1) moving from S2 to 
S1 increases Q’s physical pleasure by twenty units and decreases P’s 
physical pleasure by ten units, thus producing an overall increase of 
ten units of physical pleasure; (2) moving from S2 to S1 decreases Q’s 
artistic accomplishment by eleven units, and increases P’s artistic 
accomplishment by eight units, thus producing an overall decrease of 
three units of artistic accomplishment; and (3) one unit of artistic ac-
complishment is worth four units of physical pleasure, objectively 
speaking, and so the move from S2 to S1 decreases overall objective 
value.) This may be the right way to make overall judgments of ob-
jective value, but it need not be. The objectivist about overall welfare 
is not committed to the existence of cardinally measurable “values” 
plus tradeoffs between these. Rather, and more weakly, she is com-
mitted to the existence of some sense in which it can be “objectively” 
true that P is benefited more or less by the move from S2 to S1 than 
Q is harmed. 
 What is that sense? Objectivity, with respect to matters of value, 
morality, and norms, is plausibly understood as the convergence of 
judgments or preferences under ideal conditions. To quote Michael 
Smith, “[It] is desirable [that is, more valuable, morally better, or 
otherwise normatively better] that p in C just in case we would all 
desire that p in C if we were fully rational.”152 As Smith elaborates: 
[T]he truth of a normative reason claim requires a convergence in 
the desires of fully rational agents. However note that the conver-
gence required is not at the level of desires about how each such 
agent is to organize her own life in her own world. In their own 
worlds fully rational agents will find themselves in quite different 
circumstances from each other, circumstances that are conditioned 
by their different embodiments, talents, environments, and at-
tachments in their respective worlds. Their desires about how to 
organize their own lives in their own worlds will therefore reflect 
these differences in their circumstances. The convergence required 
is rather at the level of their hypothetical desires about what is to 
be done in the various circumstances in which they might find 
themselves.153 
Some person’s performance of action A is objectively, normatively 
better than an alternative, just in case everyone, under ideal condi-
                                                                                                                  
 151. See also Scanlon, supra note 142, at 39-44 (apparently advocating this approach to 
interpersonal comparisons). 
 152. SMITH, supra note 92, at 166. 
 153. Id. at 173. 
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tions, would prefer in this situation to perform A, or so Smith plausi-
bly proposes.154 In particular, I would argue, S1 is objectively better 
for P’s welfare than S2 just in case everyone under ideal conditions 
would (restrictedly) prefer to be P experiencing S1 rather than P ex-
periencing S2. And the S2-to-S1 move is objectively better for the 
overall well-being of P and Q—where P benefits from the move and Q 
loses—just in case everyone under ideal conditions would (restrict-
edly) prefer to be P moving from S2 to S1 rather than Q moving from 
S1 to S2.155 For example, where S2 involves complete bliss for one per-
son but torturous pain for a second, and S1 involves bliss dampened 
by a headache and hangnail for the first person and mild pleasure for 
the second person, S1 would represent an improvement in overall 
well-being if and only if everyone under ideal conditions would prefer 
(restrictedly) to replace torturous pain with mild pleasure (to be the 
second person moving from S2 to S1 rather than to be rid of a head-
ache and hangnail that dampen complete bliss (to be the first person 
moving from S1 to S2). 
 Note that the objectivist model of interpersonal comparisons, as I 
have framed it, is really quite close to Harsanyi’s extended-
preference model. This should make the objectivist model more pal-
atable to the reader accustomed to thinking of welfare in economic 
terms, as exclusively a function of preference, since Harsanyi’s and 
similar approaches have been the most influential accounts of inter-
personal comparison within welfare economics. 156 The crucial differ-
ence between Harsanyi’s model and my own is this: While Harsanyi 
simply assumes that idealized observers I1, I2 . . . In will have the 
same preferences as between the S2-to-S1 moves for P and for Q, I 
make no such assumption. If two observers under idealized condi-
tions of full information, intensive deliberation, and so on, would 
have a different preference as between the two moves, then the com-
parative effect of S1 and S2 on the overall well-being of P and Q is in-
determinate. If and only if all idealized observers would have conver-
                                                                                                                  
 154. See id. at 187 (“My handing back a wallet I found in the street in such and such 
circumstances is right, for example, only if, under conditions of full rationality, we would 
all want that if we find a wallet in the street in such and such circumstances, then we 
hand it back.”). 
 155. This approach, like Harsanyi’s approach, would be extended to comparisons in-
volving more than two persons through the device of a lottery. Each idealized observer 
would ask how she would compare the S1 lottery (the chance of being each person in S1, 
with probability 1/n where there are n persons in the population) to the S2 lottery (the 
chance of being each person in S2 with probability 1/n). See Weymark, supra note 140, at 
255 (explaining Harsanyi’s approach, including his use of an equiprobability lottery over 
person-states). 
 156. In particular, it is the approach adopted by Kenneth Arrow. See, e.g., Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice, 7 PHILOSOPHIA 223 (1978); 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Welfare Economics: Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social 
Choice, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 219, 224 (1977). 
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gent preferences over the moves can a determinate statement about 
overall welfare be made. 
 But this is no odder than saying that some person’s performance 
of an action (A) is morally better than the alternative only if all ideal-
ized observers (or all participants in a hypothetical Rawlsian or 
Scanlonian scenario of social contracting) would agree that a person 
in those circumstances should perform A. Some of our idealized pref-
erences or judgments do converge;157 and it is just in the case of such 
convergence that we can speak of objective rightness or goodness, 
rather than mere subjective preference. The compelling fact patterns 
that undermine the putative impossibility of interpersonal compari-
sons—for example, the case where S1 involves a painful death for 
thousands, while in S2 the thousands do not die, but P suffers a mild 
headache—are just cases in which the comparative effects of the out-
comes on persons are sufficiently stark that we expect any thoughtful 
and well-informed observer to reach the same welfare evaluation of 
the outcomes. 
 What criticisms might be leveled against the objectivist approach 
to interpersonal comparison sketched here? One criticism is that this 
approach leaves some outcomes welfare-incomparable. Welfare 
economists often demand that a social welfare function give a com-
plete ranking of states, such that every outcome is better, worse, or 
exactly equal to every other. The approach sketched here does not do 
that.158 If S1 is Pareto-incomparable with S2, and if idealized observ-
ers would not converge in their extended preferences over the two 
outcomes, then, on the objectivist approach, the outcomes are neither 
better, nor worse, nor equally good with respect to overall welfare. 
 However, completeness is too strong a feature to require of a 
moral criterion. It is a welcome feature, but not a necessary one. (As 
I have already observed, the Pareto criterion is itself incomplete.) 
Various prominent philosophers and economists—including Joseph 
Raz,159 Amartya Sen,160 Thomas Hurka,161 and Larry Temkin162—have 
persuasively argued that we should accept the existence of some in-
comparabilities with respect to the criterion of overall well-being or 
with respect to related criteria (for example, the criterion of equal 
well-being).163 For example, if P goes for a revitalizing walk in the 
                                                                                                                  
 157. See SMITH, supra note 92, at 187-89. 
 158. See, e.g., BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 29, at 137-70. 
 159. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM  322-35 (1986). 
 160. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 46-48 (1992). 
 161. See THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 86-88 (1993). 
 162. See TEMKIN, supra note 61, at 141-47. 
 163. For philosophical and legal discussion about the issue of “incommensurability,” 
including (although not necessarily limited to) the problem of incomparability, see 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). 
See also ANDERSON, supra note 62, at 44-64; GRIFFIN, supra note 73, at 75-92; HURLEY, 
2000]  WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION 301 
 
park in S1 but not in S2, and Q enjoys an evening with friends in S2 
but not in S1, and the two outcomes are otherwise identical, it seems 
very plausible that (1) S1 is neither better nor worse for overall well-
being than S2 (revitalizing walks and friendly talks do not differ in 
their effect on the overall welfare calculus); but also (2) S1 is not pre-
cisely equal to S2 in light of overall well-being (since the outcome S3 
in which P goes for a slightly more revitalizing walk is better for 
overall well-being than S1, but still neither better nor worse than S2); 
and therefore (3) S1 and S2 are incomparable with respect to overall 
well-being. 
 A second and more serious objection is that sophisticated prefer-
entialism is inconsistent with an objectivist approach to interper-
sonal comparison—that this approach would lead us to a more objec-
tivist theory of well-being, either simple objectivism or the more 
plausible view I have term sophisticated objectivism. But where is 
the inconsistency? Sophisticated preferentialism is a much better 
theory than simple objectivism because it preserves the truism that 
P cannot be benefited by an outcome unless he prefers it (or comes to 
prefer it). It is perfectly coherent to endorse that truism and, at the 
same time, to claim that judgments of overall well-being with respect 
to Pareto-noncomparable states are a function of objective goods. 
 Think of the point this way: In deciding who is harmed by a social 
choice (a Loser), benefited by that choice (a Winner), or unaffected by 
the choice (a Neutral), sophisticated preferentialism relies solely on 
persons’ preferences and idealized preferences; it is only at the latter 
stage of comparing welfare gains to the Winners with welfare losses 
to the Losers that objective goods come into play. By contrast, simple 
objectivism ignores preference at every stage, which makes it an im-
plausible account of welfare, while sophisticated objectivism brings 
actual preference into play at the first stage, but also brings in objec-
tive goods (rather than idealized preference) at that initial stage. 
Whether sophisticated preferentialism or sophisticated objectivism is 
the correct account of welfare is a close question, but for reasons I 
elaborated in Part II, I think the basic categorization of persons as 
Winners, Losers, and Neutrals should be solely a function of prefer-
ence and idealized preference rather than objective goods.  
 Finally, the objectivist approach to interpersonal comparison that 
I have advocated may be criticized because it seems illiberal. Is not 
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the invocation of objective welfare-judgments inconsistent with the 
liberal claim that government should be neutral between differing 
ways of life?164 But sophisticated preferentialism is significantly re-
sponsive to the liberal claim, insofar as it is P’s own preferences that 
determine whether he is benefited, harmed, or unaffected by an out-
come—whether he is a Winner, Loser, or Neutral. And the definition 
of objective goods in terms of convergent ideal judgments should fur-
ther allay the liberal’s concern; if well-informed persons genuinely 
disagree about the worth of the different ways of life at stake, then 
ideal judgments will not converge. The liberal who demands yet 
more, who eschews any talk whatsoever of objective welfare-value, 
will be forced to either: (1) claim that interpersonal comparisons are 
impossible; (2) claim that the correct approach to interpersonal com-
parisons is some approach that doesn’t involve objective values, such 
as the ordinal, cardinal, extended-preference, or cost-benefit ap-
proaches; or (3) claim that overall well-being lacks moral force. I 
have already demonstrated why the first two claims are spurious. 
Let me now try to show why the third one also is spurious. 
B.   The Moral Force of Overall Well-Being 
 Imagine that a regulatory action, policy, or institution will in-
crease overall well-being relative to alternative regulatory options, 
and that this welfare-increasing option does not run afoul of deonto-
logical requirements, perfectionist values, or norms of distributive 
justice sufficiently weighty to override the criterion of overall well-
being. Then, the welfarist claims, government is morally obliged to 
choose the welfare increasing option. Welfarism says that overall 
well-being is morally relevant, if not morally conclusive; the fact that 
a regulatory option is welfare-increasing constitutes a prima facie 
moral reason for regulators to choose the option. That is, it consti-
tutes a moral reason that will eventuate in an all-things-considered 
obligation to choose the option, if there are no overriding moral rea-
sons to the contrary. But why? Why is overall well-being even mor-
ally relevant, let alone morally conclusive? Why does that feature of 
options and outcomes have moral force?  
 This important question has been generally ignored, both by wel-
fare economists and by moral philosophers. 165 Welfare economists 
have focused exclusively upon the question addressed in Section A 
above, namely, is overall well-being determinate?166 Their working 
                                                                                                                  
 164. See SHER, supra note 74 (discussing and criticizing various liberal theories, e.g., 
those of Ackerman and Dworkin). 
 165. Shelly Kagan is one exception. See KAGAN, supra note 98, at 29-40 (arguing that 
well-being has prima facie, if not conclusive, moral relevance). 
 166. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 55; Pollak, supra note 56; INTERPERSONAL 
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and undefended assumption seems to be that, if overall well-being is 
determinate—if interpersonal comparisons are indeed possible—then 
overall well-being (“social welfare”) or something like it ought to play 
a role in government decisionmaking.167 The assumption is problem-
atic. It is a necessary condition for overall welfare to possess moral 
force that it be determinate, but it is not a sufficient condition; I can 
concede that my losses can be compared with your gains, without 
conceding that your gains constitute a moral reason (even a prima 
facie one) for me to suffer losses. This is a point well recognized 
within the philosophical literature. Philosophers have generally as-
sumed the interpersonal comparability of welfare and have instead 
trained their attention on the question, Is it morally obligatory to 
maximize overall well-being? 
 But that question is almost always mooted within the context of a 
debate about utilitarianism. 168 Utilitarians claim that it is always 
morally obligatory, all things considered, to maximize overall well-
being. In other words, they argue that overall well-being is morally 
conclusive and not merely morally relevant. The critics of utilitarian-
ism advance familiar counterexamples (for example, killing one to 
save five, sacrificing the scapegoat to appease the crowd) to show 
why welfare maximization is not always morally permissible and, a 
fortiori, why it is not always morally obligatory. Although these 
counterexamples are persuasive, they leave untouched the welfarist’s 
weaker claim that government officials are subject to a prima facie 
moral requirement to engage in welfare maximization. Yet the claim 
is hardly self-evident; pace the welfare economists, we need an ar-
gument for the moral relevance of “social welfare.” 
 What would that argument be? The welfarist faces two potent ob-
jections. Call the first the “minimalist” objection; call the second the 
“egalitarian” objection. The minimalist objection is that no person 
has a claim that others suffer losses so as to improve her welfare (at 
least if those others lack a special relationship to her).169 The egali-
                                                                                                                  
 167. For a good illustration of this assumption, see Richard Layard and Stephen Glais-
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tarian objection is that no person has a claim that others suffer 
losses so as to improve her welfare just by virtue of the fact that her 
welfare gain is larger than their losses; rather, her justified claim is 
that others suffer losses so as to provide her a fair (equal) amount of 
welfare.170 
Welfarism and Its Critics 
Welfarism: Where a regulatory action produces a gain for person 
Pw and a loss for Pl, such that Pw’s gain is larger than Pl’s loss, 
then government has a moral reason to perform the action and will 
be morally required to perform it unless other (and overriding) 
moral considerations are at stake. 
Minimalism: Where a regulatory action produces a gain for person 
Pw and a loss for person P1, such that Pw’s gain is larger than P1’s 
loss, then government has no moral reason yet to perform the ac-
tion. (In other words, government will not be morally required to 
perform the action, even if moral considerations besides overall 
well-being are not at stake.) Similarly, where a regulatory action 
produces a gain for Pw and a loss for Pl, such that this action less-
ens the inequality between Pw and Pl (because Pw is poorer than 
P1), then government has no moral reason yet to perform the ac-
tion. (Government will not be morally required to perform it even 
if moral considerations besides equality are not at stake.) Pw’s wel-
fare is simply not a sufficient basis for imposing a welfare setback 
upon Pl. Although Pl is subject to moral duties that are, in some 
sense, grounded in Pw’s welfare (for example, the duty not to inten-
tionally and directly kill Pw, to breach a promise to him, or to de-
prive him of his property), the sheer fact that Pw would be better 
off is no grounds whatsoever for making Pl worse off. 
Egalitarianism: Where a regulatory action produces a gain for per-
son Pw and a loss for Pl, such that Pw’s gain is larger than Pl’s loss, 
whether government has a moral reason to perform this action is 
essentially dependent on the welfare levels of Pw and Pl and of 
other persons in the population. If the action lessens the inequality 
of welfare levels (for example, if everyone else is at level M, and 
the action moves both poorer Pw and richer Pl closer to level M), 
then government has a moral reason to perform it. If the action in-
creases the inequality of welfare levels (for example, if everyone 
else is at level M, and Pw is already above it while Pl is below it), 
then government has a moral reason not to perform the action. 
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Further, governmental actions will generally increase or decrease 
the equality of welfare, relative to alternative actions. Although 
overall well-being might be a relevant consideration when choosing 
between options that are equally or incomparably good with re-
spect to welfare-equality, that is a highly unusual case.  
 The welfarist needs to take very seriously both the minimalist ob-
jection and the egalitarian objection. In effect, these objections repre-
sent two horns of a dilemma that welfarism must navigate. Either 
we are sufficiently linked by the sheer fact of coexistence in a com-
mon society (or on a common planet) that everyone has a claim on 
everyone else to a fair and equal share of social welfare (which every-
one can rightly claim to have helped produce);171 or we are not thus 
linked,172 in which case fellow citizens or Earthlings are under no 
mutual moral obligation to equalize welfare, maximize welfare, or 
otherwise take account of welfare effects on each other. 
 I have no foundational rebuttal to the minimalist and egalitarian 
objections. A foundational argument for welfarism would try to show 
why, given certain plausible premises about the foundations of mo-
rality, overall well-being turns out to have moral force. For example, 
the welfarist could argue (1) that fellow citizens or Earthlings are 
linked in a common scheme of cooperation—pace the minimalist—
such that the welfare each reaps is a joint product of everyone’s ef-
fort; (2) that in such a situation, moral obligations are those obliga-
tions that the citizens or Earthlings would choose in a initial contract 
setting out the terms of social cooperation;173 and (3) under the 
proper specification of the contracting scenario (for example, as a 
scenario where contractors do not know what the particulars of their 
lives will be), the citizens or Earthlings would agree to welfarism, 
pace the egalitarian. But I am not sure that this particular founda-
tional argument for welfarism works. 
 Harsanyi has famously tried to demonstrate that social contrac-
tors bargaining behind a veil of ignorance would indeed agree to 
maximize well-being,174 rather than (as Rawls claims) to maximize 
the position of the least well-off, or to choose an egalitarian standard. 
Yet Harsanyi’s demonstration is controversial, 175 both because it re-
lies upon controversial assumptions about the nature of rational 
choice under uncertainty and, even more importantly, because it con-
stitutes an argument for utilitarianism, which as I have explained is 
vulnerable to persuasive counterexamples. What we would need is a 
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hypothetical-contract argument for welfarism, but not for utilitarian-
ism; it is unclear to me how that argument should be developed. 
More generally, it is unclear to me that a deductive argument from 
any plausible view about moral foundations will lead us to welfarism 
but not to utilitarianism. Welfarism is a pluralist, not a monist view; 
it gives force to one moral item, while leaving space for qualitatively 
distinct others (rights, equality, perfections). Pluralist moral views 
are notoriously resistant to foundational demonstration. 
 Rather, my argument for welfarism will appeal to moral intui-
tions. 176 It is counterintuitive to think that overall well-being lacks 
prima facie moral force, or so I will claim. The counterintuitive impli-
cations of minimalism and egalitarianism emerge quite clearly in the 
following kind of case. 
The Beneficial Meteor: A Counterexample to Minimalism and 
Egalitarianism 
A shower of meteors has landed on government property. Most of 
the rocks are needed for scientific research and museums, but 
there is one extra one. This meteor is useless, except for the follow-
ing: (1) it can be used to relieve Pw’s emphysema, a chronic (but 
non-fatal) condition that causes him near-constant discomfort and 
prevents him from engaging in sports or other vigorous activities; 
and (2) it can be used to alleviate a very mild headache that Pl suf-
fers once every month, which like Pw’s emphysema is resistant to 
other medical treatments. Pw is much wealthier than Pl. Pw is a 
millionaire. Pl is not impoverished, but neither is she wealthy or 
even close. Her income and wealth place her in the lower middle 
class, at around the twenty-fifth percentile, while Pw’s income and 
wealth place him well above the ninety-fifth percentile. 
What should government do with the beneficial meteor? I suggest 
that government is morally required to use the meteor to alleviate 
Pw’s emphysema—in short, to choose the option that maximizes wel-
fare. First, it seems intuitively clear that government is morally re-
quired either to use the meteor to help Pw or to use it to help Pl. De-
stroying the meteor is a third option for government, but that would 
be wrong; the rock can make a significant difference to Pw’s life and a 
smaller, but still observable, difference to Pl’s. Further, as between 
the options of giving the meteor to Pw and giving it to Pl, it is the wel-
fare-maximizing option and not the welfare-equalizing option that 
seems morally correct in this case. Government has a prima facie 
moral reason to give the meteor to Pw because it matters to his wel-
fare; government also has a prima facie (and conflicting) moral rea-
son to give the meteor to Pl because it matters to her welfare. Yet the 
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effect on P1’s welfare of giving the rock to her is comparatively quite 
trivial, as compared to the effect upon Pw’s welfare of giving it to him. 
Relatedly, the (negative) effect upon welfare equalization caused by 
giving Pw the meteor is seemingly small, as compared to its (positive) 
effect upon overall welfare. Thus, I propose, it is Pw and not P1 who 
ought to get the meteor. 
 The reader may not share my intuitions about the Beneficial Me-
teor case. She may have strong minimalist leanings, and conclude 
that it is indeed a matter of moral indifference whether government 
destroys the rock, as opposed to giving it to Pw or Pl. Or, she may 
have strong egalitarian leanings, and conclude that government is 
morally prohibited from either destroying the rock or giving it to Pw. 
Instead, she may insist, the gains to equality that flow from alleviat-
ing Pl’s mild headache do take priority over the gains to aggregate 
welfare that flow from alleviating Pw’s emphysema. I have no sys-
tematic or foundational argument to show that such views about the 
Beneficial Meteor case are incorrect. If the reader has these views, 
then she can quite happily deny that welfarism is the right moral 
theory. Appeal-to-intuition arguments within moral philosophy are 
persuasive only insofar as the posited intuitions are indeed shared. 
“But that’s not my reaction” is always a possible response when the 
philosopher claims that a particular reaction to a given case is natu-
ral or obvious. On the other hand, if the reader does share my reac-
tion to the Beneficial Meteor case, that the rock should go to Pw, then 
she should also espouse welfarism. That reaction and a denial of wel-
farism are inconsistent. 
 Is this correct? Is it really true that the joint posture of (1) having 
government choose the welfare-maximizing option in Beneficial Me-
teor and other cases like it and (2) denying welfarism is untenable? 
One way to defend the choice of the welfare-maximizing option in 
Beneficial Meteor, while denying welfarism, is to argue that this op-
tion, giving the meteor to Pw rather than Pl, is actually justified on 
some basis other than its maximization of welfare. But what would 
that basis be? The moral requirement (such as it may be) that wel-
fare or its prerequisites be equally distributed cannot be the basis for 
the choice of Pw. Pw is much wealthier than Pl, and his welfare level 
is much higher, notwithstanding the misfortune of emphysema. Nor 
do considerations of moral desert177 ground that choice. Pw might 
have performed worthy actions in the past, for which he now de-
serves a reward (or reciprocally P1 might have done past wrong, for 
which her nonreceipt of the meteor is fair punishment, trumping her 
egalitarian claim to it); but the facts of Beneficial Meteor, as I have 
stated them, do not entail that Pw and Pl are differentially situated 
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with respect to considerations of moral desert. The intuition that 
needs to be explained is why Pw should get the rock apart from such 
considerations. 
 Perhaps the basis for Pw’s claim is that he has a greater physical 
need for the meteor than Pl? The notion here, as articulated in the 
work of Thomas Nagel and Tim Scanlon, is that well-being per se is 
morally inconsequential. What stand in its stead, so Scanlon and 
Nagel claim, are certain elements of well-being, such as physical 
pains and pleasures: 
If you and a stranger have both been injured, you have one dose of 
painkiller, and his pain is much more severe than yours, you 
should give him the painkiller—not for any complicated reason, 
but simply because of the relative severity of the two pains, which 
provides a neutral reason to prefer the relief of the more se-
vere. . . . 
 But many values are not like this. Though some human inter-
ests (and not only pleasure and pain) give rise to impersonal val-
ues, I now want to argue that not all of them do. If I have a bad 
headache, anyone has a reason to want it to stop. But if I badly 
want to climb to the top of Mount Kilimanjaro, not everyone has a 
reason to want me to succeed. I have a reason to try to get to the 
top, and it may be much stronger than my reason for wanting a 
headache to go away, but other people have very little reason, if 
any, to care whether I climb the mountain or not.178 
The Scanlon-Nagel view might be fleshed out as follows: (1) Only cer-
tain elements of well-being (call them “needs”) have moral force. If I 
lack a special relationship to you, I have moral reason to satisfy your 
needs, but not to increase your well-being per se. (2) Where needs 
conflict, we should maximize the satisfaction of needs, ceteris pari-
bus. If one option is satisfying some of P1’s needs by amount N1, and 
another option is satisfying some of P2’s needs by amount N2, and N1 
is larger than N2, then we should choose the first option, ceteris pari-
bus. (3) In short, we have moral reason to maximize need satisfac-
tion, but not to maximize well-being. (4) Giving the meteor to Pw in 
the Beneficial Meteor case is justified because it maximizes need sat-
isfaction—because Pw’s need for relief from emphysema is greater 
than Pl’s need for relief from a mild headache—and not because it 
maximizes well-being. 
 The difficulty with this account of the Beneficial Meteor case is 
that the moral force of needs and the moral force of welfare turn out 
on closer examination to be inseparable. A harmless need, that is, 
one that involves no welfare-setback for the person in need, surely 
                                                                                                                  
 178. Thomas Nagel, Autonomy and Deontology, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 
142, 145-46 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). For similar claims by Scanlon, see his book cited 
supra note 101. 
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lacks moral force. Imagine that Pw is a stoic who sees the emphysema 
as a test of his fortitude and thus prefers to have the condition and 
would retain this preference under ideal conditions. Then there is no 
reason to give him the meteor. Scanlon and Nagel might concede the 
point—they might even concede that needs are necessarily harmful, 
that conditions of a person do not really constitute “needs” unless 
they reduce his welfare—yet still insist that only needs, rather than 
harmful conditions of other kinds, give rise to moral requirements. 
But why should this be the case? 
 Imagine that Pw is replaced by Pw*, who is not suffering from em-
physema and therefore does not need the meteor, but who can use it 
to prevent some welfare-setback that (in terms of aggregate welfare) 
is still larger than Pl’s headache. For example, suppose Pw* has la-
bored for years to develop a unique and beautiful garden and all the 
plants have contracted a rare disease for which the meteor’s minerals 
provide the only cure. If Pw’s emphysema matters morally only be-
cause it harms him, and the loss of Pw*’s garden also harms him, and 
both harms are larger than the trivial harm to Pl comprised by his 
headache, then why should Pw, but not Pw*, get the meteor?179 Per-
haps it is generally true that relief from physical suffering (emphy-
sema, headaches) is more important for welfare than nonneeded 
benefits (the flowering of a garden). However, in a case like the just-
described modification to Beneficial Meteor where the generalization 
is untrue, it is the bedrock moral criterion of overall welfare, not the 
proxy of need satisfaction, that determines what choice is morally re-
quired. 
 Another plausible way to argue that the choice of the Pw option in 
the Beneficial Meteor case is actually justified on some basis other 
than welfare maximization is as follows: 
The Prioritarian Account of Beneficial Meteor 
Government is required, not to maximize overall well-being, that 
is, the unweighted sum of individual well-being, but rather to 
maximize the sum of each individual’s well-being as weighted by a 
factor that gives greater weight to the well-being of those worse 
off, and thus is inversely proportional to that individual’s level of 
wealth or welfare. Let us say that PiO is the welfare of each person 
(Pi) in outcome O. Then, in comparing outcomes O and O* for the 
set of persons {P1, P2 . . . Pn}, what is morally relevant is not [(P1O–
P1O*) + (P2O–P2O*) + . . . + (PnO–PnO*)], but rather something like 
                                                                                                                  
 179. James Griffin provides a similar illustration: 
A group of scholars may, with full understanding, prefer an extension of their 
library to exercise equipment for their health. . . . But then to maintain that 
needs create obligations where mere desires do not, or that they create stronger 
obligations, is to say that we have an obligation, or a stronger one, to the schol-
ars to give them what they themselves value less, which would be odd. 
GRIFFIN, supra note 73, at 45. 
310  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:241 
 
[d(P1)(P1O–P1O*) + d(P2)(P2O–P2O*) + . . . + d(P n)(PnO–PnO*)], where 
d(Pi) is inversely proportional to the level of each Pi’s welfare or 
wealth. Giving the meteor to the emphysema sufferer, Pw, in the 
Beneficial Meteor case is justified only because the effect of the 
meteor on his welfare (PwO–PwO*) is sufficiently greater than the ef-
fect of the meteor on Pl’s welfare so as to outweigh the fact that 
d(Pw) is smaller than d(Pl). 
A prioritarian view of morality, one that compares outcomes with 
reference to the criterion of weighted overall well-being, rather than 
overall well-being simpliciter, has been advanced in the philosophical 
literature180 and, to some extent, in the modern welfare-economics 
literature.181 
 The problem is that any set of weights posited by the prioritarian 
will end up seeming arbitrary. Given any set of weights, a large 
enough improvement in the welfare of a wealthier person (Pw) will 
justify, at least prima facie, a particular welfare setback to a poorer 
person (Pl). Why, then, should not a smaller improvement that in-
creases aggregate welfare also justify, at least prima facie, that same 
welfare setback to the poorer person? The prioritarian might answer 
that the criterion of overall well-being must be balanced against the 
claims of equality or fair distribution—that the weighted aggregate 
criterion is what emerges when we start with the more basic criteria 
of (1) unweighted aggregate welfare and (2) equal welfare, or some 
such basic distributive criterion. I am skeptical that a weighted crite-
rion would thus emerge from a balancing of unweighted aggregate 
welfare and a basic distributive criterion. A balancing of those crite-
ria will, I think, lead to some incomparabilities that the prioritarian’s 
weighted criterion will fail to reflect. 182 In any event the defense of 
prioritarianism just mooted effectively concedes that overall well-
being does have prima facie moral force. 
 Alternatively, the prioritarian might answer that the weights just 
emerge from the right specification of morality’s foundations, for ex-
ample, from the right specification of the social contracting scenario. 
However, the best developed analysis along these lines, Rawls’ ar-
gument in a Theory of Justice, leads not to the weighted aggregate 
                                                                                                                  
 180. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (rev. ed. 1994). 
Shelly Kagan has suggested: 
Perhaps, then, to the extent that distribution matters, this factor should be 
captured in terms of a principle that gives greater weight to improving the 
well-being of those who are worse off: the lower the level of someone’s well-
being (in absolute terms), the greater the extent to which increasing their well-
being by a certain amount improves the goodness of an outcome. 
KAGAN, supra note 98, at 53. 
 181. See, e.g., BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 29, at 137-70 (presenting various types of 
social welfare functions, including those that incorporate a weighted rather than un-
weighted sum of individual utilities). 
 182. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (discussing incomparability). 
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criterion but rather to a “maximin” criterion that gives lexical prior-
ity to the well-being of the worse off.183 If the prioritarian wants to 
justify the choice of Pw in the Beneficial Meteor case, and I am as-
suming here that she does, the maximin criterion will not provide 
that justification. 
 Finally, the prioritarian could claim that it is weighted, not un-
weighted, aggregate welfare which corresponds to (one component of) 
the overall “value” or “goodness” of outcomes. A suitably detached ob-
server, evaluating the “goodness” of world-states, would take 
weighted rather than unweighted aggregate welfare to be one dimen-
sion of goodness. 
 However, this claim seems implausible. The prioritarian agrees 
that the relevant dimension of goodness is tightly linked to human 
welfare; it is human flourishing, or some function thereof, that is at 
stake. The prioritarian also agrees that human flourishing or welfare 
is interpersonally comparable. (Indeed, his weighting scheme as-
sumes that each person’s welfare in a given outcome can be repre-
sented by an interpersonally valid number, a “utility,” which is 
weighted and then summed with the weighted utilities of other per-
sons.) The prioritarian should further agree that, as between an out-
come where overall well-being is greater and an outcome where 
weighted aggregate welfare is greater, there is more welfare or flour-
ishing in the first outcome. (Consider this analogy: The world with 
more mass is the world where the aggregate mass of the objects in it 
is greater.) Finally, the prioritarian himself is concerned with an ag-
gregative kind of goodness—the kind of goodness that is connected to 
“more” or “less.” (Note that a change that produces dramatically 
more welfare for one person and leaves everyone else unaffected will 
be counted by the prioritarian as a better world, regardless of the fact 
that the distribution of welfare may be less equal, balanced, or har-
monious.) All this forces the prioritarian to claim, implausibly, that 
the world with more welfare or flourishing is not—even from a suita-
bly detached perspective, and even when an aggregative kind of 
goodness is at stake—the better world, as far as welfare is concerned. 
 So much for the strategy of choosing Pw in Beneficial Meteor while 
denying welfarism by proposing some criterion other than overall 
well-being that purportedly justifies choosing Pw. A second and quite 
different way to defend the choice of the welfare-maximizing option 
Pw in Beneficial Meteor, while disclaiming a welfarist theory of regu-
lation, is to argue that government’s choices in Beneficial Meteor are 
disanalogous to the choices that government regulators face. The 
task of regulators is not to parcel out the meteors that fall on the 
public lands, or to distribute other sorts of public property, but pri-
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marily to impose legal duties which constrain the actions of private 
citizens. Individuals are commanded not to pollute, not to endanger 
species, not to collude in setting prices, not to impose certain risks 
upon their employees, and so on. Assume that D is some duty-
creating (act-constraining) directive, and that a regulator is deciding 
whether to issue D. If government ought to choose the option that 
maximizes overall well-being in Beneficial Meteor, but ought not 
choose between D and not-D on the basis of overall well-being, then 
the lessons of Beneficial Meteor for regulators are indeed very lim-
ited. 
 Why would one think that overall well-being has different force 
with respect to duty imposition than it does with respect to meteor-
distribution? The plausible idea here is that duty imposition raises 
deontological issues that are not present in Beneficial Meteor. To be 
concrete, imagine that Pl is the only person practically constrained 
by D. Also imagine that the issuance of D will cause Pl a slight wel-
fare harm (equivalent to the harm of a mild headache), and that the 
failure to issue D will produce a large welfare setback for Pw (equiva-
lent to the harm of emphysema). If the issuance of D will infringe 
some deontological constraint protecting Pl—if it will infringe her 
“rights”—then the sheer fact that D maximizes welfare will not jus-
tify that option. Welfare maximization, without more, does not war-
rant the breach of deontological constraints. 184 Further, the view that 
any legal duty, at least any legal duty backed by sanctions, impli-
cates deontological constraints (because such duties are coercive re-
strictions of liberty) is a possible one. 
 I do not have space here to show why this robustly deontological 
view of regulatory duties is wrong. Let me simply point out that the 
view is radically at odds with the practices of regulatory agencies. 
Roughly, if D infringes the right to liberty, then D is justified only if 
the actions it constrains are themselves rights-violating. However, 
many of the actions constrained by the antitrust laws, the environ-
mental laws, the food and drug laws, the workplace safety laws, and 
other regulatory regimes are not rights-violating actions. Rather, 
they are simply actions that produce bad consequences, by reducing 
well-being, increasing inequality, degrading perfectionist values 
(such as environmental values), or producing some other undesirable 
result. There is generally no deontological violation in directing per-
sons to refrain from such actions—surely not if the directive is civil 
rather than criminal. 185 Assume this is correct; again, if it is not, then 
the proper scope of regulation is radically more limited than most 
                                                                                                                  
 184. See sources cited infra note 189. 
 185. Cf. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 26 (1984) (articulating the view that a be-
havior should not be criminalized unless it is harmful or seriously offensive to some person 
other than the actor). 
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modern theorists (neoclassicists, proceduralists, and others) have 
thought. Therefore, the imposition of D on Pl does not implicate deon-
tological constraints. Then Pw’s claim to the issuance of D is just as 
strong as his claim to the beneficial meteor. Both D and the meteor 
help Pw much more than they harm Pl. Both cause only a slight set-
back to welfare-equality, and both are deontologically permissible. 
Overall well-being gives the government sufficient moral grounds to 
issue D, just as it gives government sufficient grounds to give Pw the 
meteor. The Beneficial Meteor case has plenty of relevance for regu-
lation. 
C.   Deontology, Perfections, and Distribution: A Note on Nonwelfarist 
Considerations 
 As I have repeatedly emphasized, welfarism refers to the family of 
moral theories that make overall well-being morally relevant, not 
necessarily morally conclusive. Welfarism, thus defined, includes but 
is not limited to utilitarianism. Further, as I have suggested, there 
are strong arguments against utilitarianism. The right welfarist the-
ory, the theory that correctly evaluates the actions of regulators and 
other government officials, will be a theory such that the moral 
status of a regulatory action is a function of a plurality of moral cri-
teria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn, where W* is overall well-being and Xi is an-
other moral criteria). Unless W* takes lexical priority over the Xi, 
which is little more plausible than utilitarianism, welfare-
maximizing regulatory actions may turn out to be morally wrong. 
The right variant of welfarism will acknowledge that “overall well-
being” can be outweighed by other moral considerations. 186 
 What, more specifically, are the conditions under which welfare-
maximizing regulatory actions will turn out to be morally wrong? 
This Article does not purport to address that crucially important is-
sue. It is plausible that a welfare-maximizing regulatory action can 
be morally wrong, all things considered, because it infringes deonto-
logical constraints, reduces overall perfection, or reduces overall 
equality or the overall satisfaction of other such “distributive” crite-
ria. But which deontological constraints, perfectionist goals, and dis-
tributive goals really do bear upon the moral status of regulation is a 
large and unanswered question, which I do not have the space to 
consider in any detail here. Nor do I mean to insist that the only cri-
teria relevant to government regulation, other than the criterion of 
overall well-being, are deontological, distributive, or perfectionist cri-
teria. I simply cite these as the most plausible possibilities. A theory 
incorporating W* plus some esoteric Xi that is neither deontological, 
                                                                                                                  
 186. On pluralism, see, for example, KEKES, supra note 163; STOCKER, supra note 64; 
SUMNER, supra note 9, at 200 n.24 (citing sources). 
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distributive, nor perfectionist would still be a welfarist theory as I 
have defined “welfarism.”187  
 Deontological constraints are nonconsequentialist duties—
generally duties of inaction rather than action.188 They would pro-
hibit regulators from performing certain types of actions, even where 
the consequences of such actions are better than the consequences of 
inaction. The pros and cons of deontological constraints have been 
much discussed within the modern philosophical literature.189 I tend 
to think that the deontologists have made a strong case for the exis-
tence of some such constraints—for example, a constraint against di-
rect, intentional killing (I ought not directly and intentionally kill 
one person, even to prevent five direct and intentional killings). As-
suming this is true, it remains possible that deontological criteria 
and consequentialist criteria are “partitioned” between different gov-
ernmental institutions—between courts, legislatures, regulators, ex-
ecutives, state institutions, and federal institutions—such that regu-
lators are effectively permitted to ignore deontological criteria.190 In 
particular, the following idea is appealing: 
The Constitutional (Deontological) Partition: 
Every deontological constraint binding upon regulators is incorpo-
rated in some justiciable requirement of constitutional law. For 
example, it would violate the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause for a regulatory official to perform a direct and in-
tentional killing.191 As between two or more constitutional options, 
the morally appropriate option for the regulator to choose is the 
option with the best consequences. 
The Constitutional Partition is appealing because it restores simplic-
ity to the regulator’s moral world: once constitutional courts are in 
place, the regulator can act as if morally right actions are, simply, ac-
tions with the best consequences. 
 But is the Constitutional Partition true? If regulators were deon-
tologically constrained, not merely to refrain from consequentially 
                                                                                                                  
 187. But note that I have given “perfectionism” a definition sufficiently broad that it 
becomes hard to see what that esoteric Xi could be. See infra note 194. 
 188. See David McNaughton & Piers Rawling, Agent-Relativity and the Doing-
Happening Distinction, 63 PHIL. STUDIES 167 (1991) (providing a precise definition of de-
ontological constraints). 
 189. See KAGAN, supra note 98, at 152-70; NOZICK, supra note 169, at 26-53; 
SCHEFFLER, supra note 180, at 80-114; Richard Brook, Is Smith Obligated that (She) Not 
Kill the Innocent or that She (Not Kill the Innocent): Expressions and Rationales for Deon-
tological Constraints, 35 S. J. PHIL. 451 (1997); Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is 
Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1994); Frances M. Kamm, Non-
Consequentialism, the Person as an End-In-Itself, and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 354 (1992); Nagel, supra note 178. 
 190. Cf. Henry S. Richardson, Institutionally Divided Moral Responsibility, 16 SOC. 
PHIL. & POLICY 218 (1999). 
 191. See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1998). 
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justified killing, but also to refrain from any kind of consequentially 
justified coercion, the Partition would be clearly false. This is because 
most if not all regulatory coercion escapes constitutional review, at 
least under modern (post-Lochner) constitutional doctrine.192 How-
ever, as I suggested in Section B above, the intuitive support for a 
general no-coercion constraint on regulators is much weaker than the 
intuitive support for a no-killing constraint. Much regulatory coer-
cion—for example, coercive orders directed at corporate officials and 
backed by civil fines that prohibit pollution, unsafe workplace condi-
tions, or unfair labor practices—is seemingly justified as long as it is 
consequentially justified. 
 Yet the failure of the robust deontological view that includes a 
general no-coercion constraint does not mean that Constitutional 
Partition is true. The correct deontological account might be a mod-
estly robust view, which does not include a general no-coercion con-
straint, but which does include the core constraint against direct and 
intentional killing and also includes other constraints, such as a con-
straint against the coercive use of the criminal law,193 which are not 
fully incorporated in justiciable constitutional norms. The truly hard, 
interesting, and unanswered question about deontological con-
straints for purposes of regulatory theory is whether the correct de-
ontological account is really modestly robust in this way. Constitu-
tional Partition is appealing and, to some extent, plausible, but it 
still may turn out to be wrong. 
 Perfectionist criteria and distributive criteria, like the criterion of 
overall well-being, are species of consequentialist criteria. An action 
is consequentially justified if the outcome it produces—technically, 
the total world-state that it produces—is better than the outcomes 
produced by alternative actions. Consequentialist criteria measure 
the goodness of outcomes. “Perfectionism”—as I’m using that term 
here—is the view that features of outcomes other than welfare can 
matter to the outcome’s goodness.194 A perfectionist criterion Xi is a 
criterion such that O1 can fare better than O2 with respect to Xi, even 
though O1 and O2 are just the same with respect to welfare, that is, 
                                                                                                                  
 192. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
348 U.S. 483, 490-491 (1955). 
 193. See FEINBERG, supra note 185. 
 194. See generally HURKA, supra note 161; SUMNER, supra note 9, at 193-95, 208-17. 
This is a simple, but very broad definition of perfectionism. Arguably, the term is better 
used to denote a subset of the consequentialist moral criteria that depend on features of 
outcomes other than welfare. For example, one might say that perfectionist criteria, prop-
erly speaking, concern the realization of certain capacities essential to humans and other 
creatures; and one might distinguish between such criteria and aesthetic criteria or envi-
ronmentalist criteria, which involve neither welfare nor the realization of essential capaci-
ties. Because my project in this Article is to defend welfarism—not to advance a particular 
view as to the correct moral criteria other than overall well-being—I employ the simple 
and broad definition of “perfectionism.” 
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even though the welfare position of every person (and every other 
welfare subject) in O1 is just the same as her position in O2. Envi-
ronmental ethicists who argue that the flourishing of nonsentient or-
ganisms (organisms without a welfare), endangered species, or whole 
ecosystems is a relevant consideration for environmental policy, 
quite apart from human well-being or the well-being of other welfare-
subjects, are perfectionists. 195 So are aesthetes, who think that beau-
tiful buildings, objects, paintings, and other artworks contribute to 
the beauty and thus the goodness of the world even if no one cares 
about, or otherwise is benefited by, this aesthetic improvement. So is 
the Aristotelian who thinks that an action which makes a given per-
son more perfect but less happy (for example, by making the person 
more fully rational, thus creating a more perfect specimen of the spe-
cies “homo sapiens”) is a good action in at least one dimension.196 
 The problem with perfectionism, as Wayne Sumner explains, is 
that: 
In doing good for someone we are therefore not merely making the 
world a better place but also doing something for that particular 
person. Now this notion of furthering someone’s good for her own 
sake can be generalized beyond the boundaries of our species; I 
have a perfectly good sense of what it means to take my cat to the 
veterinarian for her sake. But it cannot be generalized indefinitely, 
for not all natural objects have a “sake” for which we can do things. 
. . . Our ethical sensibilities seem to have much to do with our abil-
ity to see things from the point of view of potential victims and 
beneficiaries. I am prepared to think that mountains and stars can 
fare better or worse on some objective scale of perfection, but this 
fact does not give them a point of view on whose behalf I can mar-
shal my services.197 
I am inclined to find Sumner’s arguments against perfectionism per-
suasive, but the issue is one that merits much further work. The vi-
ability of perfectionism has been much less explored by philosophers 
and theorists than, say, the existence of deontological constraints, or 
the nature of fair distribution. Note that if perfectionist goals do ob-
tain, if they do figure in the best moral theory of government, then it 
is hard to see how such considerations can be “partitioned” away 
from regulators. 
                                                                                                                  
 195. This is the perfectionist view most widely held now, and thus it is the one most 
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The Perfectionist Partition: 
Every perfectionist goal applicable to regulators is incorporated in 
some nonregulatory institution, which effectively permits regula-
tors to ignore such goals. For example, if one environmental policy 
is better in light of overall well-being than a second policy, then 
regulators should enact the first policy. If it turns out to be all-
things-considered worse than the second policy, in light of perfec-
tionist considerations, then it will be reversed by the legislature. 
Perfectionist Partition is appealing, because it further simplifies the 
moral world of regulators. However, I cannot see why it would be 
true. 
 Finally, distributive criteria are consequentialist criteria that do 
supervene upon the welfare characteristics of outcomes (if the wel-
fare of every person is just the same in O1 and O2, then O1 and O2 
must be the same with respect to distributive criteria) but concern 
the distribution of welfare rather than the aggregate amount.198 By 
this definition, the following are all distributive criteria: 
(1) a criterion that measures the extent to which persons are below 
a certain minimum level of welfare (the “poverty line”); 
(2) a criterion that measures the extent to which the overall pat-
tern of welfare levels deviates from perfect equality; 
(3) a maximin criterion, which gives lexical priority to the welfare 
of the worst-off persons. 
All of the above criteria are plausible. John Rawls famously argues in 
favor of the maximin variant of the idea of proper distribution.199 
Numerous modern philosophers, including Ronald Dworkin, Richard 
Arneson, G.A. Cohen, and Eric Rakowski, have argued in favor of the 
egalitarian variant, or something like it. 200 Finally, our actual system 
                                                                                                                  
 198. This definition of “distributive” criteria, like my definition of “perfectionist” crite-
ria, is somewhat simplified. There is a family of views that look to the distribution of “pri-
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 199. See RAWLS, supra note 99. 
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of state redistribution, the “welfare” system, seems to aim at the pov-
erty-line variant.201 
 Here, as with perfectionism and deontology, it is tempting to 
think that nonregulatory institutions can be structured so that regu-
lators are freed to focus exclusively on aggregate welfare. Some 
economists working within the neoclassical tradition have claimed 
that although both efficiency and fair distribution ultimately matter 
to the evaluation of government actions, it is more efficient and just 
as good distributively to pursue distributive goals through the tax 
system. 202 Does the claim carry over from efficiency to welfare? Call 
this the Distributive Partition: 
The Distributive Partition: 
Every distributive goal applicable to regulators is incorporated in 
some nonregulatory institution, which effectively permits regula-
tors to ignore such goals. 
I find the Distributive Partition no more plausible than the Perfec-
tionist Partition. Consider the version of fair distribution that simply 
seeks to combat poverty, and is indifferent to differences in welfare 
levels among persons above the poverty line. (If the Distributive Par-
tition fails on this poverty-line view, then it should fail a fortiori on 
more robust distributive views, such as egalitarianism or maximin.) 
Imagine that O1 is welfare maximizing relative to O2, but that O1 is 
worse with respect to poverty (for simplicity, because some persons 
are below the poverty line in O1 but no one is below the line in O2.) 
Why think that a regulatory agency should ignore egalitarian consid-
erations and choose O1? 
 One possibility is that the legislature will directly reverse regula-
tory choices that are welfare maximizing, but, all things considered, 
morally bad by virtue of their distributive defects. In this example, 
the agency will choose O1 over O2 and the legislature will then prom-
ulgate a statute requiring O2. This version of the Distributive Parti-
                                                                                                                  
 201. This view is also defended by PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS,  REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: 
WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995). 
 202. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 37; Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeck-
hauser, Distributional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 
81 SCAND. J. ECON. 264 (1979); Polinsky, supra note 41, at 119-27; Steven Shavell, A Note 
on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity 
Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981). Chris Sanchirico 
summarizes the claim: 
The New [Efficiency] Rationale . . . shunt[s] distributional concerns across dis-
ciplinary boundaries from private law to tax. While conditionally conceding the 
importance of equity as a political-philosophical value, proponents of the New 
Rationale insist that the legal sphere is not the proper place to pursue distribu-
tional objectives. Efforts to decrease economic inequality, it is argued, should be 
corralled into the tax code, while legal rules should be left in a pristinely effi-
cient state, unsullied by distributive justice. 
Sanchirico, supra note  13 (manuscript at 2). 
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tion is overly optimistic about the incentives and capabilities of legis-
latures. In practice, agencies have lots of “slack,” including the abil-
ity to pursue policies that increase poverty. 
 A second possibility is that the defects of O1 can be cured through 
the income tax system by either the legislature or a tax agency. Here, 
the problem is that some kinds of “poverty” (properly understood) are 
incurable. If O1 involves some premature deaths, such that the life-
time welfare of some dying persons is very low—sufficiently low to 
bring them below the level of lifetime welfare equaling “poverty”—no 
(future) money payments to the estates of these persons will repair 
their poverty. A welfare-maximizing regulatory policy might cause 
the death of a one-year-old toddler; the total well-being the toddler 
realizes over the course of his life will be drastically lower than the 
total well-being realized by most persons, and thus the choice of O1 
will make the toddler incurably poor. 
 To sum up, welfarism allows that regulators may need to attend 
to features of regulatory options other than their effect upon overall 
well-being. Which features are those? That depends both on the cri-
teria apart from aggregate welfare (such as deontological, perfection-
ist, or distributive criteria) that may bear upon the moral status of 
governmental actions, and upon the institutional arrangements or 
“partitions” that may make different governmental bodies responsi-
ble for implementing different criteria. In this Section, I have specu-
lated in a very preliminary way about the nature of the additional 
criteria and relevant arrangements. My very tentative suggestion is 
that regulators will not be able to adopt welfare maximization as 
their sole aim. Morality will be too complex, and institutional possi-
bilities too crude, to permit that. But this is really just a guess on my 
part. The speculations in this section are simply intended to identify 
areas for future research, and they do not begin to approach a full 
analysis of the problems described here. 
D.   Welfarism and Neoclassicism: Some Differences 
 Welfarism is refurbished neoclassicism. The welfarist, like the 
neoclassicist, gives central importance to human welfare. Like the 
neoclassicist, the welfarist accords preferences a prime role in her ac-
count of well-being. Like the neoclassicist, the welfarist is focussed 
upon regulatory outcomes rather than the procedures that produce 
these outcomes. The neoclassicist need not take regulatory proce-
dures to be intrinsically valuable, and the welfarist, by definition, 
does not. Finally, both welfarism and neoclassicism acknowledge that 
the moral criterion essential to these views—overall well-being in the 
case of welfarism, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in the case of neoclassi-
cism—may be supplemented by other criteria, such as deontological, 
perfectionist, or distributive criteria. 
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 Nonetheless, there remain noteworthy differences between welfa-
rism and neoclassicism, which I will briefly describe in this Part. 
These differences have two sources. The first source is the difference 
between overall well-being and efficiency. The second source is the 
difference between the simple preference-based view of welfare in-
corporated into neoclassicism and the more nuanced view that is 
built into welfarism, namely sophisticated preferentialism. The shift 
from neoclassicism to welfarism involves material changes in, albeit 
not fundamental alteration of, our normative theory of regulation. 
1.   Efficient Welfare Losses and Inefficient Welfare Gains 
 As I have already explained, an option can be Kaldor-Hicks effi-
cient relative to an alternative but decrease overall well-being. Re-
ciprocally, the option can be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient but increase 
overall well-being. The option of permitting a factory to emit a par-
ticulate that causes respiratory distress to poor persons living 
nearby, but that also produces a beautiful sunset viewed by rich per-
sons from afar, is welfare decreasing. Nevertheless, this option will 
be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the cumulative dollar amount that the 
rich persons are willing to pay for the sunset is larger than the 
cumulative dollar amount that the poor persons would demand in 
compensation for the respiratory distress. 203 Or consider the option of 
building a road through the property of an ascetic who is barely 
bothered by it (since she is an ascetic), but who would still be willing 
to pay a lot not to have the road built (since it has comparatively 
more welfare significance for her than other things, which matter 
even less). This option will be welfare increasing, but it could be Kal-
dor-Hicks inefficient if the ascetic’s willingness to pay not to have the 
road is large enough. 
 As the ascetic’s case shows, the deviation between Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency and overall well-being is not simply a matter of wealth ef-
fects. 204 Given two persons (P1 and P2) and a regulatory choice that 
has the same welfare effect on the two in terms of units of overall 
welfare, the two persons may have different monetary equivalents 
for that welfare change for any of the following reasons: (1) P1 and P2 
have roughly identical functions, mapping wealth and other features 
of the world onto welfare, but P1 and P2 are at different wealth levels 
(wealth effects); (2) P1 and P2 have roughly identical functions, map-
ping wealth and other features of the world onto welfare, and have 
                                                                                                                  
 203. See supra Part II.B.1. Technically, the cost-benefit criterion (sum of willingness-
to-pay criterion) and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are not equivalent. The so -called “Boadway 
paradox” shows that cost-benefit analysis and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can deviate in spe-
cial cases. See Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 190-91 & n.68. For simplicity, I here use 
the cost-benefit criterion and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion interchangeably. 
 204. See Adler, supra note 63, at 1398-1401. 
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the same wealth level, but they are differently situated with respect 
to other features; or (3) P1 and P2 have significantly different func-
tions, mapping wealth and other features of the world onto welfare. 
Nor is it clear to me that wealth effects will, in practice, produce the 
largest overall divergence between efficiency and welfare. On the 
other hand, efficiency-type analysis, by regulatory agencies and 
scholars, is most readily amended to deal with the problem of wealth 
effects. The willingness-to-pay and -accept amounts can be weighted 
by a factor inversely proportional to the wealth of the person in-
volved.205 Therefore my discussion here of the divergence between ef-
ficiency and welfare will focus on those kinds of effects. 
 Consider a regulatory policy that affects various persons who dif-
fer significantly in wealth level. The policy could be a pricing system 
for a regulated service that is sold both to richer and to poorer con-
sumers (cross-subsidization of the poorer consumers will benefit 
them at the expense of the richer consumers, who would be better off 
if marginal-cost pricing were used instead). Or the policy could be a 
conservation policy with respect to wilderness areas and other envi-
ronmental benefits that are mainly enjoyed by richer persons, where 
the costs of conservation would be borne by all taxpayers; or a work-
place safety policy that benefits poorer workers at the expense of 
richer shareholders; or an antitrust policy that benefits poorer 
shareholders at the expense of richer consumers; or an “environ-
mental justice” policy that locates a waste dump or some other “lo-
cally undesirable land use” in a rich neighborhood rather than a poor 
one. Assume that the policy is inefficient. For simplicity, assume that 
the policy benefits poorer persons by an amount $P and harms richer 
persons by an amount $R where $R is greater than $P, relative to an 
efficient alternative. The neoclassicist will say the following about 
the policy: 
The tradeoff between distribution and efficiency: Although an inef-
ficient policy whose costs and benefits are borne by persons at dif-
ferent wealth levels may be a good thing with respect to distribu-
tive goals, it is a bad thing with respect to at least one normative 
goal, namely efficiency.206 
According to the neoclassical view, if we are faced with the choice be-
tween an efficient policy and an inefficient policy that benefits poorer 
persons by some amount $P too small to outweigh the losses $R to 
richer persons, then we must balance the policy gain in one dimen-
                                                                                                                  
 205. See sources cited supra note 36 (discussing possible modification of cost-benefit 
analysis through incorporation of distributive weights); see also Adler & Posner, Imple-
menting Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 
(2000) (same). 
 206. See, e.g., KAHN, supra note 11, at 189-93 (analyzing cross-subsidization in this 
manner). 
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sion (distributive goals) against the policy setback in another dimen-
sion (efficiency goals). 
 By contrast, according to the welfarist view, it is an open question 
whether the efficient policy is a good thing in any respect. First, the 
inefficient policy may be better on the distributive dimension (as the 
neoclassicist recognizes). Second, the inefficient policy may also be 
better from the point of view of overall welfare. Although $P is 
smaller than $R, the richer persons’ marginal utility of wealth may 
be sufficiently smaller than the poorer persons’, such that the $P 
shift to the poor causes a larger effect on overall well-being than the 
$R shift away from the rich. For the welfarist, an inefficient policy 
that secures distributive gains may be an unalloyed good, while for 
the neoclassicist it cannot be. Even if the inefficient policy is also 
welfare decreasing (assuming a large enough difference between $R 
and $P, or a small enough difference in wealth levels between richer 
and poorer), the policy’s negative effect on overall well-being will 
comprise a less substantial counterweight to distributive goals for 
the welfarist than its inefficiency will comprise for the neoclassicist. 
All this has practical, not just conceptual, significance, since it means 
that the welfarist will end up choosing some inefficient policies that 
the neoclassicist would, on balance, reject. 
 The neoclassicist has another string to her bow. The inefficient, 
but egalitarian, regulatory policy and the efficient, but inegalitarian, 
policy are not the only options that should be considered. A third and 
better option might be combining the efficient regulatory policy with 
income tax payments and levies designed to achieve the distributive 
goals. Neoclassicists standardly claim the following, or something 
like it. 
Regulation Is Less Efficient than Taxation in the Pursuit of Dis-
tributive Goals207 
Given an inefficient regulatory policy, there exists an efficient al-
ternative that, combined with suitable tax payments and levies, is 
just as good with respect to distributive goals and better with re-
spect to efficiency. 
I have already expressed doubt that, with respect to distributive 
goals, the income tax system is always as good as regulation. An effi-
cient regulatory policy may have distributive deficits that no scheme 
of tax levies and payments can repair. Reciprocally, some economists 
have doubted whether—given an inefficient regulatory policy and the 
most efficient tax scheme that achieves all the distributive goals of 
the policy—such a tax scheme will always be more efficient than the 
                                                                                                                  
 207. See sources cited supra note 202 (arguing that the tax system, not legal rules, 
should be used to pursue distributional goals). 
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policy, since there are efficiency deficits (specifically, work disincen-
tives) associated with income taxation.208 But let us place these 
doubts to one side. It seems plausible that the above-stated neoclas-
sical claim is widely, if not universally, true—that in a significant 
number of cases, the tax system can achieve all the distributive goals 
of regulation, and in a more efficient manner. 
 Does this eliminate the divergence between welfarism and neo-
classicism? Hardly. Imagine the following: the inefficient policy 
causes a gain of $P for the poorer persons, which is smaller than the 
loss of $R incurred by the rich. Our distributive goal is to bring all 
persons above the poverty level. A tax scheme combined with the ef-
ficient regulatory alternative would give $P to the poorer persons, 
which makes it just as good as the inefficient policy with respect to 
this distributive goal, and would cost the richer persons $Tr. The tax 
scheme would also cost other Taxpayers $To. $Tr plus $To is less than 
$R, so the scheme is more efficient than the inefficient policy. 
 Poor Rich Other Taxpayers 
Efficient Policy — — — 
Inefficient Policy $P -$R — 
Tax Scheme + 
Efficient Policy 
$P -$Tr -$To 
 
 How do the tax scheme and the inefficient policy compare within 
neoclassicism and welfarism? Now it is the neoclassicist who per-
ceives an unalloyed good! For the neoclassicist, the tax scheme is un-
qualifiedly better than the inefficient policy: It is more efficient, and 
it is no worse with respect to distributive goals. By contrast, the wel-
farist agrees that the scheme is just as good with respect to distribu-
tive goals, but she notes that it may be worse with respect to welfare. 
Imagine that the taxpayers who incur $To are poorer than the richer 
persons who benefit from the difference between $R and $Tr. Then, 
the tax scheme might be welfare decreasing even though $To is less 
than $R minus $Tr. If so, the welfarist would need to balance the 
overall-welfare goal against the distributive goal—and, in this case, 
would presumably end up rejecting the tax scheme on overall-welfare 
grounds, while the neoclassicist would have no reason whatsoever to 
reject the tax scheme. 
 It might be objected that the kind of tax scheme envisioned by the 
neoclassicist is a tailored arrangement that taxes the richer persons 
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(those harmed by the inefficient policy) for the benefit of the poorer 
persons (those helped by it), while leaving other taxpayers unaf-
fected. 
 Poor Rich Other Taxpayers 
Efficient Policy — — — 
Inefficient Policy $P -$R — 
Tax Scheme + 
 Efficient Policy 
$P -$P — 
 
Indeed, the welfarist, like the neoclassicist, does view this tailored 
scheme as an unalloyed improvement over the inefficient policy. 
However, that is only because the scheme is Pareto-optimal, relative 
to the policy. The notion that the taxing authorities will duplicate the 
distributive benefits of inefficient regulation through tailored, Pa-
reto-optimal schemes that carefully burden only those who would be 
burdened by the regulation is highly unrealistic. We live in a world 
where government officials must generally choose between Pareto-
noncomparable options. This kind of choice, inter alia, is one that 
permits welfare and efficiency to diverge.  
2.   Restricted and Unrestricted Preferences 
 Neoclassicism incorporates an unrestricted preference-based the-
ory of welfare. According to this view, P is comparatively benefited by 
outcome S1, relative to S2, just in case P prefers S1 to S2. As I have 
already explained, the difficulty with this view is that P’s preference 
is simply a ranking that is conceptually linked, in some way, with P’s 
actions. 209 (The conceptual linkage goes something like this: P prefers 
S1 to S2 just in case, if P believes that action A1 leads to S1 and action 
A2 leads to S2, P chooses A1.) However, a wide range of factors, un-
connected to P’s welfare, can motivate his outcome rankings and, 
therewith, his actions. P can prefer S1 to S2 on moral grounds, be-
cause he thinks S1 is required by some official or other role that he 
holds, or because he believes S1 is in the interests of some community 
to which he belongs and which he feels himself obliged to support. 
Sophisticated preferentialism, in contrast to neoclassicism, posits 
that only a subset of P’s preferences—“restricted” preferences—are 
welfare productive for P. Think of the restriction idea this way: 
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What Are Restricted Preferences?: 
In some cases, (1) P prefers Si to Sj, and (2) P would prefer Si to Sj 
under idealized conditions, but Si is not better for P’s welfare than 
Sj. In other cases, (1) P prefers Si to Sj, and (2) P would prefer Si to 
Sj under idealized conditions, and Si is better for P’s welfare than 
Sj. “Restricted” preference is that property of P, Si, and Sj, such 
that if the property obtains and if (1) P prefers Si to Sj, and (2) P 
would prefer Si to Sj under idealized conditions, then Si benefits P. 
This is hardly a full analysis of the concept of restricted preference; I 
do not yet have such an analysis to offer. Here are some possibilities: 
(a) P’s preference for S1 over S2 is restricted if the ground for P’s 
preference is not his belief that S1 is morally required or required by 
some legal or social norm; (b) P’s preference for S1 over S2 is re-
stricted if P prefers S1 under some description that essentially in-
volves P’s own existence; (c) P’s preference for S1 over S2 is restricted 
if the ground for P’s preference is P’s belief that S1 improves his wel-
fare; or (d) P’s preference for S1 over S2 is restricted if S1 is better for 
P in light of some objective welfare good. Each of these possibilities 
has flaws, and I am not sure how to balance the flaws against the 
merits. 
 Sophisticated preferentialism is a class of welfare-accounts that, 
one way or another, restrict preferences. Welfarism is a family of 
moral views that give prima facie weight to overall well-being and 
incorporate one or another members of the sophisticated-
preferentialist class of welfare views. In this Article, I have simply 
argued that the right moral view is some member of the welfarist 
family of moral views, without making further claims as between 
family members. On the other hand, it can be said that any member 
of the welfarist family of moral views—because that view restricts 
preferences, in some way—will diverge from neoclassicism. 
 Here is a simple way to see the divergence. An agency must 
choose between S1 and S2. Some persons prefer S1 to S2, or S2 to S1, 
but they do not restrictedly prefer S1 to S2 or S2 to S1. Call these per-
sons disinterested. Other persons prefer S1 to S2, or S2 to S1, and 
they further satisfy the sophisticated preferentialist’s criteria for 
welfare—namely, these preferences are restricted and survive ideali-
zation. Call these the interested persons. The neoclassicist will con-
sider the effect of the S1/S2 choice, both on the interested persons and 
on the disinterested persons, in determining which option maximizes 
efficiency. By contrast, the welfarist will focus solely on the inter-
ested persons. Changes in the number of disinterested persons, or in 
the intensity of their preferences, will not change the welfarist’s 
evaluation of the S1/S2 choice with respect to overall well-being.  
 For example, the S1/S2 choice might be the choice of an antitrust 
agency: S1 means having a cartel in a particular market, while S2 
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means having competitive conditions in that market. Then, plausi-
bly, consumers and firm shareholders are interested persons, while 
the citizen who prefers or disprefers S1 on purely moral grounds 
(perhaps because he thinks that cartels prevent destructive competi-
tion, or conversely because he thinks they diminish consumer wel-
fare) is disinterested. The welfarist will ignore the disinterested citi-
zen, while the neoclassicist should not—at least if the neoclassicist is 
consistent about sticking to the unrestricted preference-based view of 
well-being that is standard within welfare economics. After all, the 
citizen does prefer S1 to S2 or S2 to S1; this preference may well sat-
isfy all the standard axioms of expected-utility theory (it may well be 
complete, reflexive, and so on); it can be assumed to have the requi-
site linkage to the citizen’s actions; and it can give rise to some 
monetary willingness to pay for S1 over S2 or S2 over S1. 
 Yet it is counterintuitive, unnecessary, and maybe downright in-
coherent to think that the existence of a citizen with moral views for 
or against cartelization should itself change the moral status of car-
telization—in particular, the effect of cartelization on overall well-
being (or, for that matter, on efficiency).210 This is what leads the wel-
farist to insist on preference restriction, and to train his attention 
solely on interested persons (here, consumers and shareholders) in 
calculating aggregate welfare. Similarly, suppose S1/S2 is the choice 
facing an occupational health and safety agency, with S1 requiring 
firms to impose certain workplace safety devices and S2 permitting 
them to omit such devices. Then the preferences of labor activists, 
public-interest lawyers, or left-leaning scholars who are morally mo-
tivated to give a higher ranking to S1, as well as the preferences of 
free-market ideologues who are morally motivated to give a higher 
ranking to S2, would be ignored by the welfarist in evaluating the 
S1/S2 choice with respect to overall well-being. By contrast, these 
preferences would not be ignored by the neoclassicist in evaluating 
that choice with respect to efficiency. 
 In the above cases, I have chosen actors whose preferences are 
purely morally motivated to fill the role of disinterested persons. I 
took this tack because a purely morally motivated preference is the 
hallmark of a preference that is not restricted and that would not be 
counted as welfare productive by any sophisticated preferentialist. 
Whatever the correct account of restriction, it must, at a minimum, 
exclude the case where P prefers S1 just because he thinks S1 is mor-
ally required (and would otherwise prefer S2, or be indifferent) as a 
case where S1 improves P’s welfare. However, as I have suggested, 
the correct account of restriction may end up describing other kinds 
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moral and other disinterested preferences when performing cost-benefit analysis); Railton, 
supra note 35, at 55, 71-72 (same). 
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of persons as disinterested—for example, persons motivated by legal 
obligations, social norms, community loyalties, or considerations 
which they do not take to be self-regarding. If so, the divergence be-
tween neoclassicism and welfarism will be yet broader. 
 In practice, it seems, regulatory agencies generally deviate from 
the unrestricted preference-based view of welfare and implicitly ig-
nore persons who have policy preferences but seem to be disinter-
ested.211 The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Jus-
tice do not incorporate citizen preferences for and against antitrust 
policies into their cost-benefit analyses of these policies. Otherwise, 
the standard regulatory view that cartels and monopolies are gener-
ally inefficient would be harder to support, because sufficiently 
strong pro-cartel or pro-monopoly preferences on the part of citizens 
plus firm profits could outweigh the consumers’ loss. Similarly, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) looks to 
workers, consumers, and maybe shareholders, but not to the entire 
universe of people who have preferences over OSHA’s policies. 
 The one exception is environmental law, where the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and other environmental agencies have 
begun computing “existence values” for environmental amenities. In-
dividuals who will never physically interact with a particular endan-
gered species, wilderness area, or pristine bit of the atmosphere are 
asked how much they would be willing to pay for that amenity to re-
main in place. These values are then factored into agency assessment 
of environmental policies. 212 The neoclassicist would say that the en-
vironmental agencies’ unique attention to disinterested preferences 
in determining the welfare or efficiency effect of policies is appropri-
ate, and that other regulatory agencies should follow the environ-
mental agencies’ lead. The welfarist would say that the environ-
mental agencies’ unique attention to disinterested preferences is 
deeply misguided—that existence values should no more be calcu-
lated for environmental amenities than for antitrust policies, work-
place policies, transportation policies, redistributive policies, housing 
policies, military policies, and so on, and that it is the environmental 
agencies whose practices ought to change. 
                                                                                                                  
 211. See Adler & Posner, supra note 205 (surveying agency practice). 
 212. See id. (critically discussing EPA’s use of existence values); CONTINGENT VALU-
ATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993) (same); MARK SAGOFF, THE 
ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988) (same); Symposium, Contingent Valuation, J. ECON. 
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3.   Incomparability and Precise Equality 
 Options can be neither better nor worse (NBNW) with respect to 
overall well-being.213 One option is NBNW than another with respect 
to overall well-being if (a) the two options are equally good, or (b) the 
two options are incomparably good. If two options (S1 and S2) are 
equally good with respect to overall well-being, then any third option 
is better than S1 just in case it is better than S2 and, conversely, 
worse than S1 just in case it is worse than S2. Incomparability is less 
demanding: if S1 and S2 are incomparably good with respect to over-
all well-being, then a third option can be better than S1 without be-
ing better than S2, or worse than S1 without being worse than S2. 
 In practice (I would guess) agencies are not often faced with a 
choice between options that are equally good with respect to overall 
well-being. Why? Where NBNW options are good for overall welfare 
in different ways—where, for example, the extent of physical pleas-
ure is greater in S1, while the extent of friendship is greater in S2, or 
longevity is greater in S1, but convenience is greater in S2—then 
there will virtually always be a hypothetical option which is a small 
improvement over one option but still NBNW than the other. If so, 
the two options by definition are not precisely equal.214 
 On the other hand, it could well be the case that regulatory agen-
cies do frequently confront incomparable options. Recall my account 
of interpersonal comparisons: S1 is better than S2 with respect to 
overall well-being, or worse than S2 with respect to overall well-
being, if and only if all idealized observers would have convergent re-
stricted preferences as between S1 and S2. Will this occur if S1 is 
somewhat, but not dramatically, better than S2 with respect to one 
welfare good while S2 is somewhat, but not dramatically, better than 
S1 with respect to another? (For example, what if there are 1000 
more annual deaths in S1, but the unemployment rate in S2 is a half 
percentage point higher? What if consumer surplus in S1 is $100 mil-
lion greater than in S2, but twenty endangered species go extinct? 
What if workplaces in S1 are moderately safer, but the quality of 
education is moderately worse?) When we think hard about the wel-
fare tradeoff between such options, we may conclude that the options 
are welfare-comparable—that one option does emerge as better, and 
the other as worse. But it is at least plausible to think that a signifi-
cant fraction of agency decisions involve incomparable, and thereby 
NBNW, alternatives. 
                                                                                                                  
 213. See Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND 
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 163, at 1-34 (defining and discussing incomparability); 
sources cited supra note 163 (same). 
 214. See Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND 
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 163, at 23-27 (concluding that the “small improvement” ar-
gument is a plausible argument for incomparability). 
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 Would this create a divergence with neoclassicism? Note that two 
options can be NBNW with respect to efficiency. Clearly, two options 
can be equally efficient; it also turns out that two options can be in-
comparably efficient. 215 On the other hand, the proportion of regula-
tory agency choices that are either equally efficient or incomparably 
efficient seems to be low.216 So it is at least plausible that many 
agency choices are NBNW with respect to overall welfare, but few 
agency choices are NBNW with respect to efficiency. 
 Imagine that two options are NBNW with respect to a particular 
moral criterion X* (where X* is the criterion of overall well-being, for 
the welfarist; and the criterion of efficiency, for the neoclassicist). 
How should the agency choose between the options? There may be 
some other criteria, X1, X2 . . . Xn, that possess moral force, and that 
the agency is charged with implementing. (That is, there may be 
other criteria not covered by a “partition” that effectively places them 
within the jurisdiction of legislatures, courts, or the taxing authori-
ties, and outside the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies). If so, the 
agency should choose the option that is better with respect to the ap-
plicable X1, X2 . . . Xn. 
 But it may be that no such X1, X2 . . . Xn exist; or (more likely), 
they may exist, but the option may also be NBNW with respect to the 
X1, X2 . . . Xn. In such a case, I suggest, the agency is free to choose at 
random between the options. It possesses moral discretion. Where an 
agency’s alternatives are NBNW with respect to the applicable moral 
criteria X*, X1 . . . Xn, the agency might as well decide between the 
alternatives by flipping a coin. This is clearly true when the options 
are equally good with respect to the X*, X1 . . . Xn; and it is also true 
(I have argued elsewhere) when the options are incomparably good 
with respect to the X*, X1 . . . Xn.217 If, for example, our beneficial me-
                                                                                                                  
 215. This is a result of the Scitovsky paradox. Take two outcomes O1 and O2 that in-
volve the paradox, that is, there is some redistribution from Winners to Losers in O1 that 
makes it Pareto -superior to O2, but there is also some redistribution from Winners to Lo s-
ers in O2 that makes it Pareto-superior to O1. Then, O1 and O2 are NBNW with respect to 
efficiency. However, they are not precisely equal with respect to efficiency, since there will 
typically be at least some O* that is efficient relative to O1, but not O2 (or vice versa). For 
example, create O* by taking each person’s holding of each good in O1 and increasing it 
slightly. That guarantees that O* is efficient relative to O1, but there could still be some 
redistribution in O2 that makes it Pareto -superior to O*. 
 216. Why do I say this? Cost-benefit analysis is closely related, if not equivalent, to 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and it is highly unusual for an agency performing cost-benefit 
analysis to conclude that one option has neither positive nor negative net benefits relative 
to another. 
 217. See Adler, supra note 63, at 1401-08. Amartya Sen makes this very claim: 
Some see completeness as a necessary requirement of consequential evaluation, 
but it is, of course, nothing of the sort. A consequentialist approach does involve 
the use of maximizing logic . . . [but] [m]aximization only requires that we do 
not choose an alternative that is worse than another that can be chosen in-
stead. If we cannot compare and rank two alternatives, then choosing either 
from that pair will fully satisfy the requirement of maximization. 
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teor can be used to help Phil’s or Pat’s emphysema, and the choice of 
one or the other would not affect the fair distribution of welfare 
(which would be true if, for example, poverty-line egalitarianism ob-
tained and both Phil and Pat were well above the poverty line) or 
perfectionist values, then the meteor-possessing agency is morally 
free to give the rock to either Phil or Pat. Either choice is morally 
permitted; neither is morally required or morally prohibited. 
 The upshot of this analysis is that welfarism may confer greater 
moral discretion upon agencies than neoclassicism. If, in practice, 
agency choices are rarely NBNW with respect to efficiency, then 
agencies rarely have moral discretion (within the framework of neo-
classicism).218 If, in practice, agency choices are frequently NBNW 
with respect to welfare, then agencies may frequently have moral 
discretion (within the framework of welfarism), depending upon the 
applicability and content of perfectionist, distributive, deontological, 
and other such supplementary moral criteria. 
4.   The Possibility of Paternalism? 
 Let me distinguish between weak and strong paternalism. 219 
Strong paternalism holds that persons can be made better off in the 
teeth of their preferences. That is, (1) P prefers S1 to S2, but nonethe-
less (2) S2 can be better for P’s welfare than S1. Weak paternalism 
holds that persons can be no better off notwithstanding the satisfac-
tion of their preferences. That is, (1) P prefers S1 to S2, but nonethe-
less (2) S1 can be no better for P’s welfare than S2.220 
 Neoclassicism denies both strong paternalism and weak paternal-
ism. This is easy to see. Neoclassicism incorporates an unrestricted 
preference-based view of well-being, which says that P is better off 
with S1, as compared to S2, just in case he prefers S1 to S2. If P does 
prefer S1 to S2, then—the neoclassicist concludes—he is better off 
with S1, not S2 (pace strong paternalism). The neoclassicist also con-
cludes that this is a real welfare improvement, rather than a case 
where S1 is not better than S2 for P (pace weak paternalism). 
                                                                                                                  
Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 40, at 940. 
 218. This is overstated: an outcome could be better than another with respect to effi-
ciency, while the second outcome is better with respect to X1, X2 . . . Xn, such that the out-
comes are NBNW with respect to the balance of X*, X1 . . . Xn and the agency has moral 
discretion on balance. Nonetheless, it seems correct to say that if choices are rarely NBNW 
with respect to X*, it is less likely that they will be NBNW with respect to X*, X1 . . . Xn. 
 219. For discussions of paternalism, see GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF AUTONOMY (1988); JOHN KULTGEN, AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTION: PARENTALISM IN 
THE CARING LIFE (1995); DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION (1986); and 
Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105 (1971). 
 220. See Feinberg, supra note 219 (distinguishing between “weak” and “strong” pater-
nalism). My distinction is quite different. 
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 Welfarism denies strong paternalism, but it admits weak pater-
nalism. This is pretty easy to see, too. Welfarism incorporates a so-
phisticated preferentialist view of well-being. This says (placing to 
one side, for now, the issue of restriction) that P is better off with S1, 
as compared to S2, just in case (1) P prefers S1, and (2) P would pre-
fer S1 under suitably idealized conditions. If P does prefer S1 to S2, 
then—even if he would prefer S2 under suitably idealized condi-
tions—he does not actually prefer S2 to S1, and he therefore cannot 
be made better off with S2. This shows the inconsistency between so-
phisticated preferentialism and strong paternalism. On the other 
hand, if P prefers S1 to S2 but would prefer S2 under idealized condi-
tions, then P is not made better off by S1. This shows how weak pa-
ternalism flows from sophisticated preferentialism. 
 An example may make the point clearer. P prefers sitcoms to op-
era but would prefer opera under suitably idealized conditions. The 
public television station’s decision to show opera instead of sitcoms 
does not make P better off, because he actually prefers sitcoms. So 
the strong paternalist view that P is a beneficiary of the station’s 
choice of opera is a mistake. Yet the fact that P actually prefers sit-
coms does not mean that he benefits if, instead of opera, the station 
chooses to broadcast sitcoms. After all, P’s idealized preference is in 
favor of opera. Sophisticated preferentialism gives equal weight to 
this idealized preference, along with P’s actual preference, in deter-
mining what improves his welfare. For the sophisticated 
preferentialist, neither programming choice is better for P’s welfare. 
P is not better off with the sitcom, nor is he better off with the opera, 
since the dual and conjunctive conditions for a welfare benefit—
actual preference satisfaction plus idealized preference satisfaction—
are not true of either option. Among other things, this dual and 
conjunctive account of welfare bears out weak paternalism.  
 What does this mean for regulatory agency policy? It means that 
the agency can (weakly) decide that some persons who believe them-
selves affected by an agency’s choice are actually unaffected. Persons 
who are counted as “Winners” or “Losers” under neoclassicism may 
become “Neutrals,” neither benefited nor harmed by the choice, and 
therefore ignored for purposes of evaluating that choice in light of 
overall well-being. Consider, as a plausible example, the laws prohib-
iting recreational use of drugs. 221 Persons who prefer drug use must 
be counted as Losers from an anti-drug policy within a neoclassical 
framework,222 but they may well be seen as Neutrals by the welfarist 
                                                                                                                  
 221. See generally DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS (1992) (presenting detailed 
philosophical argument against prohibition of recreational drug use). 
 222. More precisely, certain persons who prefer drug use must be counted as Losers 
from an antidrug policy, within a neoclassical framework. It is arguably consistent with 
that framework to say that drug addicts (persons whose preference for drug use is effec-
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(if she thinks they would disprefer drug use under idealized condi-
tions). 
 It also may mean, a bit more robustly, that where actual prefer-
ences are changing, agencies can rely upon idealized preferences as 
the sole criterion for determining an option’s welfare effect. Imagine 
that P now prefers S1 to S2, and that he will continue to prefer S1 if it 
is chosen by the agency; but he would change his mind and come to 
prefer S2 if that were chosen. Then, neoclassicism has no clear basis 
for determining which option benefits P. Here, it is neoclassicism 
which may well end up classifying P as a Neutral, while the welfarist 
could plausibly say that whatever option P would ideally prefer is the 
one that benefits him.223 In such a case (on a plausible specification of 
sophisticated preferentialism), P is a Winner with S1 if he ideally 
prefers S1, and P is a Winner with S2 if he ideally prefers S2. 
E.   Welfarism and Proceduralism: A Large Difference 
 The difference between welfarism and proceduralism is both lar-
ger and simpler than that between welfarism and neoclassicism. A 
proceduralist theory, by definition, accords intrinsic moral signifi-
cance to the decisionmaking procedures that regulators follow. A wel-
farist theory, by definition, does not. Imagine that a regulatory 
agency, or an executive or legislative body with authority over the 
agency, is making a threshold determination about which procedures 
the agency ought to employ. For simplicity, imagine that the regula-
tory agency has a large set of substantive options that are legally 
available to it (specifically, the options of issuing various legal direc-
tives, plus the option of issuing no directive), and that the threshold 
or procedural choice is a binary choice between Pi and Pj, where Pi 
and Pj are alternative possible routines that the agency could follow 
in choosing a substantive option. Pi could be cost-benefit analysis, 
regulatory negotiation, civic-republican deliberation, a familiar no-
tice-and-comment process followed by an intuitive judgment on the 
regulator’s part, or any other combination of standard or esoteric ac-
tions by the agency that would result in a particular substantive op-
tion. Pj could be any such procedure distinct from Pi. Then the welfa-
rist says this: Whether the agency or oversight body should choose Pi 
or Pj is wholly a function of which substantive options the two proce-
                                                                                                                  
tively coerced because their preference is grounded in the withdrawal symptoms and other 
suffering they anticipate if they stop using drugs) and persons whose preferences are in-
ternally conflicted are not Losers from an antidrug policy. However, the neoclassicist can-
not explain why the nonaddict who (without internal conflict) just likes drugs is not a 
Loser. 
 223. See Adler & Posner, supra note 205 (suggesting that agencies could look to fully 
informed preferences where actual preferences are changing). 
2000]  WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION 333 
 
dures can be expected to produce.224 Relatedly, if Pi and Pj can be ex-
pected to eventuate in the very same option, or in the very same slate 
of options with the very same probability assigned to each option, 
then Pi and Pj are morally identical. It would, in that case, be a mat-
ter of indifference which procedure is chosen at the threshold. 
 In short, for the welfarist, different procedures Pi and Pj should be 
understood as lotteries over substantive options (lotteries over possi-
ble regulatory directives). Welfarism provides a set of substantive 
criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn, where W* is overall well-being and each Xi 
is another moral criterion) for evaluating the substantive options. 
When fully specified, welfarism should also provide a theory of moral 
choice under uncertainty. That theory will specify how regulators or 
oversight bodies should choose between actions whose outcomes are 
uncertain, as a function of the criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn) plus the 
probability of each outcome that the action may produce. The thresh-
old procedural choice between Pi and Pj is a matter of predicting 
which substantive options (directives) the different procedures may 
produce, with which probabilities, and then applying the substantive 
criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn) together with the welfarist’s theory of 
choice under uncertainty. By contrast, the proceduralist claims the 
existence of some procedural criterion XP such that two procedures 
can differ with respect to XP, even though they are expected to pro-
duce the very same option (or the very same probabilistic slate of op-
tions). In the proceduralist’s eyes, the threshold choice between Pi 
and Pj should then depend, wholly or at least partly, on how Pi and Pj 
fare with respect to XP. 
 Proceduralism consists of a class of theories, each of which speci-
fies XP in different ways. The civic-republican proceduralist thinks 
that XP favors civic-republican deliberation. The pluralist procedural-
ist thinks that XP favors a process of interest bargaining between 
groups. The collaborative-governance proceduralist thinks that XP 
favors a certain kind of collaboration between affected parties. Each 
such theory gives substantial, if not conclusive, weight to the speci-
fied XP in determining procedural choices. The proceduralist does not 
(or need not) deny that outcomes can be evaluated, apart from the 
procedures that produce them. The proceduralist simply thinks that 
the threshold choice of procedures does not reduce to the evaluation 
of outcomes. So, given any welfarist theory (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn), that 
theory will be paired with a matching family of proceduralist theories 
(W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn, XP) that specify XP in different ways. The shift to a 
given welfarist theory from some proceduralist theory within the 
                                                                                                                  
 224. I am ignoring here (1) the direct costs of the two procedures, which may differ, 
and (2) the indirect effect that this procedural choice may have on other choices, for exam-
ple, future procedural choices. For simplicity, and to make the contrast with proceduralism 
as clear as possible, I have placed these issues to one side. 
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matching family simply involves abandoning any bedrock moral role 
for the favored procedural type XP. XP no longer constitutes a basic 
moral criterion. That shift has no implications for a choice between 
substantive regulatory options, but it clearly may have large implica-
tions for the threshold choice of procedures by regulators or by the 
executive or legislative bodies that oversee them. 
 All of this is very abstract. What, concretely, are the procedural 
implications of welfarism? Which procedures, in which context, are 
regulators required to adopt or to avoid? Answering these questions 
requires a specific view as to the substantive moral criteria (W*, X1, 
X2 . . . Xn) applicable to regulators. In this Article I have been dili-
gently noncommittal about such specifics, beyond claiming that the 
right view includes W* and is therefore welfarist. Assume that the 
only substantive criterion applicable to regulators is the criterion of 
overall well-being, either because utilitarianism is true (which seems 
implausible), or because other criteria obtain but have been “parti-
tioned” away from regulators (which is less implausible, but still 
doubtful). In that simple case, the appropriate procedure for the 
regulator or oversight body to choose, given the alternatives of Pi and 
Pj, or any threshold set of procedural alternatives, is the welfare-
maximizing procedure: the procedure such that the slate of outcomes 
it can be expected to produce is welfare maximizing, relative to the 
slate produced by alternative procedures. 
 Professor Eric Posner and I have elsewhere argued that the wel-
fare-maximizing procedure for regulatory agencies is often, although 
not always, the procedure of cost-benefit analysis. 225 Whether a given 
procedure is welfare maximizing, as against alternatives, depends on 
the set of substantive options to which the procedures will be applied. 
Posner and I claim that cost-benefit analysis is welfare maximizing, 
as against standardly proposed alternatives, except where the 
agency’s substantive options are skewed by wealth effects226—except 
where the Losers and Winners from some option, as against some 
other option, have significantly different wealth levels. If the Posner-
Adler claim is correct, and if the only moral criterion applicable to 
regulatory choices is the aggregate-welfare criterion, then regulators 
would do best, morally speaking, by employing cost-benefit analysis 
as the basic procedure for choice between (legally available) direc-
tives and other options, to be set aside only where wealth skews are 
large. 
 Again, however, there is serious reason to doubt that overall well-
being is the sole moral criterion applicable to regulatory choices. 
Even taking into account the role of other governmental institutions, 
                                                                                                                  
 225. See Adler & Posner, supra note 28. 
 226. Or where cost-benefit analysis is too expensive, given the small expected differ-
ence between the options with respect to overall well-being. 
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the set of criteria that bear upon regulatory options and, deriva-
tively, procedures will likely include not just the aggregate welfare 
criterion W*, but also one or more criteria Xi that are distributive, 
deontological, or perfectionist in form. Nor is there any reason to 
think that cost-benefit analysis is the morally best procedure, all 
things considered. There is no reason to think that—comparing now 
the probabilistic slate of options that cost-benefit analysis can be ex-
pected to produce to the probabilistic slate of options that each alter-
native feasible procedure can be expected to produce—the first slate 
will be better in light of a fuller set of moral criteria including at 
least one distributive, deontological, or perfectionist Xi in addition to 
W*. For example, there is no reason to think that cost-benefit analy-
sis tracks how options fare with respect to distributive criteria, or 
how options fare with respect to distributive criteria, as balanced 
against the criterion of overall well-being. At least Posner and I see 
no such reason. However, we do make a weaker claim, which is addi-
tional to the basic assertion that cost-benefit analysis is welfare 
maximizing. We claim that cost-benefit analysis is one component of 
the procedure that is morally best, all things considered.227 Given 
whatever fuller set of welfarist criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn) is applica-
ble to regulatory choices, the morally best procedure in light of that 
set will include cost-benefit analysis as a distinct part. 
 The idea is this: The morally best procedure for regulators in light 
of (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn) will start with a serial evaluation of the options, 
first in light of W*, then in light of each Xi; and it will then move on 
to some kind of balancing of the different criteria in case no option is 
best in light of all of them. But the best way to evaluate options in 
light of W* is to perform cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis 
should be performed at that initial stage of the morally best proce-
dure where agencies are attempting to determine how options fare 
with respect to W*. It is not a means for determining how options 
fare with respect to the Xi, nor for the latter-stage balancing, if that 
becomes necessary. 
 Posner and I could well be incorrect in making the basic claim 
that cost-benefit analysis is welfare maximizing. In addition, even if 
we are correct in that claim, we could be quite wrong to advance the 
additional (and much more speculative) assertion that cost-benefit 
analysis is a component of the procedure that regulators would do 
best to follow, once distributive, perfectionist, and deontological cri-
teria are brought into play alongside welfare maximization. It could 
be the case that regulatory negotiation, not cost-benefit analysis, is 
the welfare-maximizing procedure. For example, if agencies can be 
                                                                                                                  
 227. Assuming wealth skews are not too large and cost-benefit analysis is not too ex-
pansive. 
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predicted to make lots of mistakes in the application of cost-benefit 
analysis, or to regularly distort it to their own ends, then the over-
sight body making a threshold choice between cost-benefit analysis 
and other procedures has reason to think that the slate of options 
produced by cost-benefit analysis will not be welfare maximizing. Or 
it could be the case that civic-republican deliberation, collaborative 
governance or for that matter pluralist interest-bargaining, is the 
morally best procedure once distributive, perfectionist, and deonto-
logical criteria are brought into play. 
 My point in this article is not to repeat or bolster the Adler-Posner 
case for cost-benefit analysis, but rather to bolster the implicit Adler-
Posner claim about how cost-benefit analysis should be evaluated. 
Cost-benefit analysis should not be rejected as a regulatory or gov-
ernmental procedure merely because it lacks the participatory or de-
liberative features favored by civic republicans, pluralists, and other 
proceduralists. Evaluating regulatory procedures means first specify-
ing a substantive moral framework (one that includes at least W*) 
and then making an empirical assessment of the tendency of differ-
ent procedures to produce better or worse outcomes or lotteries of 
outcomes in light of that substantive framework. Regulators could 
still be morally required to do what the proceduralist claims, but if 
they are, it will be because the favored procedure tends to maximize 
overall welfare, distribute welfare fairly, increase overall perfection, 
and induce regulatory compliance with deontological norms. That is 
what those scholars who commend participatory or deliberative pro-
cedures, as against (say) cost-benefit analysis, now need to show. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Any plausible moral theory of regulation will give a substantial 
role to human welfare. What distinguishes theories, of course, is 
what precise role welfare plays, and how specifically that concept is 
analyzed. I have appropriated the term “welfarist” (perhaps unfairly) 
to denote a particular theory or, more exactly, a particular family of 
regulatory theories. This family of theories offers a mixed answer to 
various conceptual and normative questions crucial to moral evalua-
tion. 
 A welfarist theory draws a conceptual link between preference 
and welfare, but falls short of equating welfare and preference-
satisfaction. The theorists I have described as “neoclassicists” stipu-
late that one outcome benefits some person, as compared to another 
outcome, if and only if the person prefers the first outcome. By con-
trast, the welfarist asserts that an outcome must satisfy a more com-
plicated set of conditions to be welfare-enhancing; it must be not only 
preferred, but ideally preferred, and both sets of preferences need to 
be appropriately “restricted” so as to exclude moral and other disin-
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terested preferences. (This is the view of welfare I have called “so-
phisticated preferentialism.”228) 
 Welfarists also offer a mixed answer to the question, What is the 
moral significance of aggregate or overall well-being? Utilitarians 
view well-being as morally conclusive: the morally required choice, in 
any choice situation, is that choice whose outcomes maximize overall 
well-being. Other moral theories give zero weight to overall well-
being; consider a wholly egalitarian theory that requires actors al-
ways to choose that option which best promotes the equality of well-
being, or a “minimalist” theory that merely enjoins them to comply 
with certain deontological requirements and otherwise leaves actors 
morally unconstrained.229 By contrast with egalitarians and minimal-
ists, welfarists claim that overall well-being has some weight in 
moral evaluation; by contrast with utilitarians, welfarists may also 
accord moral weight to other criteria, such as distributive, perfection-
ist, or deontological criteria.230 
 Welfarism, as I have defined it, does not generally specify which 
moral criteria, apart from aggregate welfare, possess moral weight. 
In other words, a moral theory is “welfarist” if it adopts a sophisti-
cated preferentialist view of welfare and if it sets forth a group of 
moral criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn), where W* is the criterion of overall 
well-being and the Xi are other criteria.231 I have placed only two re-
strictions on the content of the Xi: first, that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
is not an Xi; and second, that no Xi is a procedural criterion, a crite-
rion in light of which regulatory outcomes identical but for the regu-
latory procedures that produced them can fare differently. In short, 
welfarists do not accord intrinsic moral significance to regulatory 
procedure or to the pursuit of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
 I have defined welfarism in this way so as to differentiate welfa-
rist theories from the two types of theories that have dominated legal 
scholarship about regulation: neoclassical theories and proceduralist 
theories. Neoclassicists equate welfare with preference satisfaction 
and accord moral weight to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency rather than over-
all well-being; proceduralists incorporate one or another procedural 
criterion into their moral theories. The family of welfarist theories, 
by definition, does not overlap either with the family of neoclassical 
theories or with the family of proceduralist theories. 
                                                                                                                  
 228. See supra Sectio n II.C.2. 
 229. See supra Section IV.B. 
 230. See supra Section IV.C. 
 231. The welfarist is not required to set forth criteria (X1, X2 . . . Xn) independent of W*. 
Utilitarianism, which specifies W* as the sole moral criterion, also counts as a kind of wel-
farism. However, as I have explained, it seems unlikely that utilitarianism is the correct 
moral theory. See supra text accompanying note 168. 
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 This Article has argued in favor of welfarism, 232 and against neo-
classicism and proceduralism. 233 I have also suggested that welfarism 
is closer in spirit to neoclassicism than it is to proceduralism. 234 Wel-
farists, like neoclassicists, reject objectivist, hedonic, and other non-
preferentialist accounts of well-being; like neoclassicists, welfarists 
believe that some aggregative measure, linked to welfare (be it Kal-
dor-Hicks efficiency or overall well-being) must play a role in moral 
evaluation; and, like neoclassicists, welfarists deny that governmen-
tal procedures are morally significant per se.235 Law-and-economics 
scholars and others who adopt a neoclassical view are mistaken, but 
not dramatically so. The moral theory of regulation proposed by law-
and-economists is salvageable, rather than fundamentally flawed, 
and I have tried to show here what the appropriate modifications to 
that theory are. 
 
                                                                                                                  
 232. See supra Sections II.C.2, IV.A-B. 
 233. See supra Parts II, III. 
 234. See supra Sectio n IV.D-E. 
 235. This last statement is a bit imprecise. Given my definition of “neoclassicism,” a 
neoclassicist could include a procedural criterion in his theory, but he is not required to do 
so. 
